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University of California General Library/Berkeley 

Regional Oral History Office 

Frank Bane 

An Interview Conducted by 
James R.W. Leiby 


Picture on page following: 

Frank Bane 

Chairman, Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations, 
Washington 1963 



All uses of this manuscript are covered by an agree 
ment between the Regents of the University of California 
and Prank Bane, dated 15 February 1965. The manuscript 
is thereby made available for research purposes. All 
literary rights in the manuscript, including the right 
to publish, are reserved to the General Library of the 
University of California at Berkeley. No part of the 
manuscript may be quoted for publication without the 
written permission of the University Librarian of the 
University of California at Berkeley. 

These things I saw, and 
part of them I was 

Virgil, Aeneid. Book II, 11. 5-6 


The Regional Oral History Office was established 
to document the recent history of our society by means 
of tape recorded interviews with persons who have been 
significant in that history. Such a person is Prank 
Bane, whose contributions and participation in the 
development of public welfare programs and concepts 
and public administration techniques make him a prime 
mover in that field. When Associate Professor of 
Social Welfare James R.W. Leiby proposed that he 
interview Frank Bane for the oral history collection, 
the plan was accepted with enthusiasm and arrange 
ments were made to record and transcribe the sessions 
with financial assistance from the Institute of Social 
Sciences of the University. 

Professor Leiby organized and conducted five 
tape recorded sessions with Frank Bane during January 
1965 while Professor Bane was at the University 
serving as a Regents Professor. Transcribing and 
editorial work was then done by the Regional Oral 
History Office, after which the transcript was 
mailed to Professor Bane for his corrections and 
approval. He went over the manuscript carefully, 
making many small corrections of detail or wording 
but leaving the transcript basically unchanged. 
The following manuscript is copied from his 
edited version. 


The reader is referred to the catalog of the 
oral history collection for other interviews on 
public welfare and public administration. The 
Regional Oral History Office is under the admin 
istrative supervision of Professor A. Hunter Dupree, 
director of the Bancroft Library. 

Willa K. Baum, 
Head, Regional Oral 
History Office 

Room 486 The General Library 
University of California 
Berkeley, California 
September, 1965 



I first heard of Prank Bane in I960 when I was 
working on a history of public welfare in New Jersey, 
I had found it difficult to see how the various 
agencies at work there fitted into a pattern. Then, 
as I followed the historical record, I came across a 
report on the subject, made to the Governor and pub 
lished in 1949, by Mr. Bane and Geoffrey May. The 
analysis was so clear that I immediately looked 
these gentlemen up and found out that Bane was the 
executive of the Council of State Governments and 
Hay was an associate of his. I also learned that 
Bane had been secretary of the Virginia State Board 
of Charities and Corrections beginning in 1920, 
that he had later reorganized that department and 
also the welfare department of Knoxville, Tennessee, 
in the 1920*3, and that in the momentous decade 
that followed he had become the first executive of 
the American Public Welfare Association, the Social 
Security Board, and the Council of State Govern 

I learned much more about Mr. Bane and his 
works in the next few years, and so when he was 
appointed Regents Professor last fall, [1964] 
available to students and faculty, I arranged an 


interview. My thought was simply that he might fill me 
in on the history of services in New Jersey, on which I 
had written, by this time, a hefty manuscript. Sure 
enough, he not only knew most of the people who figured 
in my story, but he knew where they had come from and 
where they went later; he could put characters and 
events in a broad context that was fascinating and 
instructive. It struck me that few people saw the 
big picture as well as he. Accordingly I arranged to 
tape a series of interviews with him about his career 
in public welfare and public administration, as a 
venture in oral history. 

The setting was his office, a penthouse on Barrows 
Hall with a splendid view of the lower campus and the 
bay. The (laughter) recorded in the transcript is a 
pale reflection of the genial mood and comic insights 
of Mr. Bane's stories, and type does not convey his 
charming Southern speech and manners. 

The Institute of Social Sciences of the University 
of California at Berkeley paid a part of the cost of 
the transcribing and editing done by the skilled staff 
of the Regional Oral History Office. 

James H.W. Leiby 
Associate Professor 
Department of Social 

September, 1965 
University of California 
Berkeley, California 


from Who's Who, 

Executive Director Council of State Governments; born 
Smithfitld, Virginia, April 7 t 1893; eon of Charles lee 
and Carrie Howard (Buckner) Bane; A.B., Randolph-Macon 
College, 1914; student at Columbia University, 1914-15; 
married Lillian Greyson Hoofnagle, August 14, 1918; 
children Mary Clark, Frank. 

Principal high school Nansemond County, Virginia, 
1914. superintendent of schools, 1916-17; secretary 
Virginia State Board of Charities and Corrections, 1920- 
23; director of Public Welfare Knoxville, Tennessee, 
1923-26, associate professor of sociology, University of 
Virginia, 1926-28; commissioner of public welfare, 
Virginia, 1926-32; member of the President's Emergency 
Employment Commission, 1930-31; director of the American 
Public Welfare Association, 1932-35; lecturer in public 
welfare administration, University of Chicago, since 
1932; general consultant to the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration, 1933; consultant on public welfare ad 
ministration, National Institute of Public Administration, 
1930, Brookings Institute, 1931-35; executive director of 
Federal Social Security Board, 1935-38; director of the 
Division of State and Local Cooperation; advisory commis 
sion of the Council of National Defense, 1940-41; member 
of civilian protection board, Office Civilian Defense, 1941; 
director of field operations, Office of Price Administra 
tion, 1941-42; homes utilization division, National Housing 
Authority, 1942; secretary-treasurer Governors' Conference, 
since 1938; executive director Council of State Governments 
since 1938. 

Served as cadet-pilot Aviation Corps, U.S. Army, World 
War I. Member American Political Science Association, Phi 
Kappa Sigma. Democrat. Methodist. 

Club: Quadrangle 

Contributor to various magazines. 



PREFACE, by Willa Klug Baum 1 

INTRODUCTION, by James R.W. Leiby ill 

PRANK BANE, from Who's Who v 



CORRECTIONS, 1920-1923 6 

WELFARE, 1926-1932 24 

TENNESSEE, 1923-1926 56 




National Conference of Social Work 93 

Hiring Social Workers 97 

Consulting in Public Administration 103 


National Conference of Social Work and Public 

Welfare Officials 111 

Organizing and Financing the Association 115 


Emergency Relief 122 

Reconstruction Finance Corporation 123 

State Emergency Relief Programs 125 

Committee on Economic Security 149 

Private vs. Public Relief Agencies 150 

Direct or Work Relief 161 

Continuing Activities of the Association 172 


A Survey of European Institutions 176 

Appointed Executive Director 180 

Administrative Organization 187 

State Plans 203 

Problems in Particular States 211 

Field Offices and Service 219 

Leaving the Social Security Board 226 

Reflections on Policy and Administration 228 
Reflections on Policy and Administration. 

(Continued) 232 


Organizing the Council 244 

Mobilizing State Governments for War 256 

Official Positions During the War 270 

Post War Activities of the Council 272 

Mental Health Study 272 

Other Activities: Study of State Purchasing 276 



(Interview of January 5, 1965) 

Leiby: I know from Who's Who that 7012 were born in 
Smithfield, Virginia, in 1893, and that you 
graduated from Randolph-Mae on College in 1914. 
What was the curriculum you studied at Randolph- 

Bane: As you know it was a typieal, small, four-year 

liberal arts college. But I specialized, to the 
extent that we did specialize in those days, in 
political science: and history. The same profes 
sor, in those days, taught both political science 
and history. We had a faculty of about a dozen 
people and a student body of approximately a 
hundred seventy-five or eighty. Se the faculty 
members teamed up occasionally. 

Leiby: This was in relation to your thought that you 
would become a lawyer? 

Bane: Probably. But also because of my interest in 
political science as I knew it in those days. 
As a matter of fact we used to call it political 

- 2 - 

Bane: economy in the early teens. 

Leiby: Then you went to Columbia through the reeoamenda- 
tion of your friend. 

Bane: Yea. I went to Columbia in 1914-15. I went up 
there with the idea of getting a at art in law. 

Leiby: Were you in the law school? 

Bane: Yes, I was in the law school. The dean of 
the law school at that time was an old friend 
of yours, George W. Kirohwey. He not only was 
the dean of the law sehool but he also taught. 
He taught real property. In fact he had written 
a book called, Heal Property. 

Leiby: And he taught criminal law. 

Bane: He also taught criminal law. 

Leiby: Do you remember what courses you had at Columbia? 

Bane: I took mostly law but in addition thereto, 
beeause I like the individual and I was casually 
interested in what he was doing, I audited courses 
that were taught by Professor Edward T. Devine. He 
was teaching social welfare administration and 
general administration. I did that, as I recall, 
largely at the suggestion of Dean Kirohwey. 

Leiby: What was the suggestion? 

Bane: I met Professor Devine at Dean Kirchwey'a house. 
And we had discussed what he was doing and what 
my interests were. So Kirchwey suggested to me 
one day that I might be interested in sitting in 
in Devine' a courses. Which I did upon occasions. 

Leiby: What sort of lecturer was Derine? Did he have 
formal lectures? 

Bane: Yes, he had formal lectures. But he also had 
seminars. I remember one seminar that he had, 
whieh was entitled, "Where Does Tour Prejudice 
Start?" He would ask a series of questions 
and then some hands would begin to go up. That's 
the kind of a lecturer he was. 

Leiby: Do you remember any of the students? 

Bane: Ne. I remember a number of the visiting professors 
that used to come in on occasion, and meet with 
the class or talk with the seminar. 

Leiby: John Ellis was there about that time. He was a 

high school teacher. He was in history. He worked 
with James Shotwell. 

Bane: Shotwell and Charles Hacea were the great history 
professors there at that time. 

Leiby: He went then and taught high school in Bigelwood, 

- 4 - 

Leiby: New Jersey. You went back and taught school then 
in Virginia. 

Bane: Yea. I was principal of a rural high school in 
Nanaemond County, Virginia for a year. And then 
I became Superintendent of Schools in Nansemead 

Leiby: Had you given up the law more or less? 

Bane: At least, 1 had deferred the law. I had gone 

into teaching because, in those days, those were 
the jobs that were immediately available. So I 
started in teaching. I went on to Superintendent 
of Schools. I was enjoying it. And then the 
war came along and I went in the army. When I 
came back I went back into teaching. 

Leiby: Did you get overseas? 

Bane: No, I didn't. 

Leiby: What did you do in the army? 

Bane: T he closest I got to overseas was Langley field. 
I fought most of the war in Kelly field, Texas. 

Leiby: Yeu weren't in the air corps, were you? 

Bane: In the air corps. But, technically , not in the air 
corps because there was no air corps. The air was 
a division of the signal corps in 1917. We did 

- 5 - 

Bane: observation, primarily* I was sent to the 
University of Teras for ground schooli work, 
then I went to Kelly Field. And there I stayed, 
and stayed, and stayed. I even became an instruo. 
tor in engines for a short time* (Laughter) 
Ini November, 1918 they transferred us to Langley 
Field, Virginia, to get ready to go overseas. 
The armistice came and within ten days of 
the armistice we were all mustered out. I 
went back to the Nansemond County school system. 

- 6 - 



Leiby: When was your first acquaintance with welfare 
work in Virginia? 

Bane: My first acquaintance with welfare work in 

Virginia was a casual acquaintance, primarily be 
cause of my acquaintance with two gentlemen 
who, had been involved in welfare work in 
Virginia for many years, Dr. Samuel C Hatcher 
who was Vice-President of Randolph-Mac on College 
while I was there ( he was Chairman of the State 
Board of Charities and Correct ions) and Dr. J.P. 
Mastin who was a friend of Dr. Hatcher's. I had 
met him at Dr. Hatcher's house on the campus at 
Ashland. But my acquaintance with each of those 
gentlemen was casual. One day I got a tele 
phone call from Dr. Mastin, who was Secretary of 
the State Board of Charities and Corrections, 
asking me to meet him in Norfolk, Virginia, about 
twenty miles from Suffelk, where I was Super- 

- 7 - 

Bane: intendent of Schools in Nansemond County. I 
went down to see him, having no Idea what he 
wanted* The upshot of the matter was that 
he told me that he was going to retire, since he 
was past sixty-five years of age. He had dis 
cussed the matter with the State Board of Chari 
ties and Corrections, had cleared it with the 
governor, and he offered me the job of Secretary 
of the State Board of Charities and Corrections 
on the ground that 1 had had some little training 
with Dr. Devine at Columbia University. 1 knew 
something about the problem. And also I'd been 
with Dean Kirchwey. 

Leiby: Then the job really came to you. 

Bane: Yes. It was a complete surprise. 

Leiby: And, at that time, you had no idea of going into 
welfare administration. And then you said you'd 
consider it, I suppose. 

Bane: Yes. I said I'd consider it. "I had to go back and 
talk it over with Mrs. Bane. And I'd let him know 
within a week." I went home and talked it over with 
Mrs. Bane. We had come from Richmond originally 
that is, she had so we decided to take the job and 

- 8 - 

Bane: to go back. 

Leibyt What did Dr. Mas tin tall you about the job? 

Bane: He told me what the State Board of Charities 

and Corrections was. I knew, in general, what 
their duties and responsibilities were* He 
elaborated on it, And he told me, in addition, 
that he thought the time had come in Virginia 
to expand the welfare activities beyond the cur 
rent duties and responsibilities of the State 
Board of Charities and Corrections. As I 
remember, he said, "That being so, I think we 
nee-d a younger man." 

I asked him if I should take the job 
would he stick around for two or three months 
until I got my feet on the ground, until I 
learned the ropes, which he agreed to do. 
He did, which was an enormous help to me in get- 
ting started. In those days, the State Board of 
Charities and Corrections was what might be cal 
led an inspection agency. It had no responsibil 
ity for any institutions or any agencies. It 
had the right to inspect and we talked about the 
right to supervise, but supervise in a very loose 

- 9 - 

Bane: fashion. 

Laiby: Supervise men? Inspect? 

Bane: Inspect and report. What we did was to inspect 
and report to the legislature, to the Governor, and, 
from time to time, to the local officials and to the 
press. The Board was charged with seeing to it 
that the institutions and agencies in the welfare 
field in Virginia were conducted in an effective 
and efficient and humane manner. 

Leiby: Now who did the inspecting, did you? 

Bane: I did and we had four or five people on the staff. 
We had a staff, altogether, including stenographers 
and so on, of eight or ten people. 

Leiby: That's a fairly substantial organization. 

Bane: Yes. We had three persons, other than myself, who 
traveled around the state, primarily to the county 
courthouses, inspecting jails, alms houses; and 
also traveled all over the state inspecting private 
institutions for the mentally ill, state institutions, 
reformatories, industrial schools, etc. 

Leiby: Did the Board members themselves inspect very much? 

Bane: She Board members tried once a year to make a tour 
of the major state institutions. We used to set 

- 10 - 

Bane: aside four or five days, take two oars, get 
out on the then gravel roads, and drive from 
Staunton to Williamsburg and from Williamsburg 
to Piedmont and around the state where the 
institutions were located 

Leiby: Hew many Board members were there? 

Bane: Five. 

Leibyt Had they been in office for some time? 

Bane: Many of them had been in office for years. Dr. 
Samuel C. Hatcher had been on the Board for many 
years. Dr. W.F. Drewry, who was a medical doctor 
whose interest was primarily in mental health, had 
been on the Board for many years. H* was a very in 
teresting person. He had been enormously interested 
in general welfare, as well as his specific field. 
He was Superintendent of the Central State Hospital 
in Virginia for a great many years, which was a 
hospital for the colored insane at Petersburg. Then 
he was on the Board for a while. Then, later, when 
we reorganized the Department of Welfare, he got 
off the Board because the Board, for all intents 
and purposes, ceased to exist. 

Leibyt This was after you came on? Was this 1923? 

- 11 - 

Bane: This was 1926.. I came on in 1921. I persuaded him 
to come with the Board aa a member of the staff 
to help us Bet up mental health clinics. 

Leiby: Won't you say something else about the relation of 
the Board to private agencies. It inspected lecal 
public agencies and reported on them, was there any 
difficulty in reporting? Were your reports mueh 
read or resented? 

Bane: There was not as much difficulty as I would have 
liked. I should have been perfectly delighted to 
trade mere attention for more difficulty. I mean 
by that that we got into some controversies, but, in 
the early days, we were not strong enough to be 
strongly resented, shall I say. That changed 
after a while with reorganizations. We would 
submit reports, and unless the report got into 
the newspapers and caused some kind of a scandal, 
everybody pursued the even tenor of their ways* 

Ieiby: How did you pick your inspectors? I guess you in 
herited some of them. 

Bane: I inherited the three people when I 

went there. And thereafter we picked them on a 
very interesting basis. I hasten to say we never 
had, while I was there, any major political pree- 

- 12 - 

Bane: aura with respect to the selection of our staff. 
When I say major I mean from the governors, I 
worked with four of them, or from state legis 
lators. We might have a suggestion from 
individual people around the state, which we 
took or not as we pleased. Bat this is the 
way we selected our people. There was a man 
named Arthur W. James, who is now in Richmond. 
He was approximately my age and he'd gone to 
William and Mary College. H e also had an edu 
cational background. I talked with him 
about being my chief assistant. He was 
interested. So we made a deal. He would come 
with me as my chief assistant provided he would 
go to Harvard for six months and take a course 
specifically in the general welfare area. 
We would pay him half of his salary while he 
was at Harvard. So Arthur James went to Harvard 
and took this course and came back. 

Leiby: Was that in the School of Public Administration? 

Bane: Yes. It was just getting started. 

Then he came back with us. And years later he 
succeeded me. He is still in Richmond with 

- 13 - 

Bane: the Department of Conservation and Development. 

Leiby: Could you say something about the relation of the 
State Board to private agencies? 

Bane: In the early days, before the first reorganization 
into the Welfare Department, the State Board had 
very little oonnection with private agencies, of 
ficially. We associated with them constantly. 

I was on the board of the Associated Charities 
in Richmond, Virginia. It was the private social 
work organization in Richmond. The Associated 
Charities later became the Family Welfare Society, 
and then later the Family Service Society. 

Leiby: Were there very many private agencies in Virginia? 

Bane: Richmond and Norfolk and Roanoke each had an As 
sociated Charities organization, ^hey were small, 
three or four people. They had small appropriations. 
But they were getting away from the old-fashioned 
poor relief concept* 

Leiby: There was a professional school of social work in 

Bane: Yes. It was run by a Dr. Hibbs. He was a Fh.D, 
He operated the school first as an independent 
school, then it became associated with William and 
Mary. It is now a definite branch of William 

- 14 - 

Bane: and Mary. 

Leiby: Kow large was the school at that time? 

Bane: It was a sizable school. I would guess it had 

about a hundred people mostly from the South 
Virginia, North Carolina, 

Leiby: It trained social workers. Where did it market 
its product? 

Bane: Primarily in the private social agencies in 

Virginia and North Carolina, at that time* That 
is, in the early 1920s. The market expanded 
greatly in the late 1920s. 

Leiby: I'd like to ask about the connection between the 
members of the State Board and private agencies 
in Virginia? In New Jersey the State Board people 
are characteristically very much associated with 
private agencies and they exercise a kind of super 
vision over local public agencies 9 or they sought to, 

Bane: The same thing, to some extent, existed in Virginia, 
particularly through the State Conference of Social 
Work, which had been started by Dr. Mast in im 
mediately before the First World War, around 1914- 
15* They had this annual meeting, all the 
private agencies and all the public agencies get 
together. The private agencies, of course, 

- 15 - 

Bane: were a great source of support for this developing 
public agency* One day I almost lost all of 
their support by attempting to be brief, concise, 
and, perhaps, even cute. Before a legislative 
committee one time, one disagreeable member of 
the committee kept insisting that he didn't know 
what welfare was. And, finally, he asked me the 
specific question, "Just what was a welfare com 
missioner? 1 * On the basis of my almost total 
inexperience, I said, "A welfare commissioner was 
a general counsel for the crazy, the crooked, and 
the broke." (Laughter) Whereupon I almost lost 
all of my social work support in the state. It took me al 
most a year to live that down. 

Leiby: What were the main interests of this State Board 
of Charities and Corrections in those days? You 
said they were interested in helping public wel 

Bane: Their major interest was in doing something about 
local institutions, on the one hand, the jail and 
the alms house. That was definite and specific. 
And, secondly, about devising schemes or plans or 
programs, or providing facilities which would en- 

Bane: able them to do two or three things that were 
very much in the public mind: 
1) Get children out of jails, where they were 
held pending trial; 2) Expand the juvenile 
court system; 3) Abolish, to the extent that 
they could, the local county alms houses and 
establish regional institutions for what were 
then e ailed the aged and the infixnu 

Leiby: Now this program would put them in some sort 
of opposition to the local public officials, 
wouldn't it? 

Bane: In certain areas, but not in the particular 

area that I mentioned. Sheriffs would be glad 
if they could get children out of jail. 

Leiby: There were lots of vagrants, but not serious 
criminals . 

Bane: Yes, that's true* The overseers of the poor 

were not powerful, politically. They probably 
made $250 a year or something of that kind. 
They didn't do anything much. But, later, when 
we got into another matter having to do with 
local institutions we had a direct, powerful, 
and for many years a successful opposition of 

- 17 - 

Bane: local officials, namely sheriffs, when we tried 
to abolish the fee system. 

Leibyj When was the fee system abolished? 

Bane: ^he fee system wasn't abolished until quite a 

number of years after I left probably in 1935-36. 
They started to abolish it by a gradual development 
in 1926, after the so-called Byrd reorganization. 
But it took eight or ten years to grow out of it. 

Tear after year when 1 was with the Welfare 
Department, we would introduce a bill to abolish 
the fee system and put all sheriffs on a salary 
basis. And year after year, in the first few 
years that I was there, the bill was bottled up 
in committee. The last two or three years it 
got out on the floor to be defeated. But that 
meant progress. A. few years later they 
passed it. 

Leiby: It seems then that the Virginia Board, in a way, 
sort of stood between the people in the private 
agencies and the local public people. That is, 
you had something that you wanted to do with the 
local public agencies* And the ideas of what 
you wanted to do came mostly from the private 

- 18 - 

Leiby; agencies. 

Bane: To a very large extent the private agencies 
were doing the experimenting, the demon 
strating, the promoting, and the urging of 
governmental expansion. Notable among the 
private agencies, in addition to Associated 
Charities, was a developing movement, which 
was brand new in Virginia, of what was called 
the Community Chest; federated agencies in a 
given city; Richmond, Norfolk, and Roanoke 
were the three that had them at that time. 

Leiby: In the 1920s already Richmond, Norfolk, and 
Roanoke had federated financing. 

Bane: They were just beginning to develop. 

Leiby: What would you say were the characteristic 
interests of politicians in welfare in 
Virginia? We hear in the history of public 
welfare a great deal about politics and 
my understanding is that politics was 
less important in Virginia than in other 

Bane: In the general welfare field in Virginia, 

- 19 - 

Bane: while I was there, and I'm reasonably certain 
it exists to a large extent even now, politics 
did not play any great part in the welfare 
field. So far as state government was con 
cerned, they thought about the welfare field 
as including the hospitals for the mentally ill, 
the tubercular sanitoria, and the industrial 
schools and so on. The state, as an agency, 
that is the Governor and the state legislators, 
didn't bother much about local welfare one way 
or another. They left that largely to the 
boards of supervisors in the counties because 
there was no political pay-off in being over 
seer of the poor. So far as the penal or de 
linquent end of it was concerned, the sheriff 
was an elected official. He carried his own 
weight and looked after himself, very well, in 
cidentally. The only time the state as such got 
involved was when something like the fee system 
argument would come up. Then the sheriffs 
would descend on Richmond en masse and defeat 
any bill that we would introduce. (Laughter) 

- 20 - 

Lei/by: Then the operation of the spoils system, the 
letting of jobs and contracts, was not really 
very worthwhile. It wasn't worth enough for 
them to care about. 

Bane: That's right. 

Leiby: You were interested, of course, in administration 
and services on the State Board. You wanted a 
professional administration, more service oriented 
sort of operation. At what points would this 
bring you into difficulties with the local pol 

Bane: They would usually say, H We are, too, but we 

don't have the facilities or the money. If you 
get us the money to do this we'll do anything 
that you say, if you pay for it." That was the 
usual, eternal, and ever-lasting argument against 
any particular project. We would say, on the 
other hand, "It doesn't take much money to clean 
this jail up. What you need is soap and water 
and elbow grease." That was our constant 
argument there. We would insist that the ever- 
lasting *or of disinfectant in all jails was per 
so a confession of bad housekeeping. So our job 

- 21 - 

Banet waa to clean up the jails, aside from getting 
children out of jails* Finally, we 
developed a definite program in welfare depart 
ments to abolish local jails. We stumped all 
over the state to abolish local jails as a 
place to keep convicted misdemeanors. We have 
to have the jails to hold witnesses and to 
hold people overnight. But once a person was 
convicted, we urged that they be taken out of 
jail and sent to regional farms, and a number 
were established in Virginia, where they could 
serve out their sixty or ninety days at least 
doing something. 

Leibyt These were called farms? We called those 
penitentiaries . 

Bane: These were farms. They just handled misde 

Leiby: Drunks? 

Bane: Drunks and people of that kind. And they were 
established by agreement and participation of 
the local units. 

Leiby: Which is to say counties. 

Bane: The counties and the cities. Per instance, 
Richmond had a local farm which we finally 

- 22 - 

Bane: established there, which alao took care of 
the prisoners from Henri** and Chesterfield 
Counties, by agreement. But they were not 
state institutions. They were local in 

Leiby: These were regional*, now, wh financed them? 

Bane: The counties and the cities. They financed 

certain aspects of them. Of course, the 
state paid for all prisoners in jail on the 
fee system basis. When a person went to jail, 
for whatever purpose, if he was just picked up 
or if he was sentenced or held as a witness, 
the state, on a fee basis, paid the cost of 
his care in jail. -And, therefore, the more 
persons a sheriff had in jail, the more 
money he got. 

Leiby: I always thought it was the county taxpayers. 

Bane: No sir. In Virginia the sheriff was a state 
officer. Elected locally, but a state 
constitutional officer. 

Leiby: In other words the state treasury paid the 
fees of everybody in jail* 

Bane: Yes. So the more persons a sheriff had in jail 

- 23 - 

Bane: the more he made. Hence his opposition to the 
abolition of the fee system, until they worked 
out a scheme years later to pay him a salary, a 
little bit more than he got in fees. 

Leiby: In New Jersey sheriffs would get $10,000-115,000 
a year, from their fees* 

Bane: That was the situation in Virginia. One of 

the beat paid state officials in Virginia when X 
was there, if not the best, was the eity sergeant 
in the city of Richmond* It was the largest jail 
in the largest eity. 

Leiby: A real plum. (Laughter) 

Bane: A real plum, yes indeed. 

?ittt* a 



WELFARE, 1926-1932 

Leiby: When you went into the State Department, there 
was a real reorganization. When you became 
Secretary of the State Board of Charities and 
Corrections, you developed these extramural 
agencies and did quite a let in that line, both 
for mental hygiene clinics and probation and 
parole* The idea of these, as I understand it, 
is connected with prevention and rehabilitation. 
Can you say something about who was specifically 
interested in these ideas. Who was promoting 
these things? 

Bane: We mentioned, a few moments ago, the State 

Conference of Seeial Work in Virginia, which was 
the organization where the public and private 
organizations and agencies worked together and 
developed programs, suggestions, resolutions, 
and so on. So the State Conference of Social 
Work recommended to the then governor, Westmoreland 
Davis, that he appoint a Children's Code Commission 

- 25 - 

Bane: to review the statutes haying to do with children 
and, at the same time, to recommend a reorganiza 
tion of the State Board of Charities and Correc- 
. tions into what was called, then, a modern welfare 

Leiby: So this was connected with child welfare. 

Bane: It started off with a child welfare push. Again, 
there were three or four objectives: to establish 
a statewide system of juvenile courts; to get 
children out of jail; to set up detention homes in 
connection with juvenile courts. ?hat was the 
major impetus at the time. As someone used to 
say down in Virginia, in those days, "The way to 
get something through the state legislature is to 
shake the children at them." Se the drive was 
through the child welfare program. 

Leiby: It also fits into the idea of prevention. 

Bane: Yes, the general idea of prevention and 

education. The commission was appointed and 
its chairman was J. Hoge Ricks. He was one of the 
most prominent juvenile court judges. He was from 
Richmond and was president of the juvenile court 
judges association for a couple years* He 

- 26 - 

Bane: was chairman and the most interested people in 

the state from the private agencies were on this 
commission* Mrs. Louis Brownlow, for instance, 
was on this commission. She is the wife of Louis 
Brownlow, who had been Commissioner of the District 
f Columbia and was later City Manager of 
Petersburg* She had come to Virginia with 
all kinds of ideas--good ideasfrom the District 
of Columbia as to how they were handling this 
problem. The commission worked for about a 
year. It came in with a report that was ninety 
per cent adopted by the state legislature. The 
first recommendation was to establish a State 
Department of Welfare, to appoint a Commissioner 
of Public Welfare, to maintain the Board in an 
advisory capacity, and a whole series of extremely 
forward looking, at that time, measures and 
proposals in the realm of eare of dependent, 
delinquent, and handicapped children. For in 
stance, let me emphasize again that Virginia's 
immediate concern was to get children 
out of jail. 

Leibyt Were these city children or country children? 

- 27 - 

Bane: Mostly city children, some country children. 

Leiby: This was mostly a city problem. 

Bane: Mostly. But a child would be picked up for this, 
that, or the other and referred, maybe, to a 
juvenile court. But even if he were referred to 
a juvenile court the only place you had to detain 
him was in a jail in many instances. And as soon 
as he'd be sent to jail, everybody would raise 
Cain if they knew anything about it. We tried to 
see that they did know something about it. That 
was one of our major problems. With that in mind, 
perhaps because that situation had affected the 
conscience of the state, the legislature adopted 
a child welfare act which provided: 

1) That there should be a statewide system of 
juvenile courts in every county in the state. 

2) That juvenile courts should have exclusive, 
original jurisdiction, with respect to all 
children under eighteen years of age. 

3) And it provided and this was more or less 
revolutionary, at that time, that if any juve 
nile court judge, for any reason, decided that 
a child was delinquent to such an extent 

- 28 - 

Bane: that he had to be removed from hi a hone or his 

regular environment, the only thing that the judge could 
do with the child would be to commit him to the 
Department of Public Welfare. 

Leiby: H e did not sentence. 

Bane: He did not sentence, he couldn't send him to any 
jail or anywhere else* He couldn't send him to 
a reformatory. He could just send him to one 
place if he decided the child had to be separated 
from hia home because of delinquency. H e wag al 
lowed only one recourse and that was to commit him 
to the Department of Public Welfare, period. The 
act then went on to provide that the Department of 
Public Welfare should 8 et up necessary facilities, 
employ necessary staff to handle this duty and 
responsibility which was given to them under this 
act* That, of course, meant that: 1) T hat 
within the central department we had to get ad 
ditional social workers; 2) We had to set up a 
mental health clinic for diagnosis; and 3) We had 
to develop immediately and quickly some type of 
detention home-- children's detention home. Because 
we couldn't put a child in jail. So that was the 

- 29 - 

Bane: beginning of the expansion of the department into 
an operating agency. Prom that derelopment within 
the department itself, it naturally followed that 
the next thing we thought about was what we were 
going to do with the problem out in the com 
munities, in the various counties* So the 
second part of the program provided for the estab 
lishment of county welfare departments 'boards in 
each of the hundred counties in Virginia and in 
each of the twenty-two cities* In Virginia the 
city is separate from the county. It's a separate 
entity. So we had welfare boards in the 
cities as well as in the counties. 

Leiby: That's good, isn't it? 

Bane; Well, you generally think something is good if 
you're used to it* I'm used to that system, so 
I've always liked it. 

Leiby: I'm just astonished at the powers granted to the 
department under this and the powers granted to 
the juvenile courts. I would have expected that 
the lawyers would have howled over taking the pre 
rogative of sentence away from the judge. 

Bane: Our problem, initially, wasn't taking the sentence 

- 30 - 

Bane: away from the judge. Our problem, initially, was to 
establish a system of juvenile court judges. 
Once we established a system of juvenile oourt 
judges, those judges were in favor of having the 
sentence taken away from them* 

Leiby: Were these really separate judges? In New Jersey, 
for example, the juvenile oourt judges are our old 
friends with another, hat. 

Bane: Ne, no. In practically all instances they were 
separate individuals. 

Leiby: Especially prepared? 

Bane: No, not necessarily. But especially interested. I 
remember Suffolk, Virginia where I had been, 
which was a town then of about 
twelve or fifteen thousand people, the county seat, 
we selected a very competent lawyer-- up-and-coming 
young lawyerwho had a major interest, and made him 
juvenile judge. He was delighted to have the 
assignment. He took a major interest in it. It 
was a way for him to get some experience and at 


the same time do a public service. So in the small 
places that's the way it was. In the larger places... 
Leiby: You chose these? 

- 31 - 

Bane: Oh no, they were chosen by the County Board of 
Supervisors and the regular district or circuit 
judges, as we called them. 

Leiby: Did you make recommendations? 

Bane: Occasionally, when we were asked which we were 
frequently in the early days* We were not only 
asked to make recommendations, we were asked some 
times to persuade somebody to take it. 

Leiby: This must have been quite a show to set up. I mean, 
that's a detention home in a hundred counties. 

Bane: We didn't try to do that. We set up detention homes 
in the larger cities. And we could transport from 
the smaller counties to these centers. There were 
maybe ten detention homes in the state. 

Leiby: But then you needed at least one diagnostic clinic. 
Did you have more? 

Bane: From the one diagnostic clinic we then began to 

spread the system of traveling clinics. And from 
traveling clinics we developed the idea and the 
system this was after I leftof clinies in certain 
centers, for instance in Bristol, Hoanoke, Lynchburg, 
Norfolk, Alexandria, and Richmond. 

LeibY: These were state financed? 

- 32 - 

Bane: Tea. 

Leiby: State financed and connected with the Department of 

Bane: Yes. 

Leiby: The county didn't finance them. How were they housed? 
Bane: Generally they were housed very poerly in a small 

room, many times a basement room of a local hospital 

or of the courthouse. It was very embryonic in the 


Leiby: The children were referred to the department... 
Bane: T he children could be referred to the clinics by 

the juvenile court. Or, if the juvenile court 

committed them and they came to the department, 

then they would be referred to the clinics by the 

Leiby: And then after that you made a decision about this 

Bane: It was either foster home, or perhaps an industrial 

school for an indeterminate term, or sometimes 

Leiby: Who decided upon release? Did the school have a 

board of managers and they would decide? 
Bane: Yes. Once they went to industrial school they were 

- 33 - 

Bane: out of our hands. 

Leiby: A vary enlightened program. 

Bane: I thought it was a ground-breaking program at 

the time. There were some interesting develop 
ments with respect to it. 

You remember that the act provided that the 
juvenile courts should have exclusive original 
jurisdiction with respect to all children under 
eighteen charged with any offense. 

Leiby: Even murder, even a capital offense. 

Bane: That's right, any offense. They had exclusive 

original jurisdiction. We had a circuit judge in 
Roanoke, Virginia by the name of Judge Hart. 
He was known far and wide as a very strict and 
very stern judge. Judge Hart used to say that 
he ran his court, that's what he was there for. 
Some children, three or four boys, and maybe some 
of them were older than eighteen, were arrested 
along with a girl sixteen years old stealing an 
automobile, in the Roanoke area. The judge 
submitted the whole oase, along with the little 
girl, to the grand jury for indictment. We ob 
jected. The judge said he was going to try all 

- 34 - 

Bane: those cases. Automobile stealing had to stop. 

He would stop it. Whereupon, as we did fre 
quently in those days, the Welfare Department 
employed on a case basis a lawyer to handle 
our case with respect to this child in the Roanoke 
Circuit Court. The lawyer that we employed 
was Cliff Weodrum, who later went to congress. 
The airport in Roanoke is named the Cliff Woodrum 
Airport. We instructed Cliff to take exception to 
the jurisdiction of the court because it was a 
circuit court and the Child Welfare Act provided 
that the juvenile court should have exclusive 
original jurisdiction. Then we told him to be 
the worst lawyer that he could possibly be. After 
having noted his exception, we wanted to lose the 
case because we had discussed the matter at length 
with the Attorney General of Virginia, Colonel 
John H. Saunders, and there was no difference of 
opinion between Colonel Saunders and the Welfare 
Department as to what the law meant. So we knew 
perfectly well that if the case came up on appeal, 
and we were going to appeal it, that the Attorney 
General of Virginia would plead error and we would 
get a Supreme Court decision. Well, Judge Hart 

- 35 - 

Bane: had been around quite a while and he was experienced, 
and he had read the minutes of the previous meetings. 
So to our surprise and great disappointment 
when Cliff Woodrum noted hie exception, the Judge 
agreed with him. He threw the case out* (Laughter) 
So we didn't get our Supreme Court decision., 

Leiby: You spoke about foater families* Had you had a 
foster family program? 

Bane: The private agencies like the Associated Char 
ities had. But the state, as such, had had no 
foster home care program until the reorganization 
of 1922. 

Leiby: Was it possible for a court to commit a child to 
foster care? 

Bane: Yes. 

Leiby: Did the state pay in that case? 

Bane: 1 would imagine it did. But I wouldn't be certain. 

Leiby: I can imagine that foster care would be an important 
resource for the department. 

Bane: Yes. 

Leiby: '^-'hen you must have built up a foster care program. 

Bane: We started immediately to build up a foster care 
program in 1922. 

- 36 - 

Leiby: Did you use private agencies or did you build up 

your own? 
Bane: We built up our own staff &a rapidly aa we could, 

and we used private agencies at the same time. 

That was when we brought into the department Cray 

Shepperaon, Hay Hankins, who later was Commissioner 

of Welfare in Washington,D.C., & Bnily Dinwiddie. 
Leiby: When did you get Gay Shepperson? She'd been with 

the Children's Bureau. 
Bane: No, she'd been in charge of the social work section 

of the American Red Cross. 

Miss Hankins had been with the Children's Bu- 

reauShe used to come down as an adviser. 

And Miss Emily Dinwiddie had been with the 

Associated Charities in Philadelphia. 

Leiby: All of these people were more or less professional. 

Bane: Oh they were professional. 

Leiby: Really professional. New when did this reorganization 

of child welfare go through? 
Bane: 1922. 
Leiby: You'd been there for two years then. Did you have 

much to do in this commission that made the study of 

- 37 - 

Leiby: the children's code? 

Bane: We over in the department acted as more or less a 
secretary for the commission. We kept the minutes, 
we assembled the material, we developed the agenda. 

Leiby: You worked with them. 

Bane: Yes. To the extent that they had a secretariat, we 
were it. 

Leiby: What were the obstacles in selling this program? 
In the first place, I gather, you wanted local 
governments to set up their own county boards. 
A nd you would say that these mental hygiene clinics 
and probation and parole are very useful in preven 
tion and rehabilitation. In studying this the 
problem I've had is that everybody's in favor of 
prevention and rehabilitation, and yet it's a long 
hard battle to get them to finance it. I mean you 
go to them and you say, "Look in the long run we're 
going to save you money." Then what do they say to 

Bane: Wn f they say, if they are honest and direct and 
they're not speaking to the press, "That's all 
right about the long run saving us money, but what 
we're concerned about is our budget right here this 

- 38 - 

Bane: year, right now when we are about to run a deficit 
and somebody says we have to increase taxes. You 
take care of the long run. We're interested in the 
immediate present." That's the usual steck answer 
when you're sitting down and talking with a budget 
director about that kind of a problem. 

Leibyi Then you'd have to persuade them. 

Bane: Yes. And the way to persuade them is the age old 
technique; you get a great many people 
to come in before the committee influential people- 
to urge it. And you use examples. There are many 
more examples now than you had in those days. 
You could use the example now of what we've done 
in TB, what we've done in pneumonia, what we've 
done in polio recently. The only example we had 
in those days, that 1 can recall, is what we'd 
done in diabetes. Insulin had just come in and 
everybody was interested in diabetes. And we'd 
use that as an example* 

Leibyt Now it occurs to me that there's another way that 
you might do this. You might try to gather some 
sort of empirical evidence that this really works. 
In rther words you might say, "This is a theory 

- 39 - 

Leiby: about how it works. And here 'a a kind of empirical 
validation for this." I think this is the way we 
would go at it today. 

Bane: Yes, we would go at it that way today. We 

used to attempt to go at it that way. But it's an 
awfully difficult thing. Delinquency, human beings, 
they don't test tube very well. They don't act the 
sane way under all circumstances. We used to 
find it very difficult to prove much in that 
field, be it reasonable or not. 

Leiby: Or to put another construction on this, there's no 
real evidence that these things work. 

Bane: No* 

Leiby: I don't know if there is now, but certainly in the 1920s. 

Bane: Well even now. Let's take the field of mental ill 
ness, which is subject to much more scientific appraisal 
than delinquency. You and I remember the various ex 
periments that were carried on twenty or twenty- 
five years ago , in that area. Doctor 
Henry Cotton in New Jersey with his focal infection, Dr. 
De Jarnette in Virginia with his sterilization law, 
and all kinds of various and sundry experiments. But 
wo oould never demonstrate that such and such action 

- 40 - 

Bane: would yield such and such a result , even to the ex 
tent of a specif ie known mental illness. Even if we 
were certain that we knew what the trouble was, 
we never had any direct cure, like insulin for 
diabetes, or sulfa drugs for pneumonia. 

Lei by: Well there was salvarsan. 

Bane: It was helpful in quieting, but it never 
cured anything. 

Leiby: But it arrested* 

Bane: Yes, it arrested. 

Leiby: In other words the problem you had in trying to 

persuade somebody that it's a good idea to set up 
this kind of local service because it keeps them 
out of the institution and it gets them out of the 
institution, and it's better for them and it's 
cheaper all these wonderful arguments the problem 
was not simply that you had to say, "This is going to 
cost you money but it's worth it in the long run." 
The problem also was that you had to go very easy 
on making laims. 

Bans: Yes. And you had to base it largely on a human 
itarian appeal, rather than on dollars and cents. 
In 1923 we were not dealing with big institu 
tions e We weren't in the realm of big money. 

- 41 - 

Bane* We did get into that in 1926. In *23 we were 
deeding with money, but not big money. We had 
great support from all private agencies, church organ 
izations, and especially the League of Women Voters. 
They did an excellent job. And as I said a few 
moments ago eighty to ninety per cent of this 
program was passed. Our chief difficulties were: 

1) Inertia. Everybody was interested in roads in 
those days. We were just beginning to build high 
ways. And all the fight in the legislature was over 
a bond issue for roads. And incidentally in that 
same legislature the bond issue for roads was de 
feated. The gentleman who was leading the op 
position to the bond issues with the slogan "Pay 

as you go" was a gentleman by the 
name of Harry P. Byrd. (Laughter) a e*s been in 
favor of pay as you go ever since. And ever since 
those days he has stood for, more or less as a 
badge, economy and governmental efficiency. 

2) Honey. We emphasized that here was a situation that 
needed some money but not too much. The human 
itarian appeal was what we used more than anything 

Leiby: So basically it was a humanitarian appeal and it was 
made by many distinguished and honorable witnesses 

- 42 - 

Leiby: giving testimony. 

Bane: Chat's right. 

Leiby: Now tell me this, would you have thought very much 
of attempting some kind of empirical validation? 
I mean, they did eatoh Cotton out. T hey did perform 
a series of observations that proved conclusively 
that Cotton's theories didn't work. Would this 
have occurred very much to you, then? 

Bane: It didn't in those days. We were operating in a 
very narrow field . We wanted to set 
up a better department that would function ef 
fectively in this field and not be merely an in 
spection and advisory agenoy. And we wanted very 
definitely to do something about the children's 
situation. We wanted also to tie the two things 
together and have an effective organization in the 
children's field, which we could spread to general 
dependency and general delinquency and mental 

Leiby: So your basic interest was in humanitarian service. 
And your interest in administration, in those days, 
would have been connected with giving the chil* a 
good social worker, or a good mental hygienist, 

- 43 - 

Leibyj insofar as you could determine what these were* 

Bane: Yes. And the big economic arguments didn't come 

in until 1926, Then they came in with a bang. 

Leibyi You said this 1926 reorganization of the Department 
of Welfare was under Governor Harry Byrd, 

Bane: Yea, Byrd became governor in 1925-26. Of course, he 
had been in the state senate for years. And in ad 
dition to having been in the state senate he'd been 
Chairman of the State Democratic Committee. In 
1926 he took office. a e had a rather strenuous 
campaign against another member of the state senate, 
a gentleman named Mapp. Mapp had been a leader of 
the prohibition forces in Virginia. And he had the 
support of the famous or notorious character, de 
pending on your point of view, Bishop James Cannon. 

Leiby: One of H.L. Mencken's friends. (Laughter) 

Bane: That's right. He was a great promoter and supporter 
ef Happ. Byrd was elected. 

Leiby: Was this for the nomination? 

Bane: It was in the primary. They didn't have conventions 
in those days in Virginia. And in those days the 
November elections between the two parties didn't 
amount to anything. Happ was supported by one group 
and Byrd by another group. You might say that Mapp 

- 44 - 

Ban*: was supported by the clerical group, interested 

primarily in prohibition. Byrd, whereas he was a 
prohibitionist also, everybody was in 
Virginia in those days, was supported by the polit 
ical organization groups , the so-called county 
organizations or county rings, depending on whether 
you approve of them or disapprove of them. Byrd 
was handily eleeted. It developed 
that you had in the governor's office a person who 
had overwhelming political support in the state. 
He had been in politics since he was a young boy* 
He'd been in the state senate for many years. His 
father, Richard Evelyn Byrd, had been speaker 

of the house of representatives in Virginia 
for a, number of years. 

Leiby: How old was Harry Byrd when he became governor? 

Bane: He was about thirty-six or seven. He is now seventy- 
seven. On occasions we used to say something about 
our being young men. He's between five or six years 
older than 1 am. He came in with a definite, 
specific reorganization program. 

He had control of the legislature and he knew it. 
Se he set up a top notch in New York you would 

- 45 - 

Ban*: call it a blue ribbon committee- -on the reorganization. 
x 'he head of the commission was a man by the name of 
W.T. Reid, who was at that time President of Larus 
Tobaooo Company that makes Edgeworth tobacco. 
The commission decided to employ a consulting firm 
to come into Virginia and make a study of the state 
government and submit recommendations to the com 
mission. It employed what was called in those 
days the National Institute of Public Administra 
tion of which Luther Gulick was director, 

Luther and his group came to Virginia and 
made the study in 1926. They submitted an elab 
orate plan for changing the government very 
materially. Perhaps a dozen constitutional amend 
ments. Byrd and his commission took the plan 
almost look, stock and barrel, and put it through. It 
changed the status of many elected officials. We 
had seven or eight officials in Virginia that had 
been electedthe constitution provided they could 
be elected by the people Byrd got rid of all 
of that. It provided that all state officials in 
Virginia should be appointed, with the exception of 
the Governor, the Lieu tenant -Governor and the At 
torney General. It did away with the old $5,000 

- 46 - 

Ban*: limitation on the Governor's salary, that had existed 
since 1901. *t did away with the oath that all state 
officials had to take that, "They would not fight a 
duel with a deadly weepon." as the justices of the 
peace used to say. They reorganized the constitu 
tion and established Byrd's reputation as one of the 
ablest governors that this country had. 

Leiby: What was Byrd interested inefficient government to 
save money? 

Bane: Primarily he was interested in efficient government. 
He was also interested in economy. His great stock 
in trade in those days was economy, has continued to 
be economy. But as governor he was as much if not 
much more interested in efficiency than he was in 
sheer economy. He did more for the Welfare 
Department and for other departments than any gov 
ernor we'd ever had before that. 

Leiby: Bid he have an idea of what Chili ok was going to say 
in the report? 

Bane: Oh, not in the beginning. But certainly, as they 

went along, Gulick had constant conferences with the 

Leiby t So he wanted to reorganize the government. He didn't 

- 47 - 

Leiby: have any ideas in particular* I guess he did have some 

ideas . 
Bane: Yes he did. He had some ideas but not in detail. w hat 

he wanted was an effective and efficient governmental 

Leiby: So he called in the Public Administration boys from 

New York. 

Bane: That's right. And he made a contract with them. 
Leiby: Aad they made a study and he bought the study. 
Bane: Yes. And what is equally important or more important, 

he put it through. 
Leiby: $o this is when public administration as a science, as 

it were, begins to... 
Bane: G ome into state government and begins to come into the 

Welfare Department. The Welfare Department, from 

then on, began to think much more in terms of econ 
omics than it had before. 
Leiby: How had the Welfare Department fared in Gulick's study? 

He undoubtedly had a chapter on it. 
Bane: Oh yes. First he recommended that the Commissioner of 

Public Welfare, instead of being appointed by a board, 

be appointed by the governor, subject to the approval 

of the senate. 

Leiby: This was to establish responsibility. 
Bane: To serve at his pleasure indeterminate term. Then 

- 48 - 

Bane: he suggested that all of the major state institu 
tions, the penitentiary, the state industrial 
schools, the hospitals for the mentally ill be 
brought into the Welfare Department and that 
the Welfare Department be made an operating a- 

There was one concession to the old system. 
Whereas the welfare commissioner would be 
ex-officio a member of all of the boards, the 
one concession was to keep the boards for 
the various institutions the local boards. 
So then the welfare commissioner couldn' t 
immediately control the entire operation of 
every institution, nor could he, on his own, 
and without the advice of a board, appoint 
a superintendent of say, the Western State 
Hospital. That authority was lodged in the 

The welfare commissioner, to repeat, 
was ex-officio a member of all the boards, 
which meant to all intents and purposes that he 

- 49 - 

Bane: was the representative of the governor on each of 
those boards. He carried a great amount of 

Leiby: Now hitherto had the State Board inspected state 

Bane: Yes. 

Leiby: But it had had no operating control. 

Bane: None whatever, ne operating participation. 

Leiby: They merely inspected and reported to the governor. 

Bane: That's right. 

Leiby: And now what this did was to make the superintendent 
of the institution responsible to the commissioner 
of welfare. 

Bane: And also responsible to his board. His board had 
charge of all local operations. But for its over 
all big problems) like his budget and things of that 
kind, he worked with the welfare commissioner. 

Leiby: Did he submit a common budget? 

Bane: Bach institution submitted an individual budget, then 
were put together, consolidated. 

Leiby: When did the consolidated budget come in? 

Bane: After 1926. 

Leiby: So in other words this is a very considerable power. 

- 50 - 

Bane: Surely. That was the Byrd reorganization, that 

power. And that got us into the field of economics, 
as well as into the field of humanity. 

Leiby: Now would you expand a little on this, about economics, 

Bane: Well I remember the major economic question that came 
up so frequently. I became sick and tired of it. 
The per capita cost of a particular patient in a 
hospital. Everything had been run on that basis for 
many years. We tried during my years there to ex 
pand and elaborate that approach to the problem. 
We never got very far while I was there. But we 
succeeded in pushing up the per capita costs. So 
long as we were stuck to a per capita cost business, 
which is always tied back to what you had in years 
before, we pushed up ten cents-twenty cents, etc. 

Leiby: In other words, compared with other states. 

Bane: Yes. We tried once to wipe the slate clean and say, 
"Let's forget the past. What is an adequate per 
capita cost? Let's start from here." But we 
never made too much progress with that. 

Money began to be a problem because hospitals, 
aside from education and highways, was the biggest 
single expenditure of state government, the most 

- 51 - 

Bane: expensive facilities that we had. 

We had five of them. That is we had four hospitals 
and one institution for the epileptic and feeble 

Leibyx Were there any county institutions? 

Bane: No, just state institutions* Of course we had a lot 
of senile people in the county alms houses 
who couldn't get into the hospitals for the mentally 

And, I would guess, 35# or maybe more of 
all the people in state hospitals for the insane 
were senile, aged people. 

Leiby: I'm interested in this per capita cost basis* I 
know for years, and I guess still is. a primary 
consideration. And it has the merit that this is 
something you can figure out and you can compare. 
If you're going to manage institutions you need some 
sort of bookkeeping, obviously. And this is a very 
handy device. 

Bane: Oh that's good* I wasn't objecting to the cost ac 
counting phases of it* What I used to object to 
was being tied back to the per capita costs that we 
had five, ten, or fifteen years ago* The budget people 

- 52 - 

Bane: would always say,. * Well we have to go gradually, 
two or three steps at a time, fifteen cents, 
twenty cents ,. " etc. We had a budget 
director in my later years in Virginia, a grand 
gentleman, but if there ever waa a meticulous person 
he was it. He's still a grand old friend of mine al 
though we used to fight like oats and dogs* His name 
was Bradford. a e was there for twenty- odd years. I 
would come in and sit down and he would say, "Now the 
per capita costs... " I would say, "My Lord, do we 
have to go into that again?" (Laughter) I would want 
to start with the per capita costs now, never mind what 
the per capita costs were ten years ago. Times are 
different. Times had changed. 

Leiby: But even if you could get a per capita cost on the 
basis of a standardwhat you wanted essentially 
was to formulate standards. 

Bane: 1 wanted some modern standards. I used to say, "Yes 
we have this per capita cost but this is when we 
called our hospitals asylums for the in 
sane* Now we're talking about hospitals, not 
asylums. It's a different proposition. Let's start 
with another standard of per capita cost." 

_ 53 - 

Leiby: Would there be any other unit of service per capita 
cost doesn't measure unit of service, does it? 

Bane: It does within limits. It measures very adequately 
and effectively the problem of food; the problem of 
shelter, heat, light, and power; the problem of 
clothing* ^ut how do you measure per capita cost 
when you get into the question of physicians and so 
on? Unless you just take eighteen physicians and 
divide them by 1,800 patients and say one physician 
to a hundred patients. 

Leiby: The Public Administration people were very much in 
terested in accounting. I know, in New Jersey, this 
is the way we got to those institutions. We'd come 
out with per capita costs very different, why? Then 
you have to explain it and justify it. Was there any 
speculation about other measures of service? I'm in 
terested in this, generally speaking. You must have 
thought, "If we could only isolate service costs." 

Bane: Yes, we used to think in terms, in addition to per 
capita costs, about patient doctor ratio, patient 
nurse ratio. We used to try and get away from 
the per capita costs when we were thinking about 
these things. We used to think, also, in terms of 

- 54 - 

Bane: types of buildings for certain kinds of patients. 

Leibyt This is important. Or prisoners for that matter, you 
know, minimum custody prisoners. 

Bane: Yes. These enormous four and five story buildings 
that they built back in the eighteenth century 
for hospitals and asylums. We began to get 
away from those and build one story buildings for 
certain kinds of patients, particularly the elderly. 
We even built ramps instead of steps for elderly and 
senile patients. I notice in the housing for the 
elderly in the housing progress now they emphasize 
ramps instead of steps. 

Leiby: Where did you get the idea of doctor patient ratio? 
Did you ask some doctor? 

Bane: From quite a number of people. When I went 
with the Welfare Department my technical training 
left much to be desired. So I used to take my vaca 
tions and go on busmen's holidays. I had met a 
number of people in New York in this field. So 
I would go to visit them . The National 
Mental Health Committee , in those days , was 
my source of information, ideas, and data, Clifford 
Beers and George Stevenson. In the realm of prisons 

- 55 - 

Bane: and the general field of delinquency it was Hastings 
Hart* He was with the Russell Sage Foundation. 


Leiby: And Kirchway was with..* 

Bane: The New York School of Social Work after he came 
back from Sing Sing. And then I would go around 
and visit various and sundry hospitals in other 
states. That's when I met and knew and stayed with 
Dr. Cotton in New Jersey. He told me at length 
and showed me in detail what he was doing about what 
he called, I think, focal infection. I went 
to Massachusetts with Dr. George M. Kline, the 
Mental Health Commissioner, and with Dr. Pernald who 
was in charge of mentally retarded children. 

Leiby: Suppose we come back to the general character of 
the states you visited tomorrow. 

Bane: Fine. Tomorrow at the same time. 

- 56 - 


(Interview ef January 6, 1965) 

Leibyi Yesterday we were talking mostly about state wel 
fare in Virginia. I know from 1923 to 1926 you 
moved te Knoxville as Director ef Publie Welfare* 
Hew did you happen to get interested in the job 
at Knoxrille? 

Bane: When I was Commissioner of Public Welfare in 
Virginia there was a gentleman by the name ef 
Mr. Louis Brownlew, who was City Manager ef 
Petersburg, Virginia* Prior to going to Peters 
burg Louis Brownlew had been one of the eommis- 
sioners of Washington, D.C* In fact, he had been 
ehairman of the district commissioners, running the 
city of Washington. 

Leibyi A much better ehairman than that oity deserved. 

Banes A much better chairman than you would expect under 
the type of government which the oity of Washington 
has* It's the old type of government r the old 
commission type, whereby they divide up the 

- 57 - 

Ban*) activities of the city among three commissioners, 
each commissioner taking a certain branch of the 
government and being responsible therefore. 
Brownlow as commissioner had been responsible in 
Washington for welfare activities, for the pelioe, 
and for finance* So when he went to Petersburg 
he was greatly interested in the welfare activ 
ities in Petersburg, which were at that time al 
most non-existent. He began to look to the 
state for a great deal of help in setting up 
Petersburg's local welfare agencies of one kind 
or another. 

Leibys Brewnlew hadn't begun his academic career then. 

Bane: Ne, not yet. He was in public administration, 
mostly local administration. As a matter of fact 
throughout his life Brownlow was almost exclusively 
in local administration and probably the country's 
greatest authority on public administration in 
the locality. He branched off a little bit into 
the federal government when he made the study of 
the federal government for President Roosevelt. 
Brownlow and I were acquainted in Virginia and, in 
fact, became quite friendly. Brownlow was offered 

- 58 - 

Banes the job of City Manager of Knoxville, Tennessee. 
He came to see mo In Richmond one night, and 
told me he was going to take that job and that 
they were going to set the oity government up in 
fire major departments. Of course, a law depart 
ment with a general counsel* ill government 
agencies have a general counsel . And then a De 
partment of Public Works, a Department of Public 
Safety, a Department of Finance, and a Department 
of Welfare. He asked me if I would accept the 
job as Director of Public Welfare for the oity of 
Knozville, to set up a brand new department. 
Knoxville had just adopted a new charter and a new 
oity manager form of government. I was 
starting from scratch more or less in organizing 
a welfare department in a reasonably sized city 
probably 150,000 population. 

Lelby: A considerable metropolis. 

Bane: At that time it was the third largest city in the 
state; Memphis, Nashville, Knozville, and then 
Chattanooga. I was young and adventuresome and 
I liked Brownlow, and so I agreed to take the job. 
. In that department we had the usual welfare 

- 59 - 

- x ~' 

Banes activities;; The health bureau, the recreation bureau, 

the city institutions, and we had the licensing of various 
private institutions of one kind or another in the 
welfare or health fields. 

I spent three years in Knoxville, working 
on the task of setting up a municipal welfare de 
partment. Knoxville was a very interesting 
city in those days. The first thing that in 
terested me was the health work or lack of 
health work in the City. Shis was 1923 and Knox 
ville still had a considerable amount of smallpox* 

They had a city pesthouso in 1923, which 
startled me. 

Leibys That's an eighteenth century innovation. 

Bane: Soon after we got started and had gotten our feet on 
the ground, Brownlow and I talked about the small 
pox question. We were in the process of de 
veloping the city budget. So I announced to the 
press, with the collaboration and consent of 
Brownlow, that after this particular year, which 
was 1923, we were going to eliminate all ap- 

- 60 - 

Bane: propriations for the city pesthouse. We were 

going to substitute: 1) A compulsory system of 
vaccination in the public schools; and 2) We 
were going to set up a clinic where anybody could 
be vaccinated if they wanted to, free of charge. 
Thereafter we were going to operate on the general 
thesis that we believed in liberty public health 
liberty. If anybody wanted to have and insisted upon 
having smallpox, the city wasn't going to pay for 
it. We'd let him pay for it himself. 

Well at that the newspaper people began to ask 
all kinds of questions every day. And every day I 
was talking about smallpox, until the Chamber of 
Commerce sent a committee down to see me one day. 
They said, "You are ruining business. You've con 
vinced the people in the neighborhood and in the 
countryside that we have an epidemic of smallpox 
in town." I said, "We have." We had something 
like twenty-odd cases. That to me is an. epidemic 
of smallpox. They said, "We're going to see Mr. 
Brownlow about it." Mr. Brownlow was my boss. 
They went to see Mr. Brownlow. Mr. Brownlow 

- 61 - 

Bane: suggested to them that he thought that they could 
make a trade with me. He waa reasonably convinced 
if they (the committee from the Chamber of Commerce) 
would help me pass a city ordinance for compulsory 
vaccination of school children and would encourage 
people to be vaccinated, I would quit talking 
about smallpox. They came over* We made that deal. 
I quit talking about smallpox. We put through com 
pulsory vaccination of school children. We set 
up the clinic. Many people came in to be vaccinated. 
The next year we abolished the pesthouse. 

Leibys I would imagine that it was the Chamber of Commerce 
people who supported Brownlow at first. 

Bane: Very much so. 

Leiby: The city manager came in, this was a businessman's 

Bane: Exactly. And they were, to all intents and purposes, 
his kitchen cabinet, you might say, 

Leibys So you convinced them. 

Bane: Maybe they convinced themselves* that this was a 

good idea from a business point of view, not to have 
the reputation of having smallpox in town. We 
set up quite an elaborate* for a small city, health 
bureau, and a rather large municipal hospital. 

- 62 - 

Leiby: This was a municipal, general hospital. 
Bane: Yes. Knoxville General Hospital. We had a 
problem there, of course, which was the problem 
of staffing. I brought an outside superintend 
ent in, which was very beneficial from the stand 
point of the hospital but immediately got me into 
controversy with all of the doctors not all, a num 
ber of the doctors* That situation worked out 
and we got the hospital accredited, with the usual 
number of nurses in proportion to patients, and by 
requiring certain minimum things such as the use of 
gloves in surgical operations. (Laughter) 

We had the Job of setting up a 
recreation system. Mr. Brownlow had always been 
a great proponent of organized recreation; munic 
ipal playgrounds as well as parks. So we sub 
mitted a proposition to establish various and 
sundry playgrounds, and we put it in the budget. Al 
so, we put in the city budget a provision for su 
pervisors of these playgrounds. In retrospect 
that was one of the most interesting experiences 
we had in Knoxville. Two members of the 

- 63 - 

Bane: council opposed that item for supervisors 

of playgrounds. Said they, "It is proposed the 
most outrageous proposal we've ever heard of it is 
proposed that we use oity money to pay people to 
teaoh children to play. Any old child can play* 
The job is to teaoh him to work." (Laughter) 
That was a very very interesting experience. 

That started me, to a considerable extent, 
in the business of local government administration, 
which I hadn't had too much of except in a super 
visory capacity in Richmond* I stayed there for 
three years. 

Leibyt Did you have much to do with poor relief in 

Bane: The poor relief situation in Knoxville was what 
it was everywhere rather standard, utterly in 
adequate, but usual. We had the county alms house. 
And we had the oity overseers of the poor, which 
we took over in the Welfare Department. We put two 
social workers on the staff. We got one from the 
New York School of Social Work and one from the 
Chicago School of Social Work* 

Leibyt Professional social workers? 

Bane: Yes. Both had come from Tennessee. That helped 

- 64 - 

Bane: to offset criticism of what I'd done before. (Laughter) 
As a matter of fact in that government Brownlow, who 
was the city manager, was from out -of -at ate;: James 
Otey Walker, head of the Department of 
Public Safety, fire and police, was an outsider; I 
was head of the Welfare Department; and I brought in 
an outsider to be head of the hospital, 
Leiby: Which was the most expensive* 
Bane: The most expensive, the most controversial, the 
most potentially explosive institution was the 

Leiby: It had not been accredited* 
Bane: No, it had not been accredited 
Leiby: You got it accredited. 

Bane: We got it accredited with all the headaches that 
would go with that kind of a reorganization when 
you're dealing with professional groups as well 
as with the general public. To repeat, three of 
us were from out of the state. Two of us were 
from Virginia. 

Whenever we went to any hotel, dining room, 
or restaurant where 

- 65 - 

Banes they had an orchestra, the orchestra always started 
up "Carry Me Back to Old Virginia." (Laughter) 

Many years later the attorney general of Ten 
nessee was a man named Roy Beeler, quite a lawyer. 
When we were in Knoxville, Roy Beeler had "been city 
attorney just before the city manager form of gov 
ernment came in. So, when the city manager form 
of government came in, Roy Beeler was out of a job. 
A lawyer by the name of Edgerton was appointed 
as head of the law department and general counsel 
for the city. Roy was a delightful gentleman 
and occasionally we would speak on the same platform. 
Especially when the administration was promoting a 
bond issue to build a viaduct over the Southern 
Railroad tracks. Of course, we were for it. Roy 
was against it. M e was just against the admin 
istration. We would speak on the same platform 
occasionally, around the different wards. I would 
speak for the bond issue. Beeler would speak after 
wards. He would say, "My dear friends and my 
fellow townsmen." (Laughter) "Do you really 
think that if you vote this bond issue this 
foreigner is going to put all of that money into 
building the viaduct? Do you really think so?" 

- 66 - 

Bane: That would be his speech. Afterward he and 

his wife would ome over to Mrs* Bane and myself 
and say, "It's early. Let's go on home and play 
bridge for the rest of the evening." (Laughter) 
It was all in the game of more or less benevolent 

Leiby: Tou were spending lots of money in Knorville. 

Bane: We were spending a great deal of money at that time. 

Leiby: How did you raise it local property taxes? 

Bane: Before we went to Knorville as soon as the new 
council came in they found themselves with a 
whale of a deficit. So they, thank the Lord, had 
levied a very much increased property tax before 
we got there. The Brownlow administration got 
there in time to inherit the revenue from the in- 
or eased tax rate. The first year or two we had 
no acute financial problem. 

Leiby: And ygaa had businessmen backing good government. 

Bane: Yes. 

Leiby s Good government men hiring outside experts to come 
in and improve the services. 

Bane: That was the general pattern. 

Leiby: These services were quite different from the sorts 

- 67 - 

Leibyj of things you were doing in Virginia. Did you 
have a ohild welfare agency or operation? 

Bane: No, we had no ohild welfare operation. Of course, 
we had the children's section of the health de 
partment clinic. But we had no foster plan or 
arrangement of that kind* All that was handled 
by the county, to the extent that it was handled, 
We had no adoption procedures in the department* 
They were handled by the courts. And we had 
little connection with the courts. 

Leiby: N probation. 

Bane: No probation. Again, that was in the courts. 

We had a judge in Knorville in those days by 
the name of William*, who was very jealous of his 

He insisted that we should stay out of his 
backyard, which we did, since the charter 
so provided. 

Leiby: To get back to poor relief, what did the social 
workers do? 

Bane: They investigated income, administered means tests, 
and that's just about it. 

Leibys Social investigation. 

- 68 - 

Bane: Social investigation to determine how muchand 
we experimented a little bit in Knoxville with 
cash grant a* 

Leiby: Instead of grants in kind. 

Bane: Instead of grants in kind, instead of the grocery 
order. If a person was a oertain kind of a person, 
meaning by that if most of his life he had earned 
and expended his own money, we would give him a 
cash grant, which was new at that time. And, in 
retrospect, it didn't kick up too much opposition. 
Still most of it was on the old grocery order 
basis the order on the corner grocery store. 

Leibys Did these social workers take the place of the 
overseers of the poor? Or direct them? 

Bane: They gradually took their place. By the time we 
left Knoxville in 1926, the social work unit 
had taken over the entire job of the over 
seers of the poor. 

Leiby: Did you have a centralized intake? 

Bane: Yes, we had a centralized intake. And in those days 
whenever I went into a social worker's office her 
first question was always, inevitably, "Don't you 
want to see my records?" Records had just begun to 

- 69 - 

Bane: play a large part in social work. 
Leiby: When you as administrator walked in. 
Bane: Exactly. 

All social workers played up records in 
those days. So we started a records system. 
We had pretty good records. We worked very 
closely with the local private agency in town, 
which was a local Associated Charities. 
Leiby: Family Service. 

Bane: Family Service, which at that time was called 
Associated Charities, which was headed by a 
Miss Mgnall. She had been there for a num 
ber of years and she was one of my best sup 

Leiby: So there was something constructive or pre 
ventive, some sort of case work going on. 
Bane: Yes. And, of course, we had other institutions. 
We had the Institution for Delinquent Women, 
called Camp Home. A man by the name of Camp 
had given his big house to the city. We had, 
also, a small tubercular sanitorium. 
Leiby: A municipal tubercular sanitorium. 

- 70 - 

Bane: Yes, a small one of about twenty beds, which 
we tried to keep for temporary care until the 
state sanitorium could take over. 

- 71 - 


Leiby: Then you went back to Virginia as Welfare Commissioner, 

Bane: Then I went back to Virginia, That* a when Byrd came 
in as governor in 1926. 

At the same time the University of 
Virginia was talking with me about my 
coming to the University as Professor of Sociology. 
So I went back to Virginia as Welfare Com 
missioner and with the permission of Governor 
Byrd and the group in our own office, I would 
go over to the University of Virginia at Charlot- 
tesville twice a week. At 

first it was just once a week and then it was twice 
a week, giving courses in what they called "Pure 
and Applied Sociology, " which really meant public 
welfare administration or applied social work 

Leiby: What kind of students did you have in these courses? 

Bane: Interestingly enough we had about a fifty-fifty 

split as between men and women. The public admin- 

- 72 - 

Bane: istration side of it attracted the men and the 
social work side attracted the women. 

Of course, at that time, a woman had 
to be an applicant for a graduate degree to 
get into the University of Virginia. All 
of the undergraduates were men. 

Leiby: You were in sociology, not political science. 

Bane: Yes. 

Leiby: What sort of things did you talk about in 
your class? 

Bane: We talked about the general principles of 

social work. We talked about the organiza 
tion and operation of welfare departments. 
We talked about the day to day duties of a 
public welfare administrator or a social worker, 
as the case may be. And I imagine upon oc 
casions we branched out a little bit into 
what might be termed social philosophy. 

- 73 - 

Lei/by: Do you remember what sort of reading you could 

Bane: Yes The reading that we had mostly was Mary 
Richmond's book in the realm of social work* 
And in the realms of public administration 
we dealt mostly with pamphlets and studies of the 
Brookings Institute in Washington, the National 
Institute of Public Administration, Gulick's 
outfit, and other general text books in 
public administration* There was a professor 
at Columbia by the name of John A. Munro who had 
written an excellent text book. 

Leiby: He was in political science 

Bane: We used both political science text books and 
social work text books. 

In the Department of Sociology, there was 
just one full-time professor at that time. 

Leiby: I see. You were just on a visiting status* 

Bane: I came in once a week at first and later it was twice 
a weeko The course was denominated, which interested 
me at the time, applied sociology. What they 
were trying to emphasize was that Professor House, 
he was the sociology professor ,. was dealing in 

- 74 - 

Bane: principles and theories and I was supposed to be 


Leiby: Did this teaching weigh very heavily in your de 
cision to come back to Virginia? 

Bane: Yes, it weighed rather heavily from two points of 
view. I had had some experience in the field. I 
liked it. I still do. And another attraction was 
that state salaries in those days were not too large. 

The salary the University of Virginia paid me 
supplemented the salary which the state paid me. 

I had a growing family, and I needed the money. 

Leiby: I suppose your main attraction, however, was the 
administration . 

Bane: By that time I was in administration to stay. 

Leiby: And this was a real challenge that Byrd offered you. 

Bane: Yes, to reorganize the department. Said he, "We're 
going to put all the welfare agencies, departments, 
and institutions in one department. And I'd like 
you to run it." 

- 75 - 


Leiby: What strikes me as I listen to you is that, in a 
way, you seem to be sort of riding on a rising 
tide. That is, you got in on the reorganization 
of 1921 in the Virginia department; then you got 
in on the reorganization in Knoxville. I mean, 
people were interested in this. People wanted 
to do this. You were getting opportunities. And 
you were getting means to work with. 

Bane: ?hr was a stirring, as we used to say, in that 

field. As you say, it was coming along about 
the time I was coming along agewise. And I was 
riding it. But I had no idea at that time what a 
tide this was going to be would turn into--and 
how I was eventually going to be riding along 
with it, 

Leiby: Prom my point of view as I study the history of 

the 1920s, these reorganizations were going on all 
over the country. Knoxville, Tennessee was not a 
place that you would expect to be out for real 

- 76 - 

Leiby: modern city managers and there they were. And 
this was going on all over in places like Knox- 
ville; in Virginia for that matter. Suddenly in 
the mid 1920s they change over to really a modern 
welfare structure. And I know that there were a 
great variety of state reorganizations in the 1920s < 
Por the most part I'm impressed by the character of 
the executives who came into these jobs. They were 
young men. I know in New Jersey John Ellis was 
thirty-five when he ran and that was big money, 
that was all of the New Jersey institutions in 
one department. And you were in Virginia. I 
think Louis Brownlow was a pretty young man. 

Bane: Yes, Brownlow was just 12 years older than I was. 
That would have made him in his middle forties. 

Leiby: But I can't imagine them hiring a thirty-five year 
old man to run the New Jersey department today. 

Bane: Probably not. The market would be better today. 
There would be more people to choose from. In 
those days when you were in the welfare field if 
you were looking for someone that had any partic 
ular background, there weren't many. As wit 
ness, I imagine, in New Jersey when John Ellis 

- 77 - 

Bane: died and they began to look for a person they went 

out of the state and got Sanford Bates, an experienced execute 

Leiby: Who was on the market. 

Bane: Who was on the market, but an older man. Then when 
Bates resigned or retired, why still they went out 
of New Jersey and got John Tramburg, Virginia fol 
lowed pretty much the same pattern, not as con 
sistently as that* Although, as I think I said 
yesterday, when I left Virginia in 1931 of the four 
directors who handled eighty-five per cent of the 
state's money, three of them were from out of state. 
I was the only one who had been to the manor born, 
so to speak. 

Leibys In a historical nse this strikes me as a moder 
ately important development. It suggests the de 
velopment of a nationwide market and a nationwide 
group of people to fill the market, ^hat is, there 
is a group of young executives who are coming up. 
^hey know one another. They're in touch with one 
another. And they're in a position to staff these 
various jobs. 

Banes And you might say, in addition, a growing conscious 
ness on the part of people that government was an 

- 78 - 

Bane: important business and should be handled by some 
one who knew his business. 

Leiby: Both the politicians and the businessmen thought 

this. Both the Chamber of Commerce and Harry Byrd 
thought the government ought to be run like a 

Bane: As an example, during that period the city manager 
form of government spraA all over the country. It 
started, incidentally, in Virginia. The first city 
manager form of government was in the city of Staunton, 
Virginia, And for many years the largest city to 
have a city manager form of government was Norfolk, 
Virginia, which had a city manager form of govern 
ment in the early days--two or three years after 
Staunton started it. Norfolk adopted it and 
employed a man named Ashburn to be city manager. 
Ashburn had been city manager of Staunton. He was 
about the only person who was available who had 
definite experience as a city manager. So they 
employed him and he stayed in Norfolk 
for twelve or fifteen years. Norfolk was just coming 
out of the First World War, the navy was on the make. 
When the navy is on the make Norfolk 

- 79 - 

Bane: prosperous. It always has been a navy town. 
It wanted a top notch type of government. 
They picked the one experienced city manager 
in the country, and off they went with it. 
That kind of thing was more or less in the air 
at that time. 

Leiby: Students of public administration like Gulick 

and Brownlow looked upon their jobs in a really 
practical way. They really looked for great 
advances in municipal government, first of all. 

Bane: They started mostly in municipal government. 
We used to insist, in those days, that 
municipal government, and to a large extent, 
state government, was to all intents and pur 
poses a commodity. It was collective house 
keeping, if you please. 

It's a commodity to the extent that you can 
buy as much as you want, as little as you want, 
of good quality or shoddy quality. And generally 
speaking, you get what you pay for. For instance, 
take municipal government, practically all that 
they do is collective housekeeping. Most of 

- 80 - 

Bane: the things local governments do my grandfather 
and his family did for himself, one way or an 
other. He took care of the road that went by 
his farm. He was warranted to do so. If he 
didn't do it himself, individually, he had 
to employ someone to take care of that road and 
he had to pay him. He took care of his own 
aged parents, he even looked after his well. 
One of my most interesting recollec 
tions, after I'd gone with the state of Virginia 
as Welfare Commissioner, my uncle, who lived 
on our old home place in Virginia, wrote me 
to come to see him. I went up, and he was in 
a row with the county health officer, who had 
just been appointed in Stafford County, Virginia. 

He had sent some young men out there to inspect 

his well. And they had trespassed on his 

propertyl His well was all right. It had 
been all right for generations. "And what was 
all this business about germs anyway." (Laughter) 
So we used to take care of our own health. 

Insofar as education is concerned, in the 
East particularly, before the turn of the 

- 81 - 

Bane: century most people who sent their children to 

high school, if they could afford to do it, sent 
them to private schools. And the states abounded 
in academies for boys and seminaries for girls. 
Now government comes along and takes over most 
of that. 

But we have learned to want many, many of 
these things. And we have learned to insist 
that our governments equip themselves to provide 
these various commodities in an adequate and ef 
fective manner. 

Leiby: Suppose this idea of government as a commodity 
and standards of measuring service I suppose 
this was one of the most important ideas of the 

Bane: That's what we were urging in the 1920s, that 
government is a technical business requiring 
competent trained personnel. We used to say, "In 

- 82 - 

Bane: the health field we're going to spend a lot of your 
money on two things: Inspection of the dairies that 
supply milk and inspection of the milk itself. And 
we're going to examine the water that comes out of 
the Holston River, four or five times a day. " A nd 
they would say, "Pour or five times a day?" And we 
would say,"1fc% all to keep you from having typhoid 
fever and other diseases. If you don't want it 
inspected, if you want to take * chance on typhoid 
and other diseases that you used to have, cut it out." 

Leiby: They weren't so keen for that. The health field then 
was one field where you oould make a real ease for 

Bane: We used it not only in that particular field but we 
used it as an argument for other fields. But 
we couldn't be as specific. We couldn't point to 
definite results. We couldn't say, for instance, "If 
you set up this playground in this neighborhood 
it will reduce your crime twenty five percent.* 
But we could use the same kind of an argument. "It 
will keep them off the streets, it will keep children 
out of the back alleys, it will keep them out of 

- 83 - 

Bane: 'mischief . '" 

Leibys Now looal government is housekeeping, it's a commodity. 
And you're trying to get across the idea that you get 
what you pay for here. And there are standard** A nd 
one should not just think of the costs but also of the 
standards. You say this is peculiarly true of local 
communities. You wouldn't characterize state govern 
ment as collective housekeeping? 

Bane: Yes. I said it's primarily true of local governments. 
It's almost equally true of state governments,, For 
instance in state governments, where does seventy-five 
to eighty cents of every dollar of state revenue go? 
First it goes into education, which is the biggest 
expenditure. Then it goes into welfare and 
highways, which are second and third in almost all 
states. Then it goes into health and conservation. 

Take a look at those services. Every one a 
century ago was largely an individual family job. 
It was not until the turn of the century that they 

became primarily public services. 
Leiby: With standards. It would be true that your local 

governments were more interested in direct service. 
Bane: Arid then they brought the states into it. 

- 84 - 

Leiby: And the states are not so much interested. 

Bane: They're not very interested in operating them, except highways 
they are interested in standards; for instance, let's 
take education. When I first went to Wansemond County 
we were just getting out of a system that had been 
prevalent there for a long time. The system was 
that on the third Monday in July at the county court 
house an examination would be given for teachers to 
teach in the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth 
grades f local examinations set up by the county it 
self with no particular state standards or state cer- 
tifaotion. The state came into the picture and when 
they did they came in, as they always do, through 
financial help. And standards always followed fi 
nancial help whether it's federal to state or state 
to locality. So the first thing that the state did 
when they came into the picture with what they called 
an equalization fund was to require certain standards. 

Leiby: Of teacher selection. 

Bane: Exactly. A uniform method of certification. 

The same thing applied in roads. Up until 1916 
in Virginia we had no state highway department. 
Roads were the county's business. And working on 

- 85 - 

Bane: the roads was a very interesting operation. You 

dug out the ditches in the wintertime and threw the 
mud in the middle of the road, so the road would 
drain. And in the springtime you hitched a pair of 
mules to a heavy drag and filled in the ruts. It 
was 1914 before there was a yard of concrete road in 
the state of Virginia. Initially then there were two 
stretches about nine miles each, one from Hopewell 
to Petersburg, the rail head, and that stretch was 
built by the Du Pont Company who had built a plant at 
Hopewell. And the other was from Lee Hall, Virginia, 
to Newport News, Virginia. The navy built that 
one. It was built for the navy, not as a federal road 
building program. The warehouses for the navy were 
at Lee Hall and the docks were at Newport News. 

Leiby: Then in 1916 came the Federal Highway Act, 

Bane: And the state set up a State Highway Department and 
they began to get into the road-building business in 
a big way. 

Leiby: And insist on certain standards. It was more dif 
ficult to do this in welfare wasn't itft 

Bane: In those days they used to say, "The road business is 
easy to get into because roads are concrete. And wel- 

- 86 - 

Bane: fare is so abstract." 

Leiby: Let's get back to this group of people who are 

taking the administrative jobs in the 1920s, You 
said that in the 1920s you went around and visited 
people, I suppose you did this at Knoxville, too, 
didn't you? 

Bane: Yes* 

Leiby i And then as Virginia 1 ! Welfare Commissioner you'd 

take your vacations and go to visit people, Now who 
were some of the people you visited? 

Bane: To repeat what we discussed yesterday, when I went to 
Virginia as welfare commissioner, I did not have a 
complete and thorough training in the field of wel 
fare administration. So I immediately ran into prob 
lems that I didn't know too much about or wondered 
about. So I started visiting people around the 
country that I thought were competent in this field. 
The first place I started to go was New York because 
I'd had some experience at Columbia. 

Leiby i You had personal associations there. 

Bane: Yes, with George W, Kirchwey. And through him I met 
Hastings Hart, And those two happened to be, at that 
time, perhaps, the leading authorities in the country 

- 87 - 

Bane: in the field of penology. The problem 

that was giving me most trouble was, perhaps, the 
problem of mental health and mental hospitals 
So I started using my vacations to visit hospitals 
that I had heard were good or had read about o 

Leiby: How did you hear and where did you hear? 

Bane: I would get Survey Magazine, the Mental Health As- 
sooiation had a magazine, the American Psychiatric 
Association had a magazine* 

Leiby: There was Mental Hygiene. s o you really read those. 

Bane: I would read those magazines. And while I was in New 
York seeing these other people, I would go around to 
the National Committee for Mental Hygiene. That was 
being run by a man named Clifford W. Beers, who had 
once been a mental patient, incidentally. And his 
chief assistant was a young man by the name of 
George W. Stevenson. They would suggest places 
for me to go. One of them that I went to visit was the 
Irenton State Hospital in New Jersey and its then 
superintendent, Dr. Henry Cotton. 

Leiby: They really sent you to Cotton I 

Ban*: They sent me to Cotton. 

Leiby: My, my I 

- 88 - 

Bane: And they also sent me to Massachusetts, to Foxboro 
and several other hospitals up there. Also, to one 
of the psychiatric clinics right outside of Boston. 

In prisons it was suggested that I go out to 
Illinois. They were building a brand new prison 
in the form of a circle, which was supposed to be 
escape proof. It is interesting to note that I 
was out there at the dedication of that prison. I'd 
hardly gotten back to Richmond and gotten settled in 
my office before three people escaped from this es 
cape proof prison. (Laughter) I visited all around 
the country with these people. And, of course, as 
always happens, I would say, "Come down and see what 
we're doing. Give us a little advice on this." 
They would become interested. And pretty soon we 
were visiting back and forth. 

Another person was Mr. Homer Folks in I.'ew York. 
And another was C.C. Carstens. He was head of the 
Child Welfare League of America. And he's the person 
that used to recommend social workers for our chil 
dren's bureau in Virginia. 

- 89 - 

Bane: So what the Virginia Department turned out 

to be was largely an outgrowth of the distilled ideas 
of about fifteen or twenty people all around the 

Leiby* You would think that progress would come from New 
York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Massachusetts. 
These would be the places with the big problems and 
the professional people and the forward looking 
programs. Do you remember these states in that 

Bane: Yes. Not only in New York State but in New York 
City itself there was a group of people who had come 
from all around and were running these large agencies 
of one kind or another, like the Child Welfare League. 
Leiby: Private, national agencies. 

Bane: Yes, Like the New York State Charities Aid Associ 
ation that Homer Polks was running, the Russell 
Sage Foundation, with Hastings Hart. 
And that waa the chief center. In addition, Boston 
was quite a center in those days, especially in the 
field of mental health. And New Jersey with its 
Dr. Johns tone and Alex Johnson and its Vineland 
experiment, everybody went there, including myself. 
Leiby: What about Illinois? Illinois had had a reorganization, 
one of the first states to do so. 

- 90 - 

Bane: It was the first, in 1917, under Governor Frank 

Lowden. It set the pattern for state reorganiza 
tions for the next twenty years. When Lowden be 
came Governor of Illinois he had what most states 
had in those days, a loose conglomeration of 
agencies, semi-independent, each doing a particular 
job without reference to the whole pattern, and 
most of the heads of them elected by the people. 
The directors of agriculture, education, con 
servation, and even of fish and game. So, Lowden 
initiated a study of the government and developed 
a pattern, which was the cabinet pattern. All 
of us took that pattern, I think, perhaps too 
much too slavishly adhered to the pattern. But 
through the next twenty years, practically every 
state government that was reorganized wanted to 

1) A responsible organization; 2) An ef 
fective organization; and 3) An organization that 
could be operated by one person who could control 
costs to some extent. And out of that idea grew 
the executive budget. Immediately following the 
executive budget came state personnel departments, 
on the old theory that government essentially is people 

- 91 - 

Bane: and money* 

Leiby: Do you remember hearing anything about California 
in those days? 

Bane: I didn't hear too much about California in those days. 

Leiby: Did you visit it? 

Bane: I did not visit it for very obvious reasons; ap 
propriations were small, it cost a lot of money to 
go to California. So as far west as I went in those 
days was Chicago and Springfield, Illinois. 

Leiby: How about in the South? There were some interesting 
things going on in Alabama and North Carolina. 

Bane: Alabama particularly, yes. There was a Mrs. Tunstall 
who was for many years welfare commissioner in 
Alabama. And in the realm of child welfare activities 
she did an outstanding job, one of the best in the 
country. She never got into the institutional phase. 
But in child welfare and in extramural welfare ssh 
did an excellent job. And, by the way, her assistant 
in those days was a young girl by the name of Loula 
Dunn, who made a national reputation first by being 
with Harry Hopkins and his outfit and then succeeding 
Mrs. Tunstall as the welfare commissioner in Alabama. 
For ten or twelve years she has been director of the 

- 92 - 

Bane: American Public Welfare Association. She just 

resigned last month. 
Leiby: Hon< is it that Alabama gets a forward looking child 

welfare program? 

Bane: Personalities mostly* This should not be taken too 
seriously*, but this was Mrs. Tunstall's explanation 
of why Alabama did well in this field. She used to 
say from many a platform around the country that 
when she first became commissioner her department 
didn't amount to much because she couldn't get any 
money and it was a red-headed stepchild of the 
legislature and the governor's office and everything 
else. And year after year she butted her head 
against that stone wall of where and how are 
are we going to get the money to run 
this department? And then she had an inspiration 
as to how to solve the problem. She acted upon that 
inspiration and did solve the problem. She married 
the Speaker of the Legislature in Alabama 
and thereafter they lived happily ever after, 
in the family and in the Welfare Department. (Laughter) 
That was Mrs. Tunstall's story And I think there was 
a great deal to it. 

Leiby: She went to great lengths to get political support. 
Bane: She would say, "Anything for Welfare." (Laughter) 

- 93 - 

National Conference of Social Work 

Leiby: Could we get into the origin of the Public Welfare Associatic 
Did you attend the meetings of the National 

Conference of Charities? 

Bane: Yes. It was first the National Conference of 

Charities and Corrections and then it became the 
National Conference of Social Work. I used 
to attend those meetings regularly. 

Leiby: You regularly attended the meetings. What were 
they like? 

Bane: Mostly they were speeches and papers speeches in 

the large meetings, the general meetings; what they 
called papers in the group meetings-or discussions 
of day-to-day operations, shop talk. But out of 
those meetings there began to develop among us 
people like Sanford Bates and John Ellis,. Mrs. 
Tunstall, and Mrs. Bosh of North Carolina 
the idea that those conferences should 
be directed a little bit more toward 
the public problem rather than dealing 

- 94 - 

Bane: almost exclusively with the technique of the opera 
tion of a private agency or the technique of casework. 
In those days there was a section of the National 
Conference of Social Work, Section Nine, which was 
called Public Welfare Officials Section; and it 
always had the back room. We were regarded if not 
as politicians, as people who have to handle the 
day-to-day routine dishwashing jobs in the general 
area; that we didn't have time for the philosophy 
or the scientific approach to these problems. And 
that if we did have the time we wouldn't know how 
to do it. 

Leiby: How do you suppose they got this status? Originally 
the National Conference was set up by state boards. 

Bane: That's right. I think they got that reputation 
primarily because, with the development of social 
work as a specific and technical profession, 
they began to get more and more leery of 
what they regarded, particularly in New Jersey, as 
politics. Stay away from those contaminated people. 
I used to say, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, 
that when Harry Hopkins came to Washington as 

- 95 - 

Bane: Director of the Federal Bnergency Relief Admin 
istration he had a suspicion that 
every politician had horns and a tail. He 
would avoid them at all costs. After a while, 
after working with them there in Washington, he 
found that they were really interested in what 
he was trying to do. And, furthermore, they 
could help him enormously. 

Leiby: Could you characterize the group that seemed to 
you, as you attended these meetings, to dominate 
the conference? ^hey would be from private agencies, 
but could you characterize them more specifically 
than that? 

Bane: I would say that it was a group that had embarked 
on what, in those days, was to a large extent a 
new profession. For some reason or other, some 
times it was a related reason, they had gotten 
into this profession some from the ministry, some 
from medicine, some from education and they were 
very anxious to establish social work as a profession 
in the public mind- with certain definite standards. We 
talked a great deal in those days about standards. 

Leiby: Meaning standards of service. 

- 96 - 

Bane: Standards of service and standards of training for 
the service. And they thought that the standards 
could be best implemented through private agencies, 
such as the Family Welfare Agency and related 
agencies, the National Children's Bureau in 
the public sector. 

Leibys So in general then, just as you would go to the 
Child Welfare Association in New York because 
they would be the ones who would help you, the 
importance of these national agencies was that 
insofar as anybody eould set a standard, they 
set them. 

Bane: They set them. And insofar as anybody could 

promote a certain level of service, they promoted 

Leiby: They were the authority to whom you as an admin 
istrator would turn. You're not an ezpert on 
child welfare, you go out and hire an ezpert. 
Whom do you hire? You hire them. 

Hiring Sooial Workers 

Leiby: This is a little digression. When I talk to you 
and many others about the 1920s they talk about 

the unfolding opportunities. If you had a little 
background you could go a long way. And yet if 
you look at the writings of people who were in 
the schools of social work, or civics, or phi 
lanthropy, or what have you, they're always 
complaining about the low salaries paid to social 
workers. As a man who runs a child welfare opera 
tion you must hire social workers. And you're 
looking for them and can't find them. On the 
other hand they turn out people and they don't 
give the impression that people are writing them 
all the time saying, who can we employ?, we'll 
offer this much. This seems to be a little in 
congruous . 

Bane: Yes. Everybody always complains about low salaries, 
especially in certain areas, particularly in sala 
ries for teachers* Teachers' salaries beginning 
about that time began a rise. In recent years the rise 
has been rather substantial. We were used to 

- 98 - 

Bane: teachers then, we weren't used to social workers. 
We could sell our budget bureaus a little bit 
better on providing a somewhat better salary for 
a social worker by more or less emphasizing that 
here is a special kind of teacher. We would say 
here is a person with a graduate degree. They 
always thought of the salaries in the range of 
teacher's salaries. 

We used to be able to 
justify a little additional salary by saying, 
yes, this is a teacher all right but a teacher 
with additional specialized training. 

Leiby: You would have thought that competition would 
have forced up the price. 

Bane: Yes, but somehow or other it didn't seem to 

work that way. Although then, as now, and I'm 
certain the social work group would agree to 
this, the big salaries were paid at the top 
and it went downward too steeply when 
it got down to the third and fourth echelons. 

Leiby: I have a feeling that the professional schools of 
social work were in fact much more interested and 
perhaps were pressured into training case workers 

- 99 - 

Leiby: who were directly involved in service. And they 

were not really training administrators. 

Bane: They weren't training administrator s^that is, not many. 
Leiby: You must have been in a position where people 

called you up and said, "Who can we hire? We've 
got a job here." And you didn't say, "Write 
Edith Abbott," the Dean of the Chicago School of 
Social Service Administration. 

Bane: No * not for an administrative job. The emphasis 
was on casework and it was not on administration. 
It was not on administration until the days of 
the depression. Early in the depression the FERA 
set aside a certain amount of money which they 
would give as a grant to schools of social work to 
train certain kinds of social workers. They were 
interested in a soial work background but with an 
administrative aspect to it as well. 
Leiby: They were interested in administrators who knew 

something about social work. 

Bane: Yes. And Edith Abbott once said to me, "I'm get 
ting too many women here. And I want 
Harry (Hopkins) to send me men." PERA designated many of 
the people, then, to go to these schools. She said 

- 100 - 

Bane: to me, "You tell Harry to send me some men and I 
mean some sure enough men. I don't care if they 

chew tobacco and spit on the floor," (Laughter) 

Leiby: Did you talk very much to Edith Abbott about 
personnel problems? 

Bane: We used to talk a great deal because we lived 
in the same block after we moved to Chicago. 

Leiby: How about when you were going to New York? Did 
you ever talk to Porter Lee [Director of the New 
York School of Social Work] very much about 
personnel problems? 

Bane: Yes. That's what I talked to him mostly about. 
Porter Lee and Walter Petit [professor at the 
New York School of Social Work] both talked about 
personnel problems with me. Incidentally, we 
established such a relationship there that it 
continued with Porter Lee for years afterwards. 
Porter Lee and myself were both on Hoover's first 
Committee on Emergency Employment. It probably 
grew out of that relationship. 
Leiby: When you talked to them about personnel, what did 

you talk about? Did you ask to hire? 
Bane: Yes. I would say, "I want two or three people, 
this kind of people." For instance, a medical 

- 101 - 

Bane: social worker to help me set up mental hygiene 

clinics; or I want a caseworker; or I want some 
one who has had some experience in running a 
clinic in a penal institution, 

Leiby: My impression is that graduates of schools of 
social work could not command higher salaries 
than people who didn't have advanced training. 
If you had a year of social work you could get a 
job easier but you couldn't really command much 
of a higher salary. You hired some of these 
people. Was this your impression? 

Bane: No. I would say if they had some social work 

background, especially if they had a considerable 
amount sometimes I used to say, a specific package 
in this area, educationwise--that they could com 
mand a higher salary. 

Leiby: So as an employer, then, you paid for what you got. 

Bane: We paid for what we got. To take a specific 

instance: In Knoxville we wanted a health of 
ficer. We'd had a city physician. In those days 
a city physician was on the payroll but he just 
went to see the indigent sick occasionally. 
We were going to set up a bureau of public health 
and we wanted a top notch public health person. 

- 102 - 

Bane: So I went to Johns Hopkins University. 

Leiby: The best! 

Bane: To see a Dr. Freeman, who, incidentally, was a 
brother of Douglas Southall Freeman, the editor 
and historian. He had the best public health 
school in the country. 

Leiby: Yes, yes, the best I 

Bane: In addition to that I knew him and knew his family. 
I said,, "Pick me a health officer. I'd like to 
interview him after you've picked him, but purely 
from the standpoint of personal characteristics 
and so on, whether we can get along together. But 
you pick the man." He picked a Dr. Hagood and 
loaded him on the train. Freeman used to say, 
facetiously, that he "Crated him and sent him down." 
(Laughter) He did load him on the train and said, 
"Go on down to Knozville and take this job." 

We paid him a good salary. 

Leiby: You paid out the money and you got the commodity. 
Bane: We paid the money and we got the commodity. 
Leiby: Was there any other place that you would meet 

your associates as administrators other than the 

- 103 - 

Leiby: National Conference of Charities and your in* 
formal visiting around? 

Consulting in Public Administration 

Banes Oh, maybe we would casually meet each other fre 
quently. For instance, when visiting the 
Children's Bureau, which was a center at that time, 
you ran into Tom, Dick and Harry and Alice, Maud, 
and Kate from around the country. 

Lei"by: You didn't get acquainted with these people at 
meetings of the American Political Association? 

Bane: No, those people went to other places, i we nt to the 

American Political Science Associations for entirely 
different reasons* 

Leiby: Why did you go there? 

Bane: First, 1 was interested in administration; secondly, 
I had gone to school with those people; and thirdly, 
so many people in our state legislatures and other 
government departments were going to these various 
meetings, and it was more or less the thing to do. 

- 104 - 

Leiby: John Ellis never went to one, I know that. He 

went to the American Prison Association. He was 
a corrections man. 

Bane: I didn't go to that meeting as I did to the social 
work groups. Later I would go occasionally, but 
not regularly. 

Leiby: But your connection with the American Political 
Science Association was more of a personal thing. 

Bane: It was personal, not professional. 

Leiby s I mean, you didn't go there to hire people. 

Bane: No* I belonged to that association for many, 
many years. I didn't go as regularly 
as I did to the National Conference of Social Work. 

Leiby: Haw about the National Institute of Public Admin 
istration? You were a consultant for them. When 
did you first meet Luther Gulick? 

Bane: H e came to Virginia to do a study in 1926, and I 
met him then. 

Leiby t How old was he then? 

Bane: I would guess that he's four or five years older 

than I am. I would say he was in his early forties 
then. I was in my middle thirties. Several 
years afterward he was in Virginia and 

- 105 - 

Bane: he talked with, me about taking a part time job on 

a spot basis with the National Institute of Public 

Leiby: H e wanted to hire you. And, at first, you must have 

looked to him as a sort of expert. 
Bane: Perhaps. He was the head of that outfit. And he 

liked what we'd done in Virginia. Furthermore, he 

liked the *titud that we'd had toward the or 
ganization of state government, namely, we 
didn't want anybody between us and the governor. 

We didn' t want any protection. We'd much rather 
have help and support than protection. We sup 
ported his reorganization plan in Virginia for a com 
missioner appointed directly by the governor. So 
a couple of years later he asked me to come with 
the National Institute of Public Administration as 

a consultant to do spot jobs when they were making 

state surveys, to take over the welfare end of it. 

Leiby: Did they make a living making state surveys? 

Bane: That was a large part of their job. 

Leiby: What else did they do? 

Bane: They did various and sundry research projects. 
They did demonstration projects. They would go 
into a department in New York City and reorganize 

- 106 - 

Bane: the accounting end of it, the reporting end of it, 
or the filing systems anything of that kind. 

Leiby: Would you say they were sort of a link between 
academic and practical administration? 

Bane: That's what they were and that's what they in 
tended to be. 

Leiby: Do you recall any difficulties in establishing 
this link? 

Bane: Not particularly. The difficulties we encountered 
were neither with the academic profession, on the 
one hand, nor the practical boys on the other. 
They didn't think about the philosophical differences. 
The difficulties were in trying to uproot some vested 
interest and to get adequate appropriations for spe 
cific services. For instance, the first study that 
I worked on with the National Institute of Public 
Administration was a study of the state government 
of Maine in 1929. 

Leiby: Yes, I know that study. 

Bane: We recommended , in my area, the consolodation 
in a state the size of Maine, with the population of 
Maine-*of the welfare department, as such, and the 
health department. I didn 1 t put education 

- 107 - 

Bane: in, so it was not exactly the forerunner of 

Health, Education, and Welfare on the federal 
level. But here was the consolidation of related 
functions in a small state that couldn't afford 
elaborate, over-all administrative machinery for 
two departments. 

Leibyt Did the National Institute act as a clearing house 
in any way? 

Bane: Somewhat I imagine. I wasn't that close to them. 

Leiby: If you wanted to hire someone you would not call 
Luther Gulick? 

Bane: Yes, as an individual. 

Leiby: How about the Brookings Institute? 

Bane: Brookings was somewhat more elaborate , a larger 
institution. I also worked with them on the same 
kind of things. I did studies for them in New 
Hampshire, in Iowa, in Mississippi, in Alabama. 

Leiby: Who was running the Brookings Institute? 


Bane: Dr. Albert Hall was the head of their government 

division. He had previously been president of the 
University of Oregon. He was a political scientist. 
They had a stmff consisting of Powell, Lewis Meriam, 
Henry Seiderman and others. You might have known 
some of them. 

- 108 - 

Leiby: (Laughter) Oh yes, I've heard of Lewis Meriam, 

Bane: He was there. Henry Seiderman was their Finance 
Chairman, and I was their consultant on over-all 
management and on welfare. 

Bane: Did they do the same kind of thing as the N.I. P. A.? 

Leiby: Exactly the same and on the same basis. It 

was a contract basis for a study over a defi 
nite period of time, generally about six months, 
and submission of a report. In Iowa it involved 
not only the submission of a report, but then it 
involved a promotion job an agreement to go around 
the country, the statewith the governor to a dozen 
meetings or so to discuss the report before the 
legislature met. Governor Clyde Herring was 
governor in those days. He later went to the 
United States Senate from Iowa. He scheduled 
the meetings , criss crossing the state, Rotary 
Club meetings, Chamber of Commerce meetings, etc., 
to discuss this report. We both spoke at 
each of these meetings. 

Leiby: These groups had a small staff and they'd call in 
consultants men actually in the field. But their 
own costs were rather low. 

- 109 - 

Banes Yes. Each of them had about half a dozen men on 
their own staff, mostly in the realm of finance. 
Because the major problems were generally in the 
realm of finance. 

Leibyi A lawyer perhaps? 

Bane: Yes, but he didn't figure it was more of an 
economic job than a legal job. You could 
depend on the state attorney general for legal 

Leiby: Was their someone else besides Brookings? 

Bane: Yes. Brookings and the National Institute of Public 
Administration were non-profit organizations. There 
was another organization in the field, still is, I 
noticed they just made a study out here in the 
Western area,. Griffenhagen and Associates. 
They were in Chicago. They do work ex 
tensively in this field, both for local 
and state governments. 

Leiby i Who was the man at Griffenhagen? 

Bane: Griffenhagen, himself. 

Leiby Oh. Now, where would you meet Luther Gulick and 
Albert Hall? I mean, they never attended the 
National Conference, I suppose. 

- 110 - 

Bane: No, I would go to see them. 

Leiby: They never showed up at the National Conference? 

Bane: No. But both of them went to the American Political 

Science Association. 
Leiby: Oh. And you'd meet them there* We've just about run 

out of time* 

- 1131 - 

(Interview of January 9> 1965) 

National Conference of Social Work and Public 
Welfare Officials 

Leiby: Last hour we were talking about how you got to 
gether with your peers in various associations. 
And these weren't very satisfactory. Did John 
Ellis of New Jersey show up at the National 

Bane: Yes. He was very prominent at the National 

Conference. He was one of the most prominent 
men in Division Nine, which was known as the 
Division of Public Welfare Officials, along with 
Dick Conant of Massachusetts, Grace Abbott of 
the Children's Bureau, and a number of others 
that I could mention. 

Leiby: In other words, quite a few executives did show up, 

Bane: Yes, I would guess from ten to fifteen. Not too 
many but they were the ones who were generally in 
terested in matters other than their day-to-day 

- 112 - 

Leiby: How were those programs organized? Do you remember? 

Bane: In those days the Secretary of the National Con 
ference was Howard Knight. His office 
was in Columbus, Ohio. He was primarily interested 
in private welfare because at that time, in the late 
'20s, the private welfare social work organizations 
not only controlled but they dominated the confer 
ence. There were only about a dozen or so public 
welfare officials who came regularly, despite the 
fact that the conference, when it began as a Con 
ference of Charities and Corrections, was established 
by public welfare people rather than private. But 
this Division Nine was a small division and Knight 
used to write to the people who generally came and 
ask what they would want on the program. He 
would set it up as a part of the Conference of 
Social Work. 

Leiby: Did he do this for a living or was this a part 
time job? 

Bane: He did it for a living. It was a full time job. 
The conference, in those days, had about five 
thousand members. Only about fifteen or twenty 
active heads of state departments would attend, if 

- 113 - 

Bane: that many. 

Leiby: How about municipal heads? 

Bane: Some of them would attend. I remember a few of 
them. The one I remember particularly was the 
head of the Welfare Department in the city of 
Cincinnati, Fred Hoeler. 

Leibyi That's good social work out in Cincinnati, good 
public social workers* 

Somewhere along the line you and your col 
leagues thought that something more was needed* 
Did you discuss this with Knight at all? 

Bane: Yes. In 1929 when the Conference met in Boston 
at the Statler Hotel, at the first meeting of 
Division Nine there was a considerable dissatis 
faction not only with the program, but with the 
attendance of public officials, and more impor 
tantly, the status or prestige which public of 
ficials had in that Conference. Division 

Nine decided to attempt to do something about it. 

Encouraging Division Nine to do just that was a 
gentleman we'll talk about considerably as 
we go along, Louis Brownlow. We've mentioned him 

- 114 - 

Bane: in a previous interview. He had been city manager 
of Petersburg, Virginia; Chairman of the District 
Commissioners in Washington; and he used to say 
that he thought of himself primarily as a public 
official but also as a social 
worker. Because generally in city government he 
would be interested in the social work aspects of 
government, such as relief, police, probation, 
health, and things of that kind a 

Leiby: What was his atatua? Was he a professor at this 

Bane: At that time he was connected loosely with the 

University of Chicago as a lecturer. But he was 
just getting ready to go to New Jersey for the 
City Housing Corporation, a private organization 
in New York, 

They had just employed Brownlow to go to New 
Jersey to build in a cabbage patch a modern, small 
city. It was built and was known as Radburn. 
It was a garden city built for the modern 
age no street crossings. 

Leiby: Oh yes, and underpasses, oh yes. 

Bane: Are you interested in Radburn? 

- 115 - 

Leiby: Oh, I was in American Civilization. 

Bane: One comment about Had burn, after they had the town 
just about built, they suddenly found out that 
they had forgotten a very, very serious aspect of 
life and living. The town was built with beauti 
ful front yards, beautiful back yards, and 
beautiful aide yards, and then the question came up, 
where do you hang out the wash? (Laughter) That 
worried Brownlow a great deal* (Laughter) 

In any event at this meeting in Boston it was decided 
to explore the establishment or organization of a 
separate association of public welfare officials. 

Organizing and Financing the Association 

Bane: We talked it over with Knight at the time and we talked 
much about the status and prestige of public of 
ficials in the welfare field. He 
was interested, sympathetic, and tolerant, but 
he didn't know exactly what he could do about it. 
That being so, a number of us, Brownlow par 
ticipating, decided we would explore the matter to see if 
we could find out how it could be done. A 

- 116 - 

Bane: small committee was appointed consisting of 
Grace Abbott, John Ellis, Dick Conant, a 
Mrs* La Du of Minnesota, and two or three 
others. We had a meeting during early 
1930 to explore the matter further and we found out 
via Brownlow that a certain gentleman was in 
terested in this subject and probably 
to the extent of putting money in a 
project such as the establishment of an Associa 
tion of Public Welfare Officials . That 
gentleman was Mr. Beardsly Ruml, who was 
at that time Director of the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial Fund, which later became 
the Spelman Fund. 

With that in mind various ideas were de 
veloped. When the Conference met in 193Q 
there were some rather definite plans as to how 
the thing should be done. We had maybe 
fifteen public welfare officials there. 
And as someone said later, "Then and there a 
committee was appointed with power to act," 

- 117 - 

Bane: always with the idea that money would proba 
bly be available. We rocked along with this 
committee until the fall of 1930, when two 
things happened almost simultaneously. 

In the fall of 1930, in October I 
think, I got a telephone call from a man 
named Joslin, who was one of the secretaries 
to President Hoover. He said that the Presi 
dent was going to set up an emergency com 
mittee for employment and that I would get a 
telephone call from a Mr. Arthur Woods, who 
was going to be chairman of the committee. 
He was going to talk to me about serving on 
this committee, and Joslin said he hoped I 
would do so. 

Mr. Woods called me and asked me 
about coming to Washington for a meeting. 
The date he first suggested was impossible 
for me because I had an engagement in Wash 
ington with this committee to talk 
about the organization of the American 

- 118 - 

Bane: Public Welfare Association. So we agreed I would 
stay over in Washington and talk the next day. 
So the committee met and decided to organize an 
association f accepted a proposition from the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial to contribute 
$50,000 a year for a period of five years with 
the hope and expectation that at the expiration 
of five years the association would be able to 
take care of itself. The committee then con 
stituted itself into an operating committee to 
draft a prospectus to be submitted to the Laura 
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. Part of the 
prospectus, of course, was the constitution and 
by-laws of the organization. The only thing 
that I remember about the discussion, connected 
with the constitution and by-laws, was the 
question of how a director should be appointed 
and what should be his method of operation and 
his term of service? It was finally agreed 
that he would be appointed by a board which 
would be selected or approved by the Division 
Nine of the National Conference of Social Work. 
And that he would serve at the pleasure of the 

- 119 - 

Bane: board with no term of office* That was 

the emerging public administration idea of a 
public official. 

The committee then put on its other hat 
because it was empowered to act. A couple of 
weeks later, having been assured the $50,000 a year 
would be forthcoming over a period of five 
years, the question was, how to organize? 
It was agreed that the initial board would be a 
committee of this ad hoc committee. The 
first question was who would be chairman? I 
knew two or three weeks later a lot more of 
what had gone on before than I knew at the 
time I went to this committee meeting. As a matter of 
fact looking back on it in retrospect two or 
three months later, I realized that although I 
was a member of the committee, 
no one was talking much to me. I later found 
out that there were three people who were doing 
a great deal of talking among themselves, Grace 
Abbott, Louis Brownlow, and Beardsly Ruml, the 
foundation director who was going to put up the funds. 
To repeat, when the committee met the first ques- 

- 120 - 

Bane: tion was, who would be chairman? It 

was moved, seconded, and duly passed that 
John Ellis would be chairman. The next ques 
tion was who would be executive director? All 
of this was happening in a period of just two 
or three weeks from the first committee meeting. 

Grace Abbott nominated a 

person that she said was a hybrid, a cross between 
a politician and a social worker. That was her 
nominating speech. At the end of her 
speech she suggested that the person was Prank 
Bane. So that's how I happened to be director. 
The question was would I accept? I didn't 
know whether I would accept or not until I could 
go back to Virginia and talk to Governor John 
Pollard, who had succeeded Byrd as governor, 

I had the opportunity, of course, 
to tie in this Hoover committee 
on which I had agreed to serve on a part- 
time loan basis with this developing situation in 
the American Public Welfare Association. After a 
number of conferences over a period of three or 
four days the Governor said , "If I were you 
I would take it. This is going to be important in 

- 121 - 

Bane: the next few years." So I resigned, and 
with his encouragement took that job. 

The first thing I looked for, of 
course, was staff. The first person 
that I appointed was Marietta 

Stevenson, to be assistant director. She was 
in the Children's Bureau in Washington, had 
been with them a number of years. But she was also 
a Ph.D. in political science from the University 
of Chicago. So there I had another hybrid, or 
there were two of us on the staff. We set 
up a little office in the Architects 1 Building, 
just off 18th Street 18th and P in Washington, 
and began to advise with state welfare de 
partments, commissioners, on development of a 
program what the states should do with respect 
to the accelerating problem of relief. 

Leiby: What was the date that you set up the office? 

Bane: I would surmise that it was early September, 1931. 

Leiby: 1931, so the situation was getting very grave in 
deed, going into the second winter. 

Bane: Yes. And in the meantime, of course, the committee 

- 122 - 

Bane i for emergency employment had resigned, not with 

any great fanfare, but individually, because they 
thought they had done everything they could. 

Bnergency Relief 

Bane: Another committee had been established by 
the President, called the Gifford Committee. 
Gifford, who was then President of American 
Telephone and Telegraph, was chairman, and Croxton, 
who had been on the first committee, went over 
with Gifford to maintain a certain continuity. 

We were working with more energy and in 
tensity month by month as we assembled a staff 
on the one hand and as conditions got worse on 
the other. Early in 1932 we, of course, got 
into the midst of the discussion of federal 
relief or no federal relief. And we were divided. 
Divided to such an extent that we agreed as of the 
spring of 1932 not to take any position on it. 

Leiby: Now is this the Gifford Committee? 

Bane: No, the American Public Welfare Association board. 

- 123 - 

Bane: The Gifford Committee was definitely opposed to 
any federal aid. But it looked as though some 
thing were coming about, namely that sooner or 
later we would have to have welfare departments 
operating in every state administering a relief program, 
however that relief program might be set-up. 

Reconstruction Finance Corporation 

Something happened in Washington very soon 
that gave the American Public Welfare Association, 
this new organization, a great shot in the arm and 
got it off to a running start. Congress, in the 
early summer of 1932, passed the Reconstruction 
Finance Act that had been recommended by the ad 
ministration. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
was established. Due to pressure from both 
senate and house members, Joe Robinson in the 
Senate and John Nance Garner in the House, the 
President agreed to a section in the 
bill to loan certain monies to the states 
for relief. That section authorized the ap 
propriation of two or three hundred 

- 124 - 

Bane: million dollars, to be loaned to the 

states. It provided that the money would 
be loaned and must be paid back. If it wasn't paid 
back by a state, the amount of the loan would 
be subtracted from federal grants to the 
state for roads during the next fiscal year. 

That did three things: it provided 
federal money for relief, it got the federal 
government into the relief picture, and it 
saved everybody's face. 

Leiby: You said that the congressmen who planned this 
amendment understood perfectly well that the 
states would not pay back, probably. Did the 
President understand this? 

Bane: Oh, I'm certain he had to understand it. Any 
one in government knew that the moment the 
twenty-fifth state, the majority of one, bor 
rowed the money, you could forget it. 

Leiby: There would be a landslide repudiation. (Laughter) 

Bane: Yes. Of course, none of it was ever paid back, 

Immediately, the G-ifford Committee became in 
terested as to how this money was going to be 

! ! - 125 - 

Bane: allocated and administered. Aa a matter of 

fact, Mr. Fred Croxton moved over from the com 
mittee to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 
The American Public Welfare Association, then, 
had a direct connection with the R.F.C. because 
Croxton had been on the old Hoover committee 
with me and we worked together on the whole 

State Emergency Relief Programs 

So, with the cooperation and support of the 
R.F.C. the American Public Welfare Association 
took over the job of negotiating, in an advisory 
capacity, with the states to set up the necessary 
machinery which they would need to administer the 
money which the R.F.C. was going to loan to them. 

Leiby: The R.F.C. is a money lending corporation? 

Bane: Just a money lending corporation. 

Leiby: And they have money to lend to states. But they 

don't know how to lend it, the procedures, or what 

- 126 

Leiby: to expect in return? They can lend money to banks, 
they understand that. 

Bane: They were lending money to banks, to railroads, to 

large corporations. But they also could loan money to 
the states on the application of the governor. If 
the governor certified that he needed the money for 
relief, they would loan it to him. But the H.F.C. 
didn't know what the governor should do with the 
money once he had it. 

Leiby: It should be the condition to the loan. 

Bane: They thought, largely at Croxton's instigation, 

that it would be helpful if some machinery existed 
somewhere to advise with the states J on im 
proving existing departments in some states, 
and setting up new departments in many 
states. That is how the American Public 
Welfare Association got into that picture. 

And about that time it's interesting how 
things developed so rapidly in those days 
the Carnegie Corporation indicated to certain 
people that they were interested in the 

- 127 - 

Bane: relief picture* Enormous pressure had been 

brought upon them to make direct contributions 
to a New York City organization simply to buy 

Leiby: Do you know who was putting this pressure on? 

Bane: Well just everybody around New York. 

Leiby: New York public officials? 

Bane: New York public officials and private officials. 
1 guess it was private officials mostly because 
they were conducting most of the relief centers 
at that time. 

Leiby: Yes* And then the Carnegie Corporation would 
give them the money and they would hand it out* 

Bane: Yes. The director at that time was in 
terested in getting into the picture but he 
didn't want to get into that kind of picture, 
that is, buying and distributing food. 

Leiby: There's no future in that. That's not what a 
foundation is set up *io do. 

Bane: That's what he talked with us about. So, on 
his own, he offered two organizations some 
money. He offered the American Public 
Welfare Association $40,000 . 

- 128 - 

Bane: And he offered the Family Service Organization 

in Mew York, Lynton Swift's organization, $40,000. 
Needless to say in those days both organizations 
needing money, we accepted the grant. And 
we went out immediately to beef up our staff. 

Leiby: Did the federal government pay you for your ad 
visory service? 

Bane: No, nothing. 

Leiby: This was gratis. 

Bane: Gratis. We wanted it that way at that time. 

Leiby: I see. But the Carnegie Corporation would pay 
you some extra money. 

Bane: Yes, on top of what the Spelman group had 
given us. 

Within a short period of time, over a month 
or six weeks I would say, we employed Aubrey 
Williams, Burdette Lewis, Frank Persons, and 
Howard Hunter. Later, when we got additional money 
from the Rockefeller people, and the states began 
to put in a little money , we added 
people such as Robert Lansdale, who was later in 
New York as State Commissioner of Social Welfare, 

- 129 - 

Bane: Nothing was more in the public eye. In the 
next two or three years the American Public 
Welfare Association prospered, both from the 
standpoint of grants and from the stand 
point of what we were really able to 
do in setting up welfare departments in 
the states. 

Leiby: Can you tell me a little about what you wanted 
your staff to do and how you went about hiring 
them? You must have had a job for each person. 

Bane* Oh we had a job for each of them. They were more 
or less the same jobs but they were in different 
territory. The immediate job the governor 
would borrow a certain amount of money, then he 
would immediately raise the question of how he was 
going to administer this fund? How he was going 
to handle it? And if he asked the R.F.C. the 
R.F.C. would say, you public welfare officials 
state public welfare officials you have an 
organization, why don't you ask them? The gov 
ernors would ask us* And we would send Burdette 
Lewis to the Midwest, Frank Persons to the East, 
Aubrey Williams to the South, and Howard Hunter 

- 130 - 

Bane: to the West, They worked with the governors 

right in the state capitols. 

Leiby: They were sort of field representatives. 
Bane: Field representatives, largely doing the same 
Job, That is, they were attempting to aid 
the welfare departments already existing, at 
tempting to enlarge the relief and extramural 
picture in the states that had nothing but a 
board of control, by setting up a welfare unit 
in the board of control in states such as Iowa, 
Minnesota, and Kansas, and organizing a de 
partment in states such as Mississippi that 
had no department at all. Aubrey Williams did 
the job in Mississippi, 

Aubrey came back to Chicago to see me and 
said he thought maybe that it might be all right, 
in that state, if we suggested to the governor 
that he use the money to subsidize various 
private organizations that were already in 
the field. I said, "Aubrey, if you make that 
suggestion to the governor you can't work for us. M 
We have a principle and a slogan , "public funds should be ac 

- 131 - 

Banei ministered by public agencies." Aubrey had come 
from a private agency in Milwaukee. Aubrey 
thought about that for two or three days as I sug 
gested, and came back and said that he agreed with 
us. The next thing I knew Aubrey was going much 
further in that direction than I was* 
(Laughter) When he became converted he was con- 
verted lock, stock and barrel as witness his later 
development of W.P.A. and the National Youth Ad 


Leiby: Now when the governors borrowed the money, did 
they have to have some sort of state plan? 

Bane: No, no state plan. The plan idea came in with the 
Social Security Act. They borrowed it on the basis 
of a letter stating that there was a need and they 

would like to borrow a certain amount of money. 
Of course, as always, the R.P.C. had taken the 
gross appropriation and tentatively al 
located it in their own minds on a basis of need, 
population, and things of that kind. So there was 
a limit to how much a governor could borrow. But 
he could borrow within limits on the basis of his 
statement, that there was need, and the states and 
the localities were not able to handle it. 

- 132 - 

Leiby: Did your field representatives have any authority? 

Bane: None at all. 

Leiby: The only authority they had was if the governors 
didn't listen to them, they'd tell you, you'd 
tell the R.F.C., and the R.F.C. might frown. So 
informally they had some authority. 

Bane: Informally. But we had no authority. 

Leiby: But they did not have to formally submit a plan. 

Bane: Hot at all. 

Leiby: So the working was all informal. As a matter of 
fact I would suppose there was considerable coop 

Bane: Oh yes, a great deal. This money that the gov 
ernors were getting was money they were borrowing. 
And they were instructed by the Act to pay it back. 
Of course most of the governors were as well aware 
of the facts of political life as Garner and 

Leiby: Can you tell me something more about each of these 
individuals the field representatives? Now you 
had to hire people to do this job for you. So you 
had to look around. Can you tell me a little bit 
more about how you did that? 

- 133 - 

Banes We looked around . We talked to a great 
many people, 

Leiby: To whom did you talk? 

Bane: Anybody that we ran into. We had to have a staff. 
We wanted a top notch staff the best people we 
could get. And we'd ask for suggestions. 
For instance , with respect to Frank 
Persons, Prank had been Director of the 
National American Red Cross. He f d left them 
and gone into business. The business had folded up 
or was greatly reduced. I found out that Frank 
was out of a job. The opportunity to get on our 
staff a man of the stature, background, training, 
prestige of a former Director of the Red Cross was not 
to be overlooked. I got on a train immediately and went 
to see Frank Persons. We made a bargain and he came with 
us. The same thing applied with respect to 
Burdette Lewis, who had been Commissioner of 
Corrections in New York during the Mitchel ad 
ministration. H e had also been in N e w Jersey and 
also went into private business and didn't do so 
well. They were the first two. Aubrey 
Williams was the third. I think I heard 

- 134 - 

Bane: about him through a woman "by the name of May 
Hankins , who had worked In Milwaukee . 

She was quite a friend of Marietta 

Leiby: He had been an executive of the Family Welfare 
Agency in Milwaukee. 

Bane: Yes* 

Leiby: They kept running out of funds. (Laughter) 

Bane: Yes. And years later Aubrey used to say to me 

he didn't know in those days where his next rtnt 
check was coming from, despite the fact that he 
had four small boys. So that's the way we as 
sembled our staff. It was done very rapidly, 
in about six weeks. 

Leiby: How about Hunter? 

Bane: Hunter had been with the Community Chest in Grand 
Rapids, Michigan. 

Leiby: He was also in private welfare work. 

Bane: Yes. That's the way our staff got together. 
In those days it was quite a staff. We were 
not hampered by the things a new organization 
was usually hampered byj money and having to 
search ad infinitum for people. We had a major 

- 135 - 

Bane: project, which was the chief interest of the 

whole country, the job was just to get it done, 

Leiby: Yes. Where were you located then? I gather you 
were in Chicago. 

Bane: I started off, as I mentioned to you, in three 

offices in the Architect's Building in Washington. 
But that was purely temporary. The agreement was 
that we would move to Chicago. That was one of 
the reasons that Laura Spelman Rockefeller and 
Beardsley Ruml were interested in the American 
Public Welfare Association. They were 
planning then to move a group of government 
organizations to Chicago and establish a gov 
ernmental center there. So part of our bargain 
with the Spelman Fund was that within a reason 
able time, as soon as was convenient, we would move to 
Chicago and establish a central office there. When we 
got to Chicagt, already there in the same 
building, 850 East 58th Street, was the Public 
Administration Clearinghouse, Louis Brownlow'sj 
the International City Manager's Association 
with Ridley; the American Municipal League with 
Paul Betters; and the American Legislators' 

- 136 - 

Bane: Association with Henry Toll as director. The 
American Legislators' Association later de 
veloped into the Council of State Governments. 

Leiby: They were interested in standardizing state 

Bane: Yes. 

Leiby: How, could you say something about how the dif 
ferent states lined up. You're the first person 
who gets a good look at the way state organiza 
tions are set up. You have to work with every 
state. Did any typical pattern strike you? 

Bane: In the beginning, of course, there were three 
types of organizations in the welfare field. 
There were the states that had what was, in ef 
fect, a welfare department regardless of what 
they called it. In a pretty big outfit like 
New Jersey they called it the Department of 
Institutions and Agencies* And its 
major concerns and its major expenditures had 
to do with institutions and specific custodial 
or treatment agencies of one kind or another. 
Then there was the department in Massachusetts, 
which was interested in institutions, but it had 
an extramural program as well. In Massachu- 

- 137 - 

Bane: setts the mental health group had a separate de 
partment. The corrections people had a separate 

Leiby: That was true of New York. 

Bane: Yes, that was true of New York, also. 

Leiby: I believe Pennsylvania, too. 

Bane: Pennsylvania was almost entirely institutional, 

with practically no extramural activities at that 

Leiby: Your friend Ellen Potter had tried something... 

Bane: But she came in a little bit later as I recall. 
Her interest at that time was primarily in the 
health field, children's health. 

Leiby: That's right, children's health, that's right. 

And then this branched out into delinquency. She 
was a doctor, it was health and child welfare that 
was the link for her. 

Bane: The second group of states had small welfare 
departments, not much in the way of appropriation 
for central administration, they handled institu 
tions in a partnership way, that is, they had sep 
arate boards and had quite an extramural program, 
North Carolina and Virginia were examples. 

There were a number of states that 

Leiby: Places like Illinois and Ohio would have a de- 

- 138 - 

Bane: had nothing whatever along this line. Each in 
stitution was on its own the prison was on its 
own, the hospital on its own, and so on. And 
there was no coordinating machinery at all. 

Leiby: And nothing to do with poor relief. 

Bane: Nothing whatever to do with poor relief. 

That pertained to most, as I recall, of the mountain 
states f most of the states in the Southwest, 
and many of the states in the South. 

"\ " 

partment . 

Bane: Yes. So our Job was to say to the governor, "Here la 
what you have;here is tbe money you're borrowing." We 
would intimate that this was just the beginning, 
" A nd you'd better get yourself set up." In 
many states they would say, "How do we set it up?" 
We would send a field representative and have him 
work with the governor a week, sometimes a month. 

Leiby: You must have had some sort of model in your mind. 
When you sent these fellows out, did you give them 
instructions yourself? 

Bane: We would have conferences and say, "This is our 
plan, this is our program. " But, of course, you 

- 139 - 

Bane: must adjust this to fit the needs of the par 
ticular state, you know* We had a pattern, 
it was a state agency, and a county welfare 
board like that in Virginia and a number of 
other states. A state department operating 
through a county board, with an executive of 
ficer or whatever they chose to call him on 
the state level. The money from the state to 
the localities would be handled through the 
executive officer of the county agency, 

Leiby: There would be a county welfare board of laymen? 

Bane: Yes, 

Leiby: And they would hire professionals. 

Bane: If they could get professionals. What they 
usually got in those days was a person with 
great interest, a considerable amount of natural 
ability, who, in many instances, had been a 
teacher. (Laughter) That's what they usually got, 

Leiby: At any rate they would hire as well qualified a 
person as they could get. But the authority 
would not be with the local political boards of 

- 140 - 

Bane: Ho , through this county board of welfare. 

Leiby: How about the state level department? There 
would be a qualified executive. 

Bane: Yes, in those days, they almost always insisted 
on a board. In some states it was a board of 
control that had the authority to select the 
executive director. In other states it was an 
advisory board to let the people know what you 
were doing, but the governor usually appointed 
the executive. 

Leiby: What did you think in terms of the internal 

organization? There is a qualified executive 
at the state level. H e is either appointed by 
a board of laymen or he's appointed by the gov 
ernor, who very likely has an advisory board. 
Now, did you think of him having any organiza 
tional structure under him, in particular, like, 
for example, departments for child welfare, or 
old age or anything like that? 

Bane: Of course in the new states, the states that 

were setting up from scratch, we set up initially 

an organization to deal with relief. The idea, hope and 

expectation, which was realized in many instances, 

- 141 - 

Bane: was that it would expand into these other fields. 
We didn't try to set up a full outfit all at once. 

Leiby: Obviously. I'm interested in the political re 
sponsibility of these agencies. You were pretty 
clear in your own mind that the local men who 
actually handed out the money at the county level, 
or supervised those who handed it out, these men 
would be responsible to a county welfare board. 
You were pretty clear on that. 

Bane: Definitely. 

Leiby: At the state level, did you tend toward hoping that 
there would be a board of laymen? 

Bane: We used to talk about that. Our pattern , 

on that particular point, was to set up two alter 
natives and take no position. Our own staff was 
split wide open. 

Leiby: Burdette Lewis would have been solid for the board. 

Bane: For the board. Aubrey Williams was solid for the 
board. I was for the executive appointed by the 
governor. Bach of us was following our up 
bringing, shall I say, and our pre-conceived notions on 
that point.So we had an alternative and we left it 
up to the governor. We were not adamant either way. 

- 142 - 

Leiby: What were some of the things that these fellows 
would go out and then they'd come back and they'd 
talk to you. They'd say, "We've got problems." 
What were the kinds of problems they'd get, 
actually? What were the problems of field 

Bane: The first problem, and this not only applied to 
this particular project, but it applied to all 
of our field service work with the Governor's 
Conference over a quarter of a century, was to 
establish a definite, sympathetic, understanding, 
working relationship with the governor himself. 
It's interesting about field work, as I've ob 
served so many times, the first time a field 
representative of any organization goes in to see 
a governor if he doesn't know him, the gov 
ernor is polite, he might be greatly interested, 
but he's careful. The second time he goes in to 
see him, he knows something about the business and 
about you, he. relaxes. The third time you go in, 
it's old home week. By that time you've 
established a relationship of trust and con 
fidence and the governor wants to get all the 

- 143 - 

Bane: help he can get. That applied then 

and it applied down through the years I've worked 
with the states. That was the first problem. 
The next problem was if the governor had 
machinery or thought he had machinery, he al 
ways said--this is almost axiomatic "I don't 
want to establish anything new. I want to fit 
it into the machinery which I have." The 
question was, then, how you fitted it into the machin 
ery he had and whether it could be fitted in. 
That was the pattern, as you will remember, in 
New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts, where 
they had strong departments. If they didn't 
have a department, the problem was how do you establish 
an agency? Then we came in with our pattern. 
The minute you began to talk about a pat 
tern and how to set it up, you ran into per 
sonalities. And we would urge gently; "This 
is a man-sized job, don't put a boy in it." 
Meaning by that, this was a job that 
required competence and don't put 

- 144 - 

Bane: somebody in there "because his mother loves him 
or he needs a job, I would say those were the 

Leiby: Now, surely your field representatives talked 

with someone else besides the governor. I mean, 
they went out and they sized up the situation. 
They'd have to talk to the governor but they'd 
also have to make an independent judgment of the 
situation. Did you tell them who to talk to? 

Bane: Yes. As a matter of fact we always made two 
independent judgments. If we were going into 
a state to talk to a governor about the situa 
tion, especially if we didn't know the governor 
personally, we went to the welfare people 
we knew in the state and talked to them before 
we went to see the governor. So they would be 
advised that we were working in their state in 
their field. [And this is what you were going to 
say to the governor.] Then we talked with the 
governor and then checked back with the 
welfare group. As a matter of fact, in New 
Jersey, the minute I went into that state, or any 
of our people did, the first person we went to 

- 145 - 

Bane: see was John Ellis And we would say, "John, at 
eleven o'clock this morning we have a date with 
the governor to talk about this relief situation. 
This is what we plan to say. What do you suggest? 
Or what are your ideas?" And he would say, "The 
governor is this kind of a person. I would ap 
proach it this way and not approach it that way." 
We'd go over and talk with the governor and come 
to some kind of an agreement, or a tentative 
agreement. And we'd check back with the welfare 
department, which was just across the street. 
And we'd say, "This seems to be the set-up." 
And then we would work together along the same 
lines. In almost every state, in those days, 
there was somebody that some of us knew in the 
welfare field. And if it wasn't in the welfare 
field, we knew some people in the political 
field whose judgment we valued and who we thought 
could be very helpful. 

Leibyj You said there were two independent judgments. 
Do you mean before and after? 

Bane: Before and after. 

Leiby: But you talked to--like in New Jersey you talked 

- 146 - 

Leiby: to John Ellis, you didn't mean you talked to 
anybody else besides John Ellis? 

Bane: There was a lady in New Jersey in those days, 

Geraldine Thompson. When we were setting up the 
Association John was chairman and I was the di 
rector. So, I was in New Jersey quite frequently. 
She lived up in Monmouth County and I used to go 
up there and speak at some of her meetings We 
used to talk to people like Geraldine Thompson, 
people of that kind. 

Leiby: Oh yes, Geraldine Livingston Thompson, New York 
Livingston and Standard Oil Thompson. 

Now, you'd know these people primarily, I 
suppose, through the Public Welfare Association. 

Bane: Yes, or National Conference of Social Work, or 
some people from universities, and the American 
Political Science Association. 

Leiby: But you had a group of people, in an informal way, 
one way or another you'd have connections. And 
the principal channel of these informal connections 
was through channels that had been set up in the 1920s. 

Bane: Yes, in one way or another. Which is the technique, 
if it can be called a technique, which any organ! za- 

- 147 - 

Bane: tion uses in the field service today. If I 

was setting up a new organization in the public 
interest and came to California, I'd come by and 
talk with people at the University here; I'd go 
down to Los Angeles and talk to people who'd been on 
our Commission on Intergovernmental Relations; I 
would go up to Sacramento and talk to people I've 
known there in the past. It would be the same 

Leiby: Who was associated in the Public Welfare Associa 
tion? You had a membership? 

Bane: Oh yes, we started right away with a membership 
drive . 

Leiby: And who gets to be members? Did institutions? 
Or did individuals? 

Bane: We had three kinds of memberships: departments, 

institutions, and individuals. We wanted an over 
all department. We wanted departments, institu 
tions, and we wanted individuals. In fact we wanted 
anything, in those days, that would give us a source 
of funds because, as I said a few moments ago, where 
as we hadn't agreed to it, we had not objected when 
the Spelman Fund told us that in five years we 

- 148 - 

Bane: should be self-supporting. As a matter of fact 
I employed a young man to head a membership 
drive, a specific drive for a short period of 
time, a period of four months. He'd had 
some experience at this. That young man's 
name was Louis livingston. Years later, 
after I'd gone to the Social Security Ad 
ministration, a young lady came into my of 
fice one Friday and asked me what I was 
going to be doing on Saturday, the next 
morning? I said, I worked a half day and 
that I would do anything she wished. "What 
do you wish me to do?" And she said, "I'd 
like for you to give me away." I said, "Who 
are you going to marry?" She said, "Louis 
Livingston." That was Marietta 

That was the pattern, and that was 
the program. We had some side interests 
here and there, but relief and the machinery 
to take care of it was so pressing all over 
the country , that we gave ninety - eight 
per cent of our time to it , until 1934. 

- 149 - 

Committee on Economic Security 

Bane: In 1934 people around the country, in 

the Association and elsewhere, began to talk 
about social security, and the President set up 
the Committee on Economic Security. It was in 
teresting that he called it Economic Security 
and not Social Security. We became very much inter 
ested in that committee. As an individual and 
as a director of the American Public Welfare As 
sociation, I gave half my time to working on this 
developing program* 

However, we had lost a good part of our 
original staff in the interim, between April, 1933 
and August, 1933. I lost Prank Persons, Aubrey 
Williams, Robert Lansdale, and Howard Hunter. 
And we had brought in a new group of people. 

Ivan Asay, who's now the administrative of 
ficer of the Bureau of Standards; Glen Leet, who's 
now with the United Nations in charge of child care- 
Save the Children Foundation; and Alvin Roseman, 

- 150 - 

Bane: who was with U.N.R.R.JU for a while, then 
with the A.I.D. program , and now he's 
at the University of Pittsburgh teaching public 
welfare administration. 

Leiby: The old group was hired away from you. 

Bane: Yes. Miss Perkins took Frank Persons to head the 
Employment Office. Harry Hopkins took Aubrey 
Williams, Howard Hunter, and Bob Lansdale. 

Leiby: Did he go with Hopkins, too? 

Bane: For a little while. 

Private Vs. Public Relief Agencies 

Leiby: Would you say something about the administra 
tion of relief? There are two questions I'm 
particularly interested in. One is private and 
public agencies, if you could expand on that a 
little more. And the other is direct or work 

Bane: The private and public agency controversy we 

mentioned the other day in passing. The initial 
reaction of almost all of the private agencies 

- 151 - 

Bane: was to agree with the prevalent idea, namely that 
this was an emergency. And underscore emergency. 
In many states and cities it was underscored to 
such an extent that the organizations were called 
the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration, 
as in New York State, That being the case, the 
funds appropriated by the states first and later 
by the federal government should be used to sub 
sidize already existing private agencies in the 
field so the argument went. 

There were four or five people who promoted 
that idea with great fervor and much enthusiasm. 
They were the head of the American Bed Cross, 
at that time it was Judge Payne of Virginia. He 
was chairman. He had a staff that was urging 
that point of view, especially in the rural 
areas, where they'd develop a home service system. 
In the cities there was another group that 
aaid, "No, it should be administered not by 
government but through family service agencies." 

- 152 - 

Leiby: They did case work regularly. They didn't have 
any money. 

Bane; No they didn't have any money but they had the 

staff and they had the know-how. We didn't then know the 
phrase "know how," that came in later. (Laughter) 

Then there was another group in the cities 
that agreed with the Family Welfare group , 
the associations of community chests, 

The Family Welfare national association was 
run "by a friend of mine , lynton Swift. 
The community chests group headed by Allen 
Burns agreed completely with the private sub 
sidization program because he also was having trouble 
raising money for the community chests in those 
days. And going along with them was the National 
Association of Catholic Charities and W grand 
old friend Father O'Grady. 

We, the American Public Welfare Association, 
disagreed completely, flatly. We all just agreed to 
disagree. ^e had numerous conferences but we 
always disagreed. So it was a contest. And those 
gentlemen that j mentioned were all very influential 

- 153 - 

Bane: in this field. But I had an influential staff, too; 
Burdette Lewis, Aubrey Williams, Howard Hunter, Bob 
Lansdale, etc. 

Leiby: What about Fred Croxton himself? He was a key man. 

Bane: Yes. He had been a public official in Ohio in the 
Labor Department. But he was also a very able, 
careful, cautious administrator. So as success 
fully as anybody I've ever known, he walked straight 
down the middle in that controversy. 

Leiby: Now the nature of the controversy was this: These 
people said, it's a temporary emergency, it's going 
to be over soon. We have an organization. The 
organization is skilled, it's volunteer which means 
it's inexpensive, relatively. Why set up a public 
salaried organization? Why go through all this 
routine when you can simply channel your funds 
through the existing organization? It will be 
cheaper, you know it will be well administered. 
We have our past and you certainly catt f t cast any 
aspersions on Home Service, the Red Cross, or the 
Family Service Agency. What you fellows want to do 
is hire people to hand out relief. In answer to 
this you said, public money must be expended by a 

- 154 - 

Leiby: public agency. And O'G-rady could never really 
understand this. "That's the only thing you 
say, Why do you keep saying that over and over 
again?" Now, why did you keep saying that? 

Bane: We started out with a philosophy and we reasoned 
from that philosophy to what turned out to "be 
an accurate fact. Our philosophy was that public 
funds should be administered by public respon 
sible agencies; to use such public funds that 

happened to be available and scatter them among 
Tom, Dick, and Harry, would be to make it im 
possible to develop an effective, over-all, 
coordinated program. That was just good 
political science philosophy to begin with. 
That was the political scientist in me, if you 
please, and the administrator. Furthermore, 
we would insist that this isn't what you think 
it is. We think this is going to be much more 
serious, we think that it's high time the states 
organized themselves to handle this kind of a 
problem, in fact, organized state welfare depart- 

- 155 - 

Bane: ments because we think welfare is an important, 
respectable, large scale function of government 
and the states better get themselves set to 
handle it, 

Leiby: They say, "Public welfare means the administration 
of relief by irresponsible officials, that is, 
political hacks who are just holding down a job. 
That's what it means, traditionally. What we 
are talking about is a tradition of service. 
Traditionally the people who give the service, the 
people who know something about it, are volunteers. 
What you're going to do is subsidize a lot of local 
public welfare operations that aren't worth sub 
sidizing." Is that the sort of arguments you got? 

Bane: Oh yes, we got that all the time. And we would im 
mediately say, "From an historical point of view, 
that isn't true. Initially and traditionally, the 
job was a public job." We could go back to 1600 if 
they wished. "Of course it hasn't been done ef 
fectively in the light of present day situations, 
but it's always been accepted as a public job. 
We've always accepted the general philosophy that 
local government had the responsibility for the 

- 156 - 

Bane: welfare of the individual. So, traditionally, 
government is in this; it's going to get in it 
more; and it ought to organize itself effectively. 
Now you say | if you turn it over to government you 
know perfectly well you're just going to have it 
handled by a bunch of politicians. It may be so, 
initially, in some places. But the problem is 
to get competent people to handle it. If a 
politician handles it through fraud and graft and so on, 
get rid of him, get a decent one." We used to use 
the public university as an example. We said, 
"They used to say the same thing about education. 
As late as 1900 you used to say exactly the same 
thing about education. Look what we've built in 
public universities and public schools. Welfare 
is the same kind of a function, namely the 
responsibility of the public. And the public 
should equip itself to handle it." 

Leiby: This involves, really, a rejection of the old 

charity organization society philosophy that you 
do away with public outdoor relief. 

Bane: Oh yes. 

Leiby: As a matter of fact we haven't done away with public 
outdoor relief. All you have to do is look at these 

- 157 - 

Leiby: statistics. Wayne McMillen was beginning to col 
lect these. Did you know Wayne McMillen? 

Bane: Yes, I knew Wayne in those days, as soon as I 

moved to Chicago* By the way, he's here in Oakland 

Leiby: Yes. I mean, you must have been able to go to 

these people and say, "Just look at the statistics. 
Just look at who's handing out the relief, really." 

Banet i n the country at large, I mean from one c*ast to 
the other, even in those days, much more was going 
through public outdoor relief than through private agencies 
Because the private organizations were centered 
largely in just a few places. 

Leiby: Even there the ratio was as much as two or three to one 
that weren't, according to McMillen and his 
statistics. So this argument for private agencies, 
it seems to me, was not really a very good argument. 

Bane: No, Except that it was a good pragmatic 

argument from the private agencies* point 

of view. In certain places, doubtless, they could 

handle it better for a short period of time. 

Leiby: So their argument is it's temporary. 

Bane: Yes, it's a temporary emergency. And why set up 

- 158 - 

Bane: all this machinery? 

Lelby: This would recur at every state level. 

Bane: Yes, they would carry it right to the gov 
ernor. And that's when Aubrey Williams came 
back to see me and said, "Maybe that's the 
best thing to do . " I have already told 
you that story, 

Leiby: Now, what was really involved here , then , 
was in the first place , the nature of public 
welfare as a public service. You said , 
"This is a public service . " And you knew 
this because you had actually been in it in 
Virginia, And , at that time , you worked 
very closely with private agencies. But , 
nevertheless the work has got to be 
done. It has got to be paid for out of tax 
monies, one way or the other. And it's got to 

--< . 

- 159 - 

Leiby: be done by public officials who are trained and 
qualified and responsible as public officials. 

Bane: .And underscore responsible as public officials. 

Leiby: Not as decent men or as philanthropists, but as 
public offials who are giving a service like 
the other public services. 

Bane: And who would be audited and supervised and in 
vestigated, and responsible all along the line. 
Let me emphasize because perhaps there is some 
misapprehension here, during all these contro 
versies and many arguments, it was all in the 
best gentlemently spirit. We all met together. 

Leiby: Even Father O'Grady? 

Bane: Father O'Grady used to come to Chicago and come 
out to our house and stay. And he'd sit there 
and say, "Frank for God's sake, won't you de 
velop another idea except that public funds 
should be administered by public agencies?" 

Leiby: (Laughter) Well this was a real important mat 
ter to him. 

Bane: Oh yes, it was so important to him that we had 
a meeting in Chicago in the middle of 1932 
of public and private agencies. The up- 

- 160 - 

Bane: shot of the meeting was that we agreed --by that 

time, the middle of '32, the size of the problem was be- 
coming clear that we should set up public agencies 
to handle this. After every motion that was made 
Father O'Grady said, "Please record Father O'Grady 
as voting, 'No.'" (Laughter) I always had a sneaky 
feeling and I would tell him so and we would laugh 
about it that maybe Father O'Grady was voting his 
sentiments and feelings and maybe, again, he was 
voting the party line. (Laughter) Maybe that's not 
a good phrase for it. (Laughter) We were 
great friends. At that time and down through the 
years we've continued as great friends. And the 
public and private agencies continued being helpful 
to us all along the line. Some people have sug 
gested, with a certain degree of accuracy perhaps, 
from one point of view, that the Red Cross never 
got over that setback. But I don't know. After 
that matter was settled, first with the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration, then the Civil 
Works Administration and the Works Progress Ad 
ministration, along came sooial security , and 
it was apparent that the Red Cross was out of that 

- 161 - 

Bane. picture. But in its disaster relief business and 
in the various assistance programs of that kind, 
and in experimental work, they've continued to 
grow and prosperand what a job they have done 
and are doing. 

Leiby: There was, in 1932 and 1933, this argument and 
what happened was that time was on your side. 

Bane: Yes, but the economic system was sliding badly 
and the worse it got the more favorable it was 
for us from the standpoint of governmental 
philosophy and public administration. 

Direct or Work Relief 


Leiby: Pretty soon it became clear that recovery wasn't 

Just around the corner and then they began to have 
the argument about direct or work relief? Do you 
remember anything about where this idea came from? 

Bane: Yea. 

Leiby: What did the American Public Welfare Association 
have to do with that? 

Bane: Just a little background: The type of person on 
relief in late '33 was an entirely different kind 
of a person than the person who had been 
on relief in years gone by. Here 

- 162 - 

Bane: was a person who'd earned his own living, done 
well. The great majority who had been put out 
of work and were destitute, were destitute "because of cir 
cumstances beyond their control, not due to 
any handicap either mental or physical. 
And someone expanded upon the idea that what an 
unemployed person needed was a job. So the 
thing to do was provide jobs. 

Leiby: Now this was a really new idea. 

Bane: This was completely new at that time* 

Leiby: Do you remember anything about where this idea 
came from? 

Bane: A lot of people were talking about it Aubrey 
Williams developed it into, what we would call 
now in Washington, a position paper, a memorandum, 
a prospectus. 

Leiby: So Aubrey Williams was the man who took the ball. 

Bane: You might be interested sometime in looking 
at two books dealing with this 
particular proposition. The first part of 
Sherwood's book, Roosevelt and Hopkins. deals 
specifically with this very question which you 
asked me. And Brownlow's second book, Passion 

- 163 - 

Bane: for Anonymity* also deals with it in some detail. 
Aubrey developed this idea and Hopkins suggested 
that he bring it out to Chicago and discuss it with 
us. The "us" being Charles Merriam, Edith 
Abbott, Bob Hutchins, Louis Brownlow, and myself. 

Leiby: They didn't have work relief in England, did they? 

Bane: No. They had what was called, in this country, 
the dole. Although the localities might have 
had some work relief, the national government 
was on a dole system. 

Leiby: Do you remember what Edith Abbott's position was 
on direct relief? 

Bane: She was all for it. 

Leiby: She was for work relief. 

Bane: Yes indeed, work relief also. 

The idea was to set up some kind of an ex 
periment in providing jobs for people out of 
work and paying them in wages. So four or 
five of us, one Saturday afternoon Saturday 
morning Hopkins had come out to join us along 
with Williams decided to go to a foot 
ball game together and sit in Bob Hutchins* , the 
President of the University, box and talk 

- 164 - 

Bane: about it , It so happened that I had three 

tickets for that football game for myself, my wife, 
and my daughter. I came home at lunch and said 
I couldn't go to the football game with them, that I 
was going to the football game with this group, and 
so on and so on. That didn't sit very well with 
either my wife or, particularly, my daughter. And 
from that good day to this my daughter never liked 
Harry Hopkins. (Laughter) *" went to this foot 
ball game and sat there in the box and watched 
Indiana run all over the University of Chicago, 
Incidentally, that was the last football game the 
University of Chicago ever played. After that 
game, they abolished football. But we came away 
from the meeting on the football field with 
a work relief plan. 

Ten years later, another plan was de 
veloped there, on that football field, in 
that stadium and fieldhouse, at the 
University of Chicago! 

Leiby: The bomb. 

Bane: Y e a, the bomb. So it was agreed to set up the 
Civil Works Administration, C.W.A.? to stop al- 

- 165 - 

Bane: locating money, to allocate jobs. I went back 
to Washington for a while and took half of my 
staff for two or three weeks to help get that 

Leiby: Your initial response to this idea was favorable. 

Bane: Very favorable. We took Maine, Vermont, New 
Hampshire, all the states right down the line 
and allocated a certain number of Jobs to them, 
on the basis of what we knew by that time was 
their need. We said, "If you put this number 
of people to work, in a given length of time, 
we 1 11 pay them this wage." Immediately, you 
understand, that put the F.E.R.A. , that was 
sponsoring and operating the C.W.A. into a 
wage controversy. And added to that, it had 
administrative troubles. Suffice it to say C.W.A. 
was admittedly just a winter program. But the 
minute it went out everybody began to work on 
how do you continue it? And out of that came 
the Works Progress Administration that lasted 
through the depression. It was a straight 
federal program, W.P.A. j not a federal-state 

Leiby: JProm an economic point of view, work relief is a 

- 166 - 

Leiby: "bad idea, or would have been in those days, because 
it tends to force up wages, it tends to increase 
taxes, it costs more money. And you want to save 
money. Everybody wants to economize. So econ 
omically it's a bad plan. 

Bane: Practically all of the Congress and the economists said 

exactly what you're saying here. And, incidentally, it's in- 
teresting to note in retrospect and was interesting 
then, that the economists had a great supporter in 
the political area. His name was Harold Ickes. 

Ickes agreed with the economists. "The thing 
to do if you're going to spend money on work is to spend 
it on useful public works." 

Leiby: Productive productive investment. 

Bane: Exactly. And spend it on building big public 

works. Then it will filter down, so much for land, 
so much for cement, so much for labor, and so much 
for this, that, and the other. And the by-products 
will be enormous. 

A number of us, in particular Hopkins and 
Williams--of course they were running it, we were 
supporting them would say, "That's all very nice, 
that's beautiful, delightful, interesting. We 

- 167 - 

Bane: listened to the economists in 1929, '30 and *31. 

We concede that they are brilliant people "but they were 
definitely wrong. They're wrong now. And whether 
they're right or wrong isn't the question. Here 
we have a man who is out of work. H e needs a job. 
He needs it now. He has to have some kind of sus 

Leiby: He needs relief* 

Bane: First he needs a job. And if he doesn't have that 
he doesn't have sustenance and must have relief, 

Leiby: He needs a job from private, productive industry. 

Bane: That's right. H e needs the wherewithal, we'll say, 
to care for his family. 

Leiby: There's no question about this. 

Bane: Exactly. And he needs it now. He doesn't need 
it next week . He hasn't any great over 
riding interest in the gross national 
product or whether prosperity is around the corner. 
What he needs is something which will provide him 
with the wherewithal to take care of his family 
Saturday night. And the only way to do that and 
do it rapidly is this program. 

Leiby: The traditional way, the way they did it in England, 
is to give them a relief check, not give them a job. 

- 168 - 

Bane: That was the traditional way, always had "been the 
traditional way. 

Leiby: He needs a relief check. 

Bane: Tea, But conceding that, if there is any way 

whereby you could maintain his skills, maintain his 
interest, improve his morale, and at the same 
time provide this relief check let's 
try it. 

Leiby: So work was justified. Now, you had to justify the 
idea of work relief. You had to justify it, first, 
to the President and then to the congress. 

Bane: Just as you say we had to justify it first to the 
President. And interestingly in this connec 
tion , Ickes , as I said before was with the 
economists and not in favor of this kind of a 
program. And one of the reasons that he wasn't in 
favor of it was when C.W.A. was set up and first 
discussed with the President, it was thought that 
the President would take it under advisement. 
He listened to it for about an hour. And he said, 
"We'll do it. I'll transfer three hundred fifty 
million dollars or some such amount from the 
works fund , to finance it." 

- 169 - 

Bane: The public works fund was administered by Ickes. 
And there began, right then and there, the feud 
between Hopkins and Ickes. 

Leiby: Were you at the conference at which this idea was 
broached to the President? 

Bane: No, 1 was over at the office-- the w.P.A. office, 

Leiby: You must have known though that somebody, presum 
ably Hopkins, was going to the President, 

Bane: Oh, yes, we prepared all the papers and so on, 
He went over and the only person that he took 
with him at that time was the auditor. To re 
peat, we thought this was going to be a pre 
liminary presentation to the President, It 
was something he would think about and probably 
decide in a couple of weeks. Harry came back 
flabbergasted and said not only had the President 
bought it lock, stock, and barrel, but he had 
provided the money! Harry knew, of course, what 
that would mean with respect to Ickes, The 
President also had called in the press and told 
them "We'll have this in operation in thirty 

- 170 - 

Bane: days." 

Leiby: The Cabinet didn't decide. 

Bane: Nobody, just the President. And it was operating 
in thirty days. 

We set up a little sub-office over at the 
then Powhatan, now the Roger Smith Hotel, 
Within thirty days it was rolling. But immediately 
two slogans developed, which in no time at all were 
countrywide, one was "leaf -raking" and the second 
was "leaning on a shovel," 

Leiby: Yes. Reflecting the notion that this is the wrong 
kind of thing for these guys. 

Bane: Boondoggling. 

Leiby: What they really need is a job in private industry. 

Bane: That's right, yes. 

Leiby: Where they'll make them work hard. There's no 
boondoggling in private industry. (Laughter) 

When the emergency relief set-up was dis 
banded, one of the main functions of the 
American Public Welfare Association, traditionally, 
is here. 

Bane: Yes. When the F.E.R.A. was disbanded, the national 
government concentrated all of its activities on 

Bane: work relief. That left the residual load of relief 
to the states and locaties. And a large part of 
the residual load was cardiac cases, aged persons, 
and marginal economic people. 

Leiby: And they were a large, large number. (Laughter) 

Bane: Yes. Of course, that immediately put us, in the 
American Public Welfare Association, in the 
position to say, which we would try, being more 
or less ladies and gentlemen, not to say too often, 
tt We told you so." Because the states were left 
with the residual load. And by that time they all 
had some kind of an organization to handle it. 

Leiby: In other words in 1933 you had said, "This is 

probably going to be a continuing thing. In one 
way or another public welfare is certainly going 
to be a continuing thing. You need a public wel 
fare organization, a public welfare administration 
in your state. You should have had one. But now 
the need is perfectly evident." And four or five 
years later you go around saying, "I told you so." 

Bane: Not too blatantly I hope ! By 1935 the 
federal government was out of direct relief and 
concentrating entirely on work relief. 

- 172 - 

Continuing Activities of the Association 

Leiby: Were you still with the Public Welfare Association? 

Bane: I was still with the Public Welfare Association up 
until about August, 1935. 

Leiby: At this time and later the Public Welfare Associa 
tion must have been thinking of what they were 
going to do. They had been advising on emergency 
relief. Now this job was over. What role did 
they see for themselves? 

Bane: They didn't think the job was over. They thought 

their job was going to be more or less a continuing 
job. And they thought and believed that the As 
sociation was, if possible, even more necessary 
once these new organizations had been set up; to 
establish standards, to develop morale among public of. 
ficials,etc.As a matter of fact the American Public 
Welfare Association was first called the American 
Association of Public Welfare Officials. And 
they had an enormous training program ahead of them. 

Leiby: Training program? 

Bane: They were advocating training programs in the various 

- 173 - 

Bane: states in order to provide the social workers that 
would be needed in these new welfare departments. 
It was urging Hopkins, which he did, to estab. 
lish training programs and to send 
people to Chicago , the New York School, etc., 
to take training. The reason they urged 
Hopkins to do it was because he was the only 
person who had what we called, in those days, un 
encumbered money. He could operate, to a consider 
able extent, on allocations from the President's 
Bnergency Fund. And for little things like grants 
to colleges &r training he didn't have to go back 
to the Congress for additional funds* 

Leiby: What was your staff organization like at that time? 
Did you continue with the field representatives? 

Bane: Oh yes, we continued having field representatives. 
And I was in the field as much as any of the staff. 
Our person who ran the shop was still 
Marietta Stevenson. She was Assistant Director and 
later Deputy Director. She ran the office. 

Leiby: You had a publication. 

Bane: Yes, we had the Public Welfare News, which I think 

- 174 - 

Bane: is still being published. 

Leiby: There's still a periodical, yes. 

Did you have anything to do with research? 

Bane: Not to any considerable degree. To repeat, 

Marietta was a Ph. D. and had been a re- 
search per son* And we did some spot, what might be 
called, utilitarian research. That's what Leonard 
White used to say we did. He said, "We did the 
best kind of research one could imagine 
to substantiate our own preconceived notions." 
And he wasn't too far wrong. 

Leiby: What did he have in mind there? 

Bane: Oh, he was Just being facetious. In other words, 
we had such and such an idea and we would look 
around and set up a research project to 
assemble the necessary data , to support 
what we wanted to do* That was a 
facetious remark . What 

he meant was that we didn't do any fundamental re 
search. And he was right. 
Leiby: In other words you were in the position of promoting 

enlightened policies, essentially. 
Bane: Decidedly promoting. I was speaking all over the 

- 175 - 

Bane: country most of the time, 

Leiby: You'd go around and talk to people. 

Now these enlightened policies, did the 
county welfare board continue to be viable? 

Bane: Y es indeed , as I understand. I've been 
away from it for many years. 

Leiby: In the 1920s this was a big thing in California, 
the county welfare boards. In the 1930s it was 
dropped and now, of course, it's run by the 
county board of supervisors. There's no county 
welfare board. And that's my impression over the 

Bane: Y es. I think they started off with these 
boards, because it was something new; 
But now it's, especially in California, the regular 
board of supervisors. In California counties 
relief is one of their biggest jobs. It's 
very expensive. It's not only just a part of gov 
ernment, it's a big part of government. 

- 176 - 

(Interview of January 13, 1965) 

A Survey of European Institutions 

Leiby: In 1935 you left the Public Welfare Association and 
became the first Executive Director of the Social 
Security Board, a position you held until 1938. 
Could you tell me something about how you were 
approached for that job? 

Bane: I'd better start with a little background. Early 
in 1934 a great many people in Washington, and 
certainly around the country, began to wonder when 
an emergency would cease to be an emergency. And 
they began to be a little tired of the oft-repeated 
words temporary and emergency. Many of the organ 
izations in the early days of relief were called 
temporary emergency organizations of one kind or another,as 
we have said. There was considerable talk about 
social security. And the Rockefeller people 
suggested to me soon after the Committee on Econ 
omic Security was appointed by the President to 

- 177 - 

Bane: devise a social security plan, that I might go to 
Europe and take a look at the social security 
programs in Germany, where social security had 
started under Bismarck, and also in England 
and France. 

Leiby: You speak of the Rockefeller people? 

Bane: The Spelman Fund. 

Leiby: Under Beardsley Rural. 

Bane: Beardsley Rural, yes. 

Late in June Mrs. Bane and I went to 
Europe on this assignment. We went first to 
Germany. And we did the "best we could under 
the circumstances in Germany at that time. But 
"Bast man in Germany persistently got in our way. 
We got there immediately after the blood purges 
of 1934. And just before we left, we stayed 
there some two or three months- Hindenburg died 
and Hitler took complete power. So we 
learned as much as we could from the German de 
partments and agencies , but in retrospect , 
it seems to me , that they spent 
part of the time giving us information and 
the other time jumping up when anybody came in 

- 178 - 

Bane: and saying, "Hell Hitler!" (laughter) 
Leiby: What sort of information were you looking for? 
Bane: We were looking for the background of the 
first social security program: How it was 
set up? Why it was set up? But, particu 
larly, we were interested in the organization 
and operation of the system itself and what 
it included. 

Leiby: You were an administrator looking at a system. 
Bane: We were administrators looking at a picture 

and trying to develop ideas as to how we would 
set such a program up administratively, if and 
when we should have one. 

We did the same thing in France and in 

Leiby: To whom did you speak in Prance and in England? 
Bane: I don't recall the individuals' names. 
Leiby: Professional administrators. 
Bane: In England, it was primarily the Department of 
Labor. In Germany, it was scattered around in 
different departments ; assistance , unemployment 
compensation, insurance, and so on. It was different 
departments in Germany, as it was in Prance. We weren't 

- 179 - 

Bane: very successful in getting much information in 
France because we happened to get to Paris in 
August, Then and since everybody in Paris 
in an official capacity, it seemed to us, went 
out of town in August. 

Leiby: Summer vacation. 

Bane: Yes, summer vacation. 

When we came back we reported at length to 
the Committee on Economic Security, to which I 
was a general consultant; and to the Technical 
Committee, of which I was a member. Then we went 
to work on the actual report and a little later 
on the substance of the actual bill* 

Leiby: You say, "we." Was there anyone with you? 

Bane: No. When I say, "we" went to work on the bill and 
the substance of the report, I was working with 
Ed Witte. 

Leiby: I meant when you went to Europe. 

Bane: Mrs. Bane was the only person with me. 

Leibyj I see. Did you bring back any ideas that were in 
fluential in your report? 

Bane: Yes, we brought back some ideas that, as a matter 
of fact, were written into our act. The federal- 

- 180 - 

Bane: state idea we had, of course, before we went* 

Leiby: Grants -in -aid, like for highways. 

Bane: Exactly. But the German system was similar, 
to a very large extent. They had their 
divisions; Bavaria, Rhineland, and so on. And 
they operated... 

Leiby: It was a federal government. 

Bane: Yes, it was a federal government. 

Leiby: Unlike Ifagland and Prance. 

Bane: That's right. So we learned more from Germany 
than we did from either of the other nations. 

Leibyt Did they use grants-in-aid? 

Bane: They used grants-in-aid for one activity or an 
other, particularly, in the assistance field. 
Also , in the unemployment field and in the 
insurance program it was somewhat similar to the 
one we developed in this country. 

Appointed Executive Director 

Bane: Then the bill was sent up to congress. 
The problem then was to get action on the 

- 181 - 

Bane: suggested bill* And there, again, the 

American Public Welfare Association came in 
very handy because we had representatives 
in all the states who could explain to their 
representatives in congress: 1.) what the 
act was , and 2.) emphasize its import 

Leiby: So this is a wonderful lobbying device. 

Bane: It was an excellent lobbying device and I 

was repeatedly accused of using the American 
Public Welfare Association as a lobbying 
device. I've never denied it. (Laughter) 
The act was passed. At that time 
there was a professor of economics at the 
University of Chicago , Simeon E. Leland. 
He is now Dean of Northwestern University, 
retiring next month. He had a cottage on 
the dunes outside of Chicago, the Indiana 
Dunes. The Banes and Lelands lived very 
close to each other and saw a great deal 
of each other. Leland suggested, in the late 
summer, that we go out and spend a week or ten 

- 182 - 

Bane: days with them at their cottage in the dunes, 
assuring us that it was a delightful, restful 
plaoe. No telephones, no visitors, Just rest, 
recreation, and relaxation. 

Leiby: This is the summer of 1935. 

Bane: Yes. 

Leiby: After the bill was passed. 

Bane: After the bill was passed. The bill was passed 
in August and this was late August. One morning 
a gentleman came down the road in a Model T Ford 
from the crossroads store, about a mile and a 
half away. He asked, "Is there a Mr. Bane around 
here anywhere?" Leland admitted it. He said, 
"There's a telephone call in my store," that 
was the only telephone around there "I think 
it's a joke, but they say the White House is cal 
ling Mr. Bane." (Laughter) So, Leland and I got 
into the car and went up to the store and got the 
White House on the telephone. Marvin Mclntyre, 
the President's secretary* was calling. He said 
that Mr. John Winant, former governor of New 
Hampshire, had just been appointed chairman of the Social 

- 183 - 

Bane: Security Board, the other two members were 

Arthur Altmeyer of Wisconsin and Vincent Miles 
from Arkansas. 

Leiby: Who was Miles? 

Bane: Miles was a lawyer from Arkansas. And 

he'd been strongly recommended by Joseph Robinson, 
who was at that time Senator from Arkansas, and 
the majority leader in the senate, 

Leiby: A strong recommendation. (Laughter) Had Miles 
had any connection with you? 

Bane: No, Miles had no connection with me prior to that 

Leiby: Of course, Altmeyer had. 

Bane: Altmeyer was a professional in the field. He had 
run the Department of Industrial Relations in 
Wisconsin before 1932. And he had come to Wash 
ington with the Roosevelt administration as As 
sistant Secretary of Labor, when Frances Perkins 
was appointed Secretary of Labor. 

Leiby: And John Winant, had he been governor? 

Bane: John Winant had been governor for two terms in 
New Hampshire. He was a Republican. 

Leiby: I suppose Altmeyer was a Republican* 

Bane: I would imagine so a La Toilette Republican, or Pro. 

- 184 - 

Bane? gressire Democrat although the question never 
came up> And I'm reasonably certain that at the 
time he was appointed he was listed as a Democrat, 
or was thought of as a Democrat. Because that 
would have given the Board two Democrats and one 

Winant had been a very progressive governor, 
an excellent governor of New Hampshire. 
Working for the Brookings Institute, a couple of 
years before, I had done a study of the state 
government of New Hampshire when he, Winant, was 
governor. So we were well acquainted with each 
other. Secretary Mclntyre said Winant was going 
to call me the next day or that day about a 
proposition with the Social Security Administra 
tion, at that time the Social Security Board. 
The President had told him, Mclntyre, to call 
me and tell me that he hoped I would take the 
jobo I asked Mclntyre what kind of a Job it 
was and what were the limits and delimits, duties, 
responsibilities and so forth? He said he 
didn't know, that Winant would tell me. Winant 
called me later the same day. The following 

- 185 - 

Bane: day I went down to Washington and had a long 
session first with Winant and then with the 
Board. And I was appointed the Executive 
Director of this new social security program. 

Leiby: What did they tell you? 

Bane: They told me what was in the act, which I knew 
lay heart. (Laughter) They told me what the 
problem was. I knew that also, in some detail. 
But we discussed, primarily I raised the ques 
tion what was and what was going to "be the 
relationship between the executive director 
and the board? 

Leiby: That's a good question. 

Bane: Since I was going to be the executive director, 
I wanted that point cleared up to the extent 
possible before I agreed to take the job. And 
it was agreed that the board was going to be a 
policy board, concerning itself, primarily, to 
the extent possible, with questions of policy 
and broad program. That the executive director 
would be in charge of administration and that 
included the supervision and direction of per 
sonnel. I asked for two or three days to think 

- 186 - 

Bane: it over and to go home and talk with my fam 
ily. I wanted to talk also with the board 
of the American Public Welfare Association 
and the people at the University of Chicago* 
I was lecturing at the University of Chicago 
at that time* I went back to Chicago, had a 
meeting of the Public Welfare Board and a 
meeting with the people at the University of 
Chicago, And, incidentally, Beardsley Ruml 
came over to the meeting* He brought along 
Guy Moffett, who was to succeed Bum! as 
Director of the Spelman Fund, when he came 
to the University of Chicago as head of the 
social science division. We had a long 
luncheon. Brownlow was there and Meriam 
was there. 

Leiby: The Chicago crowd. 

Bane: Yes. And it was decided and I'm choosing 

my words carefully by the group that I ought 
to take the job* Mrs. Bane agreed, and I 

- 187 - 

Bane: But before we went to Washington we sent 
a confirming telegram, dealing with the agree 
ments which we had as to what the job would 
be. Because I knew that It was extremely dif 
ficult to separate policy and administration. 
But we wanted it understood, in any event. 

Administrative Organization 

Bane: So down to Washington we went and we 
had four offices, which had been loaned to 
us, over in the Labor Department Building. 
They were loaned to us by Prances Perkins. 
Each member of the board had an office and 
I had an office. At that time each of us 
had a secretary. But we had only four of 
fices, so the secretary was in the same of 
fice. And that's how and where, the Social 
Security Board started. 

Leiby: How did the board members look upon their own 
duties? Did they divide them up, like county 

- 188 - 

Leiby: commissioners? (Laughter) 

Bane: No, they never divided them up. We never had the 

set-up that the Tennessee Valley Authority had initial- 
ly. They definitely divided up the duties and 
responsibilities among the three commissioners 
One took over-all management, one took power, one 
took agriculture. Arthur Morgan, for instance, 
took over-all administration. H e was chairman. 
David Lilienthal took power. Harcourt Morgan, 
who had been President of the University of Ten 
nessee, took the agricultural part of the program. 
Leiby: Acting, in effect, as executive vice-president. 
Bane: Exactly. But the board decided and, in fact, 
that was part of the decision which influenced 
me to come to the board, that it would 
always act as a group and that they would act, 
as far as operation and execution was 
concerned, through an executive director. 
Leiby: There was only one executive vice-president, in 

other words. 

Bane: The board took their duties and respon 
sibilities very, very seriously. They met in- 
terminably, morning, noon and sometimes night. 

- 189 - 

Bane: We had the problem of setting up the administra 
tive machinery and deciding how we were going to 
handle, from an administrative point of view, 
the duties and responsibilities as set forth in 
the act. We had the problem of establishing 
precedents, as we used to say , in those 
days* And very soon, almost immediately, I 
employed as a secretary for board operations, Miss 
Maurine Mulliner. She was with the Social Security 
Board and Administration continually, with leaves 
of absence here and there, up until a year ago 
when she retired. So it was the board, myself, 
and Miss Maurine Mulliner as the secretary for 
board operations, meeting interminably in the 
early days. 

The first thing decided, of course, 
which, as a matter of fact, was set forth in the 
act, was that the social security program had 
three major segments: the public assistance 
segment, the unemployment compensation segment, 
and the old age insurance segment. This made 
it immediately apparent that the first job was 
to think about top personnel a director for 

- 190 - 

Bane: the Bureau of Public Assistance, which included 
old age assistance, aid to dependent children, 
and aid for the blind; a director for the Bureau 
of Unemployment Compensation, which, of course, 
just had unemployment compensation; and a 
director of the Bureau of Old Age Insurance. 

Leiby: But unemployment compensation was a major thing. 

Bane: A major thing and a brand new thing. That had 
been the great focal point of interest. 

Leiby: It had already been decided that this would be 
a federal-state thing. 

Bane: Oh yes, that was decided and written in the act. 

Leiby: So, in other words, this man was going to Wave 
to deal with forty-eight states. 

Bane: Yes. The first person we appointed was the 

director of the Bureau of Public Assistance, be 
cause that was the part of the act that would go 
into effect first. That would go 
into effect January 1, 1936. So we had to set up 
administrative machinery; we had to devise a plan 
of operations; we had to get state plans in; we 
had to approve state plans; we had to have a staff 
for supervision all ready to go by January 1, 1936, 

- 191 - 

Bane: And that was just four months away. 

Leiby: You were getting underway in September. 

Bane: We were getting underway just about the first of 

Mie question was who would be director of 
the Bureau of Public Assistance? Of course, 
we canvassed the country. Several of us knew 
right much about that field. We decided to 
offer the job to a top-notch social worker, a top- 
notch public relations person, a red-headed, Irish 
girl named Jane Hoey. I called her on the tele 
phone on a Thursday or Friday and the following 
Sunday I went to New York to see her and offer 
her the job. Her mother objected strenuously. 
Her brother, Jim Hoey, who had been Collector of 
Customs in New York for years, approved enthus 
iastically. And, ultimately, within the next 
week, Janie took the job. She came to Washington 
and started to work. 

Leiby: How old was she then? Do you remember? 

Bane: Perhaps we shouldn't go into that* (Laughter) 
Coming from where I do I would never dare risk 
such a guess. But I would imagine that Jane 

- 192 - 

Bane: was in her early forties. 

Leiby: What was she doing at that time? 

Bane: She was with the Catholic Charities in New 


Leiby: With a private agency. 
Bane: A private agency. She had been most of her 

life. But she had had extensive experience, 

during the relief period in 1933 and early '34, 

with relief activities in New York State and in 

New York City. 
Leiby: Had you known her? 

Bane: I'd known her for a number of years. 
Leiby: In what connection? 
Bane: National Conference of Social Work, during the 

relief period. 
Leiby: She was one of that crowd and you ran into her. 

So you knew Jane Hoey well. 
Bane: Yes. I knew her well. 
Leiby: Was this your idea? 
Bane: Yes, it was my recommendation. 
Leiby: So you picked her. 
Bane: I picked Jane. 
Leiby: Quite a sound appointment 1 

- 193 - 

Bane: Well, it turned out admirably from every point 
of view; from an operating point of view, from 
the standpoint of association, from the stand 
point of accomplishments* It was a good ap 
pointment, I admit it. 

The next task was to appoint someone to 
the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation. And, 
again, we searched the country. The person in 
the structure that knew more about that field, 
of course, than anyone was Altmeyer. He had 
been working in the only state that had a program 
of that kind. We came to the conclusion that 
Gordon Wagenet was the best man we knew, 
Altmeyer was enthusiastic about him. He recom 
mended him. We appointed him. He, also, made 
an excellent record. He stayed with that or 
ganization for twenty years. He set it up from 
top to bottom, 

Leiby: What had he done? 

Bane: He had been with some public industrial relations 
groups in the states. He knew something about 
workmen's compensation, and public service. He 

- 194 - 

Bane: also had had some experience with insurance 
companies. And he was a well-rounded 
person. I would say he, also, was in his mid 
dle forties 

Leiby: Do you remember what he had been doing before 
he'd been in the public service at the time 
he was appointed? 

Bane: I think he'd been with workmen's compensation, 
primarily, just before he was appointed. 
Then we came to the question of Old Age Insur 
ance. That was a tough one. No one of us, 
that is, no member of the board nor myself, 
were too well acquainted in the insurance field. 
So we consulted everyone that 
we thought had any ideas on the subject 
And then we finally came back to Washington. 
The railroad retirement system had been 
operating in Washington. And the person 
who had been most active in that particular area 
was Murray Latimer . We ended 
up appointing Murray Latimer as director of the 
Old Age Insurance Bureau. 

We were over the first hurdle. But in 
setting up a brand new, big Washington department 

- 195 - 

Bane: of course you think first in terms of the 

substance of the .lob, that is, public assist 
ance, unemployment compensation, and old age 
insurance. You think first in terms of line 
operation. And then you think in terms of 
staff agencies, or staff departments, or staff 
bureaus. And , first , inev 
itably, in almost any department in Washington, 
y*i have to get a general counsel. 

We decided to employ a lawyer 
by the name of Thomas Eliot, a grandson of the great 
Charles Eliot, former President of Harvard 

Tom had been assistant general counsel 
in the Labor Department. And he had worked ex 
tensively with Miss Perkins and all the rest 
in drafting the act itself. When we agreed 
on Tom as general counsel and he was appointed, 
we thought we should be pretty careful about 
the associate general counsel. Tom was an ex 
cellent, careful, cautious, judicious lawyer, 
shall we say. So we wanted as associate general 
counsel, someone who was, shall I say, of a more 

- 196 - 

Bane: adventurous nature, (Laughter) So we ap 
pointed a gentleman by the name of Jack Tate, 
from Tennessee. He is now, incidentally, as 
sociate dean of the law department at Yale 
University. Tom Eliot is 
Chancellor of Washington University in St. 
Louis, at the present time. Those two 
gentlemen have done very well. 

As it worked out, and this has often 
amused me,* 116 Wa 7 we operated at that time- 
when we wanted a "no" answer to any question 
with respect to the act, we would call Tom 
Eliot. (Laughter) Whenever we wanted a 
"yes" answer, we would call Jack Tate. 
(Laughter) So that worked out admirably. 

The next staff agency was, again the 
inevitable staff agency, Audits and Accounts. 
We appointed a man by the name of Banning 
who stayed there a long time, in that most 
important, but most uninteresting kind of a 

The Bureau of Research and Statistics. 
That was one that interested me immensely. 

- 197 - 

Bane: We spent a lot of time considering personnel 
for that Bureau. We decided on three 
people at pretty much the same time; Mr. Walton 
Hamilton to be director. He was an excellent person, 
especially on sociological and legal theory. He 
was enormously interested in not what you have, 
but where do we go from here? What are going 
to be the long term trends? We were in 
terested in that also ; Winant, the chair 
man of the board, was particularly interested 
in that. We agreed to appoint Walton 
Hamilton as director of this bureau. 

Then we were going to need a lot of stat 
istics and a lot of research, which might be 
called utilitarian research* day before yester 
day statistics, a day-to-day operation. 

Leiby: Operational statistics. 

Bane: Yes. So we appointed two assistant di 
rectors; Ewan Clague, who is now director of 
the Bureau of labor Statistics and Tom Blaisdell, 
who is now Professor Bneritus of Political Science 
at the University of California, right here. His 
office is right down on the next floor. That's 

- 198 - 

Bane: the way that bureau was set up. 

Leiby: What were the duties of these gentlemen? 

Bane: Their duties were to collect and tabulate and 
get into usable form for the administrators, 
all the facts, figures, and statistical informa 
tion that we would need when we began to con 
sider state plans and what grants to make to the 
states for public assistance, unemployment comp 
ensation; and to suggest for Congress, primarily, 
what would be the long term trends. What we would 

suggest in terms of amendments to the act? 
Why? What would be the financial trend and so on? 

Leiby: A most important bureau. 

Bane: A most important outfit. 

The next one was the Bureau of Business 
Management. They would handle the budget. They 
would handle the actual processing of personnel. 
They would handle the mundane and most important 
and controversial question in Washington, 
space. Where are you going to put a desk? They 
would handle supplies. They would have the 
housekeeping job. And this will interest 
you particularly for that job I stole a man, al- 

- 199 - 

Bane: most literally, from an old friend of yours 
and mine, Sanford Bates. Sanford Bates was 
director of the Bureau of Prisons. He 
had an assistant director , James 
7. Bennett. So, of course, going through chan 
nels, I went to see Sanford first. I told him 
I would like to have Jim Bennett to direct this 
Bureau and that we could do somewhat better for 
him, financially and otherwise. Sanford was not 
enthusiastic about the idea. (Laughter) But, 
of course, he said, ultimately, as everybody 
always says, "If you can do better for him and 
if he wants the job, all right." We offered 
the job to James V. Bennett, who, incidentally, 
has just recently retired. Bennett came over, 
accepted , and did an excellent job 
with the assignment and the task. Two or three 
years went by and Sanford Bates decided to re 
tire as director of the Bureau of Prisons, 
whereupon he, Sanford Bates, stole Bennett back 
from us to come over to the Bureau of Prisons and 
succeed him as director. 

The fifth and last of the service bureaus 

- 200 - 

Bane: was what we called a Bureau of Information. 
All bureaus of that kind in Washington were 
generally called bureaus of information, rather 
than bureaus of publicity and public relations. 
But they're the same thing. They handled our 
relationship with the press; took the material 
from the Bureau of Research and Statistics and 
developed it into pamphlets; developed charts 
of one kind or another--the usual thing that a 
bureau of information does. 

Leiby: Which I use in my class. 

Bane: You do, good. 

We employed a gentleman from New York who'd 
had extensive experience in those fields. His 
name was Resnick. 

Now we were all dressed up and ready to go., 
from the standpoint of structure. 

Leiby: Were these positions under Civil Service? 

Bane: The positions were under Civil Service with the 

exception of lawyers, policy people, and so-called 
experts. An expert had to be a person who was con. 
sidered by the Civil Service Commission to be par 
ticularly qualified in the particular area. 

- 201 - 

Bane: -And it had to be a person that we 

paid more than $3,600 a year. (Laughter) This 
was 1935, you remember, and it was during the 

Leiby: The reason I asked was because the T.V.A. did 
not. . . 

Bane: Did not have ; always had their own system. 

Leiby: Two things strike me. One is that you evidently 
had no trouble hiring. 

Bane: We had no trouble hiring people, from the stand 
point of the availability of people. 

Leiby: You got who you wanted right off. 

Bane: We got whom we wanted, the top people. 

The woods were full of people, literally alive 
with people, who wanted to work for the Social 
Security Administration, for two very definite 
reasons. Just before we started the 
Supreme Court had declared the National Recovery 
Administration, N.R.A.., unconstitutional. 

Leiby: So they were going out of business. 

Bane: Also , just before we started the Supreme 
Court had declared the Agricultural Adjustment 

- 202 - 

Bane: Administration, A. A. A., unconstitutional. And 
it seemed to us that every employee of N.R.A. 
and every employee of A. A. A. landed on our 
doorstep wanting a job. It seemed to us also 
that each and every one of them had a letter 
from his congressman. It got to be 
such a rush that Miss Heiser, my secretary 
for at least a month and maybe 

much more, set up a two hour period every 
afternoon at which we did nothing but run an 
interviewing system. The person with 
a letter from his congressman would insist that 
he had to see me, personally, individually, and 
right now. (Laughter) And thinking, perhaps, 
that I would be going up on the Hill, I 
tried to see as many as I could. I saw 
hundreds of applicants over a month or 

Leiby: But I get the impression that your appoint 
ments represented your judgment. 

Bane: Yes, insofar as top personnel was concerned. 

But these people that I was seeing with letters 
and so on were told that their applica- 

- 203 - 

Bane: tions were gone over at another place, I 

would have a brief interview with them, tell 
them we were setting up a personnel office, 
and make arrangements for them to see our 
personnel officer, who we were in the process 
of appointing at that time Henry Aronson. 
He is still with the Social Security Ad- 
ministration-in H.E.W, now. 

State Plans 

Bane: Our problem was, of course, to work 
with the states immediately, directly, help 
fully. Every state was clamoring, "What are 
you going to require in this plan? What should 
our plan consist of? We have to submit a plan 
to you before January 1st if we're to participate 
immediately in all three of the public assistance 
programs. Tell us what we should do." So we 
had to devise a manual . "The act re 
quires so and so and so and so. We suggest that 
you set it up this way, so that it can be handled 
most expeditiously here in this office. We 

- 204 - 

Bane: would suggest that you pay particular attention 
to these various aspects of the problem. 
We would suggest that you send the plan to us in 
triplicate. So we will have one for our desk, 
the lawyers will have one and the auditor will 
have one." Th plans began to come in, 

We began to develop a little staff, 
Jane Hoey and her outfit would be available to 
go out to a state that was uncertain as 
to what the plan should be, 

Leiby: Can you tell me something about how you formu 
lated the requirements for the plans? 

Bane: We discussed them, I assure you, ad infinitum, 
in board meetings. The board had to pass on it 

Leiby: These are practical men. 

Bane: These are all practical men, 

Leiby: In effect you were testing out the response you 

would get. 
Bane: Exactly. And Jane, of course, was sitting in on 

all of these conferences as head of the bureau. 

- 205 - 

Bane: And she was fighting for every principle, aa 
only Jane could fight for such things. We 
finally just hammered it out what the plan 
should include, And it was pretty well agreed 
upon. By that time a stream of welfare com 
missioners from the various states was coming 
in. And we would try all this out on them. 
"Is this the way it should be? How will it 
work? What will it do to you? Can you handle 
this in your territory?" I would say the out 
line of the initial suggested plan, which we 
developed to send out to the states, was modi 
fied again and again at the suggestion of the 

Leiby: It was a sort of model. 

Bane: A model outline plan. 

Leiby: A model of a legislative act. 

Bane: Yes. It was a combination of our thoughts and 
the thoughts of the people out in the states 
who came and helped us develop it. 

Leiby: Were there any particular discussions that you 
recall very vividly? 

Bane: This is interesting, though somewhat facetious. 

- 206 - 

Bane: We were new and the board was enormously 

anxious not to make any major mistakes and 
to set correct precedents. We were conscious 
of the fact that we were doing something that 
had never been done before and if we made a 
boo-boo here and now it might react for years 
to come. We took this job seriously. The 
board would discuss most any point for hours, 
it seemed to me, being an impetuous, impatient 
person. One problem came up that we dis 
cussed so long that it became something of a 
joke with the board. The question was , 
"HOW did the Confederate veteran who was 
drawing Confederate pensions fit into this 
picture?" And there was a certain lady in 
Alabama who came up to advise with us in de 
veloping the plan. She was Loula Dunn, 
who had just become Welfare Commissioner 
for the State of Alabama; later she be 
came director of the American Public Wei- 

- 207 - 

Bane: fare Association. 

Leiby: What was the decision? 

Bane: The decision was to treat them, of course, 
just like everyone else. 

Leiby: Right, a good decision! What was Jane Hoey 
fighting for? 

Bane: What Jane would call standards; merit exam 
inations for all social workers that were 
going to handle the program, 

Leiby: What did Winant think? 

Bane: Winant was all for it; so was Altmeyer. And, 
of course, I was for it. But all of us knew 
very well that there was no possibility of 
getting trained social workers in all of these 
jobs to start with . The bodies just were 
not available. 

Leiby: But a merit system required some sort of 
qualifications, like another degree. 

Bane: Yes, that's why we called it a merit system. 

We did our best to persuade all the 
states to include in their plans a merit system. 

- 208 - 

Bane: In some states it worked, in some it didn't. 
We couldn't require that. The act didn't re 
quire it. So we just tried to develop it 
by persuasion. 

I might insert right here that purely by 
accident there developed a situation that en 
abled us to do what we had wanted to do and 
had not been able to do except in patches . 
It enabled us to do it straight across the 
board. W.P.A. was still operating in 1936 and 
'37. And there was, of course, as there al 
ways had been, a great deal of criticism of 
that program. The United Press sent a re 
porter , Tom Stokes ,into Kentucky and Pen 
nsylvania to investigate what was happening 
with respect to W.P.A., from the standpoint 
of politics to look into reports 
of scandals of one kind or an 

Tom Stokes went into these states, par 
ticularly Kentucky* He wrote a series of 
articles blasting the administration of 
W.P.A. Incidentally , he got a 

- 209 - 

Bane: Pulitzer Prize for those articles. In the 
articles he mentioned many times Senator 
Berkley's connection with the happenings. 
Barkley never denied any of this. He simply 
said, "The W.P.A. is a federal program. And 
federal officials are using a federal program 
to their advantage." Barkley was running for 
re-election to the Senate. He said he had to 
use it, "Because social security was a federal, 
state program administered by the state and 
Happy Chandler [the Governor of Kentucky] 
was running against him for the Senate and 
using the social security program." Mr. 
Barkley thereupon introduced an amendment to 
the Social Security Act that "All staff in 
the federal-state program of social security 
must henceforth be appointed in accordance 
with a merit system established by the state 
and approved by the Social Security Board." 
That's how we got the merit system in the 
social security program. When politicians 
fall-out merit systems sometimes prosper. 

- 210 - 

Bane: Incidentally, that amendment inserted in 
the Social Security Act of 1937 has been a sec 
tion of practically every grant-in-aid program 
since that time. And the state plan idea, which 
was developed in the Social Security Act of 1935, 
has been carried over in practically every 
federal-state grant program since* 

Leiby: As you reviewed these state plans, do you re 
member any particular difficulties that you 
came to have to watch out for? 

Bane: I don't remember any particular difficulties, 
initially. Again, this was a new program. 
Again, every state wanted to qualify as soon 
as possible. 

Leiby: Actually many states did not qualify. 

Bane: Many states did not and, therefore, approvals 

were postponed for quite a while. But they all 
wanted to do it, generally speaking. Where they 
didn't qualify it was incompetence (lack of in 
formation) in setting up the plan. But 
the big states qualified pretty 

- 211 - 

Bane: quickly because they had staffs. 
Problems in Particular States 

The troubles came later, in the actual 
operation of the plan. I might mention three 
of the troubles; Illinois, Ohio, and Oklahoma. 
I mention those three because in each of those 
three instances we had to withdraw funds from 
the states because they were not living up to 
the plan which they had submitted and the board 
had approved. And they were, in fact, not living 
up in some aspects to the law itself. 

Leiby: That's the state law. 

Bane: The state law, which was, of course, modeled 
on the federal act. 

The first was in Illinois. Interestingly 
enough, before the Social Security Act was pas 
sed and before I went with the Social Security 
Administration, at Governor Horner's request 
I had made an appraisal of the situation 
in Illinois. I was then with the American 

- 212 - 

Bane: Public Welfare Association* I made the ap 
praisal of that system and drafted a sug 
gested act for him in the light of what I 
thought Congress would pass, and which it did 
in the Social Security Act* When we began 
to look at what was happening in Illinois, 
we became greatly disturbed. We couldn't 
find out what was actually happening, from 
an auditing point of view. We were matching 
their funds, millions of dollars. Our 
auditors would come in with the reports 
that they didn't know whether things were 
right or wrong. They couldn't find out any 

Governor Horner had appointed as the 
first director of the Illinois system a de 
lightful gentleman, who had absolutely no 
experience in this field whatever. He'd 
been city manager of a very small city, in 
fact, just a town. He was completely buried. 
He just didn't know anything about it at all. 

- 213 - 

Bane: -And we couldn't find out anything. Of course, 
I went through the usual procedure; first I 
wrote a letter to the governor about it, no 
reply; then I wired the governor; and then I 
telephoned him. We always pursued that one, 
two, three-- letter, wire, and then telephone 
call. The governor, on the telephone, said 
he'd get to it as soon as he could. He had 
a legislature in session and he said he was 
busy. Well, we were busy too. And we 
didn't want a financial scandal in our laps. 

Leiby: This is a serious thing. 

Bane: Yes. The General Accounting Office, as we 

knew, would be coming along in the next month 
or so. And they'd be checking all of this. 
So after much effort to get together and do 
something, with no response, we cut off funds 
and set a hearing. The governor, of course, 
reacted violently. As he had to, of course. 
(Laughter) A few days later he called up and 
said, "Let's get together and iron this thing 

- 214 - 

Bane: out." We got together in a room In a Chicago 
hotel. Within a morning and afternoon we 
straightened out the whole business. The 
question was to get a competent person. The 
governor took his commissioner of finance, a 
man by the name of John Weigel, and trans 
ferred him over to the W.P.A. program a 
top-notch man. He set up the necessary forms, 
accounting procedures, and so on. They were 
all right. 

We had a different situation in Ohio. 
In Ohio we ran into the election of 1936. 
We began to get reports from newspaper 
people. Social security was news in those 
days. It was new; it was a big program; 
a lot of money; a great deal of con 

Leiby: Sort of like W.P.A. 

Bane: Yes. The newspapers were writing about it 

extensively. We began to get reports of ir 
regularities gross irregularities in Ohio, 

- 215 - 

Bane: So we sent out to Ohio a task force, to 
investigate. We'd just heard that phrase, 
"task force." We just loved it and adopted 
it unanimously. (Laughter) And thereafter, 
every time we would send out a group, we 
would oall it a task force* 

Leiby: The plan had been in operation for about 
eight months. 

Bane: About, yes. We got a wild, frantic telephone 
call from some member of our task force. 
They had just come across something that 
was outrageous, illegal, immoral, and any 
thing else you can think of. The governor, it 
was alleged, had sent out in the envelopes 
that enclosed the old age assistance checks, 
a slip that said, in effect, unless Governor 
Davey is re-elected the first week of November, 
in the pending election, this will be your last 
old age assistance check. That was the story! 
Well, I knew the press would have that 
pretty quickly. And I was extremely 
anxious to beat the press to 

- 216 - 

Bane: that story. I didn't want them to be in 

a position to say they had found out and they 
had pressured a reluctant administration to do 
something about a Democratic candidate who was 
running for governor. So, fifteen minutes after 
we got that telephone call, had checked and 
verified it as to its accuracy,., 

Leiby: How did you verify that? 

Bane: I just called two or three other people out 
there. -And they all said the same thing im 
mediately. They had access to some elderly 
people who had these envelopes with their 
checks. So I asked them to check it immediately. 

Then, with the information in hand, I went 
to see Winant, Altmeyer, and Miles and I said, 
"This is what we're going to do." Ind they 
said, "Surely, do it quick, " (Laughter) So we 
wired the governor and cut off funds and set a 

Leiby: Made an announcement. 

Bane: T s made an announcement that night as to what 

the alleged facts were and what we'd done about it. 
We had a hearing and, incidentally, Davey was 

- 217 - 

Bane: not re-elected, John Bricker was elected 
the first time he was elected as governor,. 
He cleared up that situation after a lit 
tle while. But for months thereafter the ques 
tion was, in congress, whether the amount which 
we'd taken away from Ohio for a month or two, 
should be reimbursed to the state. 

Leiby: What was the decision on that? 

Bane: The decision finally was to reimburse them. 

Leiby: You really hated to withdraw funds. 

Bane: Surely. What we were doing was just cutting the 

aged persons' allowances in half. And that's why 
we didn't fight much the reimbursement on a retro 
active basis. It was just giving back to the old 
folks what they should have had anyway. 

Leiby: You meant to hurt the politicians. 

Bane: No, we just meant to aat to it that the organization wouL 
operate in accordance with the statvitej and that 
the people who were entitled to benefits would 
get the benefits. Of course, sometimes, when we 
tried to make the organizations operate in accord 
ance with the statutes, in order to do that we 

- 218 - 

Bane: would temporarily hurt the benificiaries. 
It was a tough problem all along the 

The third state was Oklahoma. Again, 
we sent a task force. The task force 
came back with a very interesting and 
amusing sort of story. They had in 
vestigated three or four counties in 
Oklahoma. The one that I remember 
best was Cherokee County. In this 
county approximately one hundred twenty 
seven per cent, as I recall, of all per 
sons sixty-five years or over were on old 
age assistance. (Laughter) We notified 
the governor that we had to withdraw funds. 
We had a hearing. We sent a group down 
there that worked with the state department 
and helped set it up in such a way as to 
enable the state department to more ef 
fectively supervise the local units. Those 
were the kinds of problems we had initially. 

- 219 - 

Field Offices end Service 

Leiby: You haven't said anything about the field services, 
Bane: Each of these bureaus, public assistance, un 
employment compensation, and old age insurance, 
had a field service. 

The field services for the Bureau of Public 
Assistance and the Bureau of Unemployment Comt)en- 
sation were pretty much the same type of service; 
assistance, a certain amount of supervision, a 
certain degree of inspection. But in the early 
days it was primarily a question of assistance. 
We were depending for inspection on our auditing 
crowd, largely. They would come along after a 
month or two to just see what was happening to 
the money. 

Leiby: A field service is an office with some people in 
it. And you have these for regions, I suppose. 
How many regions were there? 
Bane: We set up twelve regions initially, 
Leiby: Did they correspond with the Federal Reserve? 
Bane: No. They were our own regions. It probably was 

- 220 - 

Bane: a mistake but we set up our own regions, con-' 
tending that this problem was different. All 
problems are different! 

Leiby: In each regional office you had a director. 

Bane: We had a director and we had a representative 
of each of the bureaus That ia , 
public assistance; unemployment compensation: 
old age insurance; a lawyer; a representative 
of the General Counsel; a statistical person; 
an auditor; an information person--all except 
the business manager. 

Leiby: In other words, it was a duplication of your 

central office and they were in touch with the 
people in the states. 

Bane: And, immediately, the age-old problem that has 

never been settled and hopefully maybe our grand- 

children in federal or state government will de 
vise a way to settle it we ran into the problem 
of what is the relationship between the staff in 
Washington and the regional offices? 

Here's the way the regional offices were set 
up. We appointed right from my own office, the 

- 221 - 

Bane: regional director. And he was responsible 

directly to me. Then we'd have a public as 
sistance representative in that office. I 
would ask Jane to designate a public as 
sistance representative. 

Is that public assistance rep 
resentative in that regional office primarily 
responsible to the regional director of that 
office or is he primarily responsible to the 
Director of the Bureau of Public Assistance, 
Jane Hoey in Washington? And the same thing 
applied across-the-board. 

So I drew up executive order number eleven. 
I did that early in 1936. I left the Social 
Security Board in the fall of 1938. In that 
time I had rewritten executive order number 
eleven at least five times to try to solve 
that problem. I'm not certain it was in any 
better shape when I left than it was when I 

Leiby: Why was it such a problem? In theory? 

Bane: In theory it's not such a problem. Representa 
tives should be responsible to the regional directors, 

- 222 - 

Bane: The regional director should run his office 
and be in charge of it. But the regional 
director is a general practitioner. And 
these representatives of the various bureaus 
and divisions are specialists. As Jane Hoey 
used to say, "What does that regional director 
know about this technical problem of social 
welfare? He has no basis for judgement." 
Her favorite phrase was "no basis for judge 
ment." Tfce same thing would happen with 
the lawyers time and again. They would say, 
"He's a grand administrator but he doesn't 
understand the legal aspects and ramifications 
of this problem." And constantly I was having 
to settle that kind of an argument. 

Leiby: There's a problem in a state and one of the 

field representatives, the person from public 
assistance, for example, would go out and say, 
"The standards of adequacy are really very bad , " 
or something like that. Then they'd come back 
to the regional office and they'd, presumably, 
report this to the regional director. But the 
regional director is a general practitioner. 

- 223 - 

Leiby: Were these fellows under Civil Service? 

Bane: Oh yes. 

Leiby: But at any rate he would probably be closer,.. 

Bane: To the administrative aspects, financial as 
pects of the problem. 

Leiby: And to the state authorities. 

Bane : Yea . 

Leiby: Did they ever have anything to do to clear 
this guy and complain about him? 

Bane: Oh yes. We had decided who we would appoint as 
Regional Director. I would frequently consult 
the Senator in the state in which the regional 
office was going to be located. I'd tell him 
we're going to appoint so and so and that we 
planned to make the announcement next week, 
which would give him an opportunity to... 

Leiby: Well, it's only decent to talk to a Senator 
when you're going to make an appointment. 

Bane: Back to your question, the public assist 
ance representative would think 
something definite should be done. 

- 224 - 

Bane: The regional director would say, "You just 

don't push these people around you understand, 
We're going to have to take this thing 
gradually. This is new." Well, maybe the 
public assistance representative was en 
thusiastic, impatient, and suffering from 
a bit of frustration. Maybe she'd been out 
there before and come back with the same re 
port. Then she'd get in touch with her 
Washington bureau. And then, of course, 
Jane would come in to see me. Of course, 
I would call the regional director. And 
pretty soon we would have a nice little 
donnybrook going . This always hap 
pens in every new agency when you're starting 

from the ground up. You have to settle 
down and not only establish precedents, but 
you have to become used to each other. And 
you have to learn to devise ways and means to 
keep your elbows and knees out of the other 
fellow's ribs. 

leiby: What strikes me is that although this is awk- 


ward for administrators, nevertheless in the 

- 225 - 







long run it's a good idea to have a number 

of points of view on a subject and have a 

number of courses of action. 

Why, of course. 

So this was not really so bad after all. 

Oh no. 

Of course it might be that occasionally the 

public assistance person was right. 

Yes. And occasionally we'd have exactly the 

same situation develop in exactly the same way 

between the regional director and the auditor. 

Those were the fighting points. 

You really used the auditor as a kind of 



And then the auditor might very well come back 

and talk to the public assistance person. 

Yes. And you'd go out and check on this. 

When they didn't agree it always landed on 

our desks. 


- 226 - 

Leaving the Social Security Board 

Leiby: Could you say something about leaving the 

Social Security Board? 
Bane: That's something else that just happened. 

I had no idea of leaving the Social Security 
Leiby: You looked upon this, hopefully, as a long 

term job. 

Bane: Yes, I thought I was going to be there for a 
number of years. 

In August, 1938 the American Bar 
Association met in Cleveland and I 
got a telephone call from Henry 
Toll, who was Executive Director of the 
Council of State Governments . H e asked me to 
meet him in Cleveland. I thought he wanted 
to talk to me about something having to do with 
social security. Or I thought maybe he wanted 
me to talk at a group meeting of the Bar As 
sociation on this subject. So I went over and 
I found he had something else in mind. K e told 

- 227 - 

Bane: me he was going to retire in the next month 
or so and he offered me the job as Executive 
Director of the Council of State Governments. 
He told me he'd checked with the governors and 
the board and so on. I said, "Let me think 
about that a while." 

I began to get calls from the governors 
I'd worked with first in the American Public 
Welfare Association, then in relief, and then 
in social security. They said they under 
stood that I'd been offered this job and would 
I consider it carefully and seriously. They 
said, it's urgent that you by all means ac 
cept it. So I agreed to give Toll an answer 
in the usual week. 

Mrs. Bane and I talked it over at length. 
I talked with the Board. I talked with the 
people over at the White House, Mclntyre 
mostly. And we finally decided to take the 
job with the Council of State Governments. 

Social security was operating, it was a 
going concern. 

had a growing family. I'd come to 

- 228 - 

Bane: Washington at some sacrifice in salary. My 
children were now going to private schools. 
The future looked better with the Council of 
State Governments than it did with the Social 
Security Administration. 

Leiby: You mean financially? 

Bane: Financially, And I've always liked to promote 
things, start things, expand things. The Gov 
ernors' Conference had just agreed to combine 
its operations with the Council of State Gov 
ernments, They both offered me the job, urged 
me to take it, 

Leiby: So substantially then, it was, in the first 
place, a financial advantage and also a new 

Bane: Yes, 

Reflections on Policy and Administration 

Leiby: I have one more general sort of question. I'm 
interested in this business about policy and 
administration. You say now that you think 
it's very hard to separate these. Could you 
give me any example of a case earlier in the 

- 229 - 

Leiby: Social Security Administration when the really 
necessary connection between policy and ad 
ministration came up? 

Bane: Let me discuss it briefly from this point of 
view. If you have a board in this kind of a 
situation, the better the board is individual 
qualifications of the individual members the 
worse it is. Because a good man dealing with 
a problem in which he's enormously interested 
wants to work at it and work at it strenuously. 
And every board member was interested, as the 
Children's Bureau used to say, "In the total 
child." (Laughter) People would come in to 
see them about personnel, or about what had 
happened in a state. And they would dis 
cuss it. And pretty soon implied commitments 
would be made. And people would come in and 
talk to me as Executive Director as to what 
should be done about amendments and so on. 
That was essentially something which eventually 
would be decided by the board. They go out of 
my office with certain ideas as to what I 
thought of it. And again and again we found 

- 230 - 

Bane: that administration and policy were inter 
twined. Governor Winant was the type of 
person who liked to work late at night, like 
Winston Churchill, and get up late in the 
morning. I was in the office every morning at 
about eight o'clock and I was used to going to 
bed early. Occasionally I used 
to tell the Governor after he'd called me up 
and asked me to come over and we had talked until 
one or two o'clock in the morning, that he'd 
make a nervous wreck out of me. (Laughter) 

Leiby: Would it be fair to sum it up by saying that 
board members tend naturally to want to be 
come executive vice presidents, because 
they're interested. 

Bane: Yes. Because they're interested, because 
they're able, and because whatever the ar 
rangement is, if they're on the board and somebody 
oomes in to see them the visitor thinks he 
is a responsible executive on this job. 

Leiby i And Executive Directors tend to want to be 
come board members. 

Bane: Just the same way. 

- 231 - 

Leiby: You're close to the situation. 

Bane: Yes. My judgment, on the basia of the many errors 
and mistakes that I made in this field, is 
that you can't effectively separate policy 
and administration. 

- 232 - 

Reflections on Policy and Administration 

(Interview of January 14, 1965) 

Leiby: At the end of our last meeting you made the 
striking statement that the better a board 
is , the worse it is in the sense that the 

Bane: Meaning by that that the more competent, the 
more able, the more energetic, the more dedi 
cated a board member is to his task, if 
it's a board operating through an executive 
director, the more you have a situation pieces* 
sarily and, I think, inevitably, where you 
have proliferated directorship. The board 
members, if they're able and competent, al 
beit they're supposed to deal exclusively 
with policy, policy gets into administration 
and they can't avoid it. And, on the other 
side, an executive director can't possibly 
avoid doing things time and time again that 

- 233 - 

Bane: infringe upon the policy making prerogative, 

be it board or commission. And in many instances 
inadvertently his executive action will deter 
mine policy. Because the board will find it- 
self in the position, as the board did with me 
once in the Social Security Administration, to 
either stand by the executive director in what 
he has done which is really maTrlng policy or 
get another executive director. 

Leiby: Could you say more about that occasion? 

Bane: Yes. It's written up quite extensively, in 
cidentally, in Professor Joseph P. Harris* 
book, The Advice ft ftd Consent of the Senate* 
Professor Harris is now here in Berkeley, he 
was for twenty odd years a professor of 
political science at the University of 
California. He's now professor emeritus here. 

In 1937 we had a controversy the 
Social Security Board with the United 
States Senate , which I had some 
thing to do with instigating. You must 
remember that I was younger in those days than 
I am now. And perhaps under present oiroum- 

- 234 - 

Bane: stances, having acquired as much experience as 
I have, and , you know, you acquire experience 
as a result of your bad judgement, I might have 
done differently. But when we set up the 
Social Security Administration we were very 
conscious of the fact that we were doing some 
thing brand new, very large, and very signif 
icant in the lives of the American people* 
We wanted to do it right. w e insisted 
that people should be employed solely on the 
basis of competence and ability and insofar as 
certain experts were concerned, which were not 
under Civil Service, we wrote our own personnel 
requirements. I wrote them, the board approved 
them. We distributed them to the bureau di 
rectors and said, "You be certain to follow 
these instructions in this personnel manual. 11 

Some time after that a distinguished 
Senator, one of the most distinguished persons 
in the Senate, Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, 
my Senator I had known him since I was a 
boy and incidentally he was Chairman of the 
Senate Appropriations Committee 

- 235 - 

Bant: ame to: see me about appointing 

a certain person to a job as an expert in 
Public Assistance, I hasten to say that 
Senator Glass was not a politician in the 
usual, curbstone sense of the word. H c was 
not interested in patronage and never had 
been. But the Senator, bless his heart, was 
eleemosynary. (Laughter) A friend of his 
had come to see him who, incidentally, was 
not a resident of Virginia. She was a resident 
of Tennessee. He had known her through 
his wife. She was a widow with several chil 
dren. Sne came to see the Senator and 
told Mm that she wanted a job with 
the Social Security Board. The Senator 
assured her that he would do everything he 
could. And so he came to see me about it. 

We looked her up, investigated her care 
fully. The only job in welfare that she'd 
ever had was as a $1,200 a year ease assistant 
in the District of Columbia Welfare Department.. 
for about six months. I carefully explained to 

- 236 - 

Bane: the Senator that she was not competent In 

this field* She was not experienced enough 
to be appointed as an expert, and we couldn't 
recommend her* We couldn't appoint her* 

I thought the matter was settled. Some 
time later he raised the question with me 
again* And I told him I would look into it 
a second time, which I did. Some weeks 
later he came by the office* Previous to 
that I had been going usually up to see him 
at his request* He sat down and said, "Frank, 
when are you going to make this appointment?" 
The Senator was getting along in years at 
that time. And I thought, very mistakenly, 
that he had probably forgotten some of our 
previous conversations. He had not. I went 
through the whole file and the whole rigmarole 
of the discussion again. He sat patiently 
and listened. When I got through the 
Senator said, "Yes Prank, that's very in 
teresting. I've heard it all before. But 
when are you going to make this appointment?" 
He said, "I want a yes or no answer. Are you 

- 237 - 

Bane: going to make this appointment or are you not?" 

I had written these personnel 
standards. I had recommended their adoption 
by the board. I had insisted that our bureau 
chiefs govern themselves accordingly. The 
only place that I could appoint this person 
would be in one of the bureaus. And the only 
excuse that I could give the bureau chief for 
suggesting the appointment, was that my own 
senator had recommended it. I was of the 
opinion that were I to make such a suggestion 
on such a basis, that I wouldn't have too 
much influence thereafter with our bureau 
chiefs. So I replied briefly, "Senator, 
we've known each other for many years, since 
I was a boy. I have valued your good 
opinion but if you insist upon a yes or no 
answer, the answer has to be no for the rea 
sons that I've said." The Senator walked out 
and as he left he said, "Very well Mr. 
Bane" I'd become Mr. Bane "I shall govern 
myself accordingly." He did! 

. 238 - 

Bane: When our budget came before the Ap 
propriations Committee he cut $500 out of 
my own individual salary and he cut 
ten million odd dollars, as I recall, out 
of our appropriation. How you see what the 
Executive Officer had done to the Social 
Security Board, its policy, and its program. 
As a result of this action I was way over in 
policy and program* We would have to re 
adjust all of our affairs because of this action. 

An interesting sidelight on that was that, to 
repeat, in those days social security was nev/. 
There were very few people in cengress who 
knew anything about it except in the most 
general fashion. The amount that the senate sub 
committee had cut out of our appropriation came 
out of administrative grants by the federal 
government to the states for the operation 
and administration of unemployment compensa 
tion. When they did that I almost bit my 
tongue to insure that I would keep 
quiet, very quiet, make no comment and no 
protest. The appropriation bill went back 

- 239 - 

Bane: to the house. By that time every state had 
been alerted to the fact that they had lost 
about half the appropriation they were 
going to get to administer their own unemploy 
ment compensation programs. They all screamed 
to high heaven. And of course it was all 
put back. That's an example of what can 
happen inadvertently and without plan, but 
nevertheless is an instance of an executive 
action infringing upon policy and program. 

Leiby: Not intentionally, quite indirectly. 

Bane: Yes. Not intentionally at all. We could name a 
number of similar instances where the ac 
tion of a board member hampers to a consider 
able extent, at least complicates, the opera 
tion of an agency through its executive. 
With all those things in mind and with 
experience over a period of two years, when 
the Commission on the Study of Executive 
Management of the Federal Government con 
sisting of Louis Brownlow as chairman, 
Charles Merriam and Luther (Juliet went into 

- 240 - 

Bane: this matter they recommended the abolishment 
of the board and the establishment in lieu 
thereof of the Federal Social Security Agency. 

Leiby: When did they make this study? 

Bane: 1937. It went through congress in 1938, The 
board was not entirely abolished. The board 
was made the usual one, two stepinto an 
executive and advisory board. An executive 
officer was appointed with full authority to 
administer programs. The "board reported to 
him. That executive officer was Paul McNutt, 
who had been Governor of Indiana, 

Leiby: Was this after you had resigned? 

Bane: Yes, it was after I left, I left in '38 and 

congress passed the bill in the latter part of 
'38 or early '39. It was in the middle of '39 
that the actual change was made from the control 
ling board, from the standpoint of policy and 
program, over to a single-headed agency with the 
board left in an operating and advisory capacity-- 
but subject to the executive officer of the agency. 

Leiby: I should think in some ways an advisory board 

- 241 - 

Leiby: could be a great help*. 

Bane: An advisory board is a great help. It's 
an enormous help to any executive in three 
or four areas. One: it's a cushion between 
the executive and the general public and 
between the executive and the legislature. 
He can always use the advisory board as a 
friend at court, so to speak to testify for 
his legislation, to issue statements to the 
press, to represent an understanding and 
sympathetic public. Two: an advisory board 
is also enormously valuable, if as and when 
you run into a crisis. 

Welfare departments are notorious for 
having crises riots in penitentiaries, a 
charge of murder through neglect in a hos 
pital for the mentally ill, a child dies 
under questionable circumstances in an in 
stitution. That's the time that you thank 
the Almighty for a good competent advisory 
board that understands your troubles. 

Leiby: And speak to the whole nation* 

Bane: Yes. 

- 242 - 

Leiby: You also might get advice from them. 

Bane: Oh yes, you get advice from them constantly, 
(Laughter) I don't mean that it's unsought 
advice. It usually is advice that you seek. 
And it usually is knowledgeable and sympa 
thetic advice, if you have the right kind of 
advisory "board. Occasionally you get on an 
advisory board a person who might be unsympa 
thetic, characterized as a busybody, that will 
cause you a few minor headaches. It might cost 
you some time smoothing over some ruffled feel 
ings here and there. But on the whole an ad 
visory committee's assets, in my judgment, far 
exceed its liabilities, 

Leiby: Did the Social Security Board continue to be 
an advisory board? 

Bane: It continued to be an operating and advisory 
board until the Re -Organization Plan of 1946, 
when the Board was abolished! 

Leiby: I see. And then, presumably, H.E.W, set up 

- 243 - 

Leiby: another system* 

Bane: Adrisory boards of one kind or another t 
ad hoc boards. 

Leiby: Ad hoc boards, I think, are good from an 
administrator's point of view, 

Bane: Again, not only for the reasons I've al 
ready cited, but for other reasons* 

n*nr* ea p** following! 

***titiv Director, HaUon*l 

, with 

of liw S*ticm*l 


- 244 - 

Organizing the Council 

Leiby: Would you say something now about the 

beginning of your work with the Governors' 

Bane: At the last interview I mentioned the fact 

that I got a telephone oall from Henry Toll, 

who was Director of the Council of State 
Governments, to meet him in Cleveland* 
The upshot of that, after talking with the 
governors and the board, was that I took 
the position of Director of the Council of 
State Governments with the understanding, 
which Toll had engineered, and with the 
implied agreement of the governors who had 
called me, that the Governors' Conference 
would consolidate itself with the 
Council of State Governments. That is, it 
would come into the Council of State Govern 

- 245 - 

Leiby: Could you say something about the back 
grounds of these two institutions? 

Bane: Yes, The Council of State Governments 
had been up until two years before I 


went with it , the American 
Legislators' Association, it had been 
getting foundation grants and a little 
money, very very little, from states 
themselves. It was concerned primarily 
with, uniform legislation. 

Leiby: Standardized. 

Bane: Standardized legislation in certain major 
areas as among the several states. 

Leiby: Their main interest was divorce or family? 

Bane: Divorce, commercial codes, juvenile proba 
tion, non-support, returning what has been 
ailed so many times runaway fathers, and 
things of that kind. That had been their 
major interest. 

Leiby: Who was their director? 

Bane: Henry Toll from Denver, Colorado. 

Leiby: He was a lawyer, I believe. 

Bane: He was a lawyer and he had been a State 

- 246 - 

Bane: Senator in Colorado, a very able man, 

But he had to return to his own law prac 
tice. His senior partners had died, so 
he resigned, And they were looking for an 
other director. And that's how I happened 
to go with the Council of State Governments. 

To repeat, my first interest was to 
consolidate the Governors' Conference, which 
just had a part-time secretary, with the 
Council, which had by now a very competent 
albeit small staff. The Governors' 
Conference came into a cooperative arrange 
ment with the Council of State Governments 
in December, 1938 or January, 1939. 

Leiby: What was the Governors' Conference? 

Bane: The Governors' Conference was started in 
1908 at the instigation of Theodore 
Roosevelt, then President, who had been 
before, as you know, Governor of the State 
of New York. Roosevelt was greatly in 
terested in conservation. He called all 
the governors together to talk about con 
servation. The governors had never before 

- 247 - 

Bane: worked together In one group* 

They met at the White House. They 
liked meeting together. So then and 
there they decided to develop a continuing 
organization known as the Governors' 
Conference. It went along for years 
as a conference that met once a year with 
a part-time secretary that developed a 
program dealing with some matter of major 
interest to all of the states. It was 
just a casual sort of an organization. 

In 1938 and *39 the Governors* Con 
ference was beginning to think it should 
be much, more than just a conference; that 
it should be an operating organization; 
that it should have a research staff; that 
it should have an action staff that would 
render various services to the states in 
such areas as budgeting and account 
ing, personnel and planning and what not. 

Leiby: Welfare service. 

Bane: Welfare. As a matter of fact the idea grew 
very largely out of welfare because of 

- 248 - 

Bane: experiences in the depression. 

Leiby: It reflects the rising importance of state 

Bane: Exactly. -And the rising importance of fed 
eral-state activities the development of, 
shall I say, cooperative federalism* 

Toll had initially suggested and I pro 
moted with everything that I could the con 
solidation of these two agencies. The Gov 
ernors 1 Conference voted for it. And im 
mediately because of their strength and their 
financial situation, their status and prestige, 
the Council of State Governments sky 

Leiby: Yes. Instead of having a group of state 
legislators who are notoriously dubious 
characters ... 

Bane: Well, I'd take some exception to that. 

Leiby: But a governor is a potential presidential 

Bane: And then, speaking administratively, when we 

- 249 - 

Bane: were working through legislators you had to 
work through a commission or a board or a 
committee. As soon as the governors came 
with us and were well coordinated within 
the structure of the Council, our financial 
troubles began to ease* We could deal in 
each state with one personI'm talking 
about administrative procedures and fi 
nance. We had only to deal with the gov. 
ernors. We were strenuously advocating 
and promoting the executive budget* The 
governor made up the executive budget. If 
you wanted a state to contribute to the 
Council of State Governments, you had to 
sell only one man; not go before a committee 
in the house and the senate and so on as 
previously. And I learned, to my great 
delight, that it was almost as dif 
ficult to get an item out of the gov 
ernor's budget as it was to get it in in 
itially. Once the governor put your ap- 

- 250 - 

Bane: propriation Into his budget, you were set. 

Leiby: Would you say something about the finance 
of the new organization? 

Bane: When I went with the Council they had a 
budget of approximately $100,000, of which 
about $87 t 000 was furnished by the Spelman 
Fund. About $12, 000-15 t 000 came from all 
the states combined* 

Leiby: In what way was this assessed? 

Bane: It wasn't assessed. You went before the state leg* 
islature; you talked to the House Appropria 
tions Committee; then you went over and you 
talked to the Senate Appropriations Committee. 
And you hoped and prayed for the best. 

Leiby: You pleaded. 

Bane: You pleaded with hat in hand and sometimes 
heart in mouth, as you thought about the 
staff back home and the upcoming pay day. 
You got very little money for an excruciating 
expenditure of time and energy* 

Leiby: Who did contribute? 

Bane: In those days just five or six 

states were actually contributing any- 

- 251 - 

Bane: thing that amounted to much, I mean, a 
few thousand dollars. There were a few 
others that would contribute around two 
hundred fifty dollars. The state that con 
tributed the most in 1938 was &ew York State. 
And as I recall its appropriation was 15*000. 
Virginia had about $1,500 in; South Carolina, 
interestingly enoughbecause of a gentleman 
by the name of Edgar Brown, who was president 
pro tern of the South Carolina Senate and 
chairman of the Finance Committee 

In other words, in those days, 
you got money from a state if you had an in 
fluential legislator who would really see 
that you got it, as Brown did in South Carolina 
or a person like Morrisett in Virginia. But once 
the governors came into the picture it was 
all different. 

Leiby: Whose idea was it to bring the governors in? 

Bane: Henry Toll's, initially. I inherited it. 
So the governors came in. This would 


interest you, we had an excellent executive 

- 252 - 

Bane: committee in the latter part of 1939 and 
early 1940. At one executive committee 
meeting I suggested that the states either 
wanted a Council of State Governments or 
they didn't. They either wanted a compe 
tent research and service agency, or they 
didn't. The fact that the states should 
be running around to the foundations getting 
little dabs of money for this, that, and 
the other seemed to me to border on the 

It was then and there proposed that 
we write to the Spelman Fund and tell them 
how much we had appreciated their help over 
the years, what a grand demonstration job 
they had done, but tell them as of next July 
first we would ask for no more money, and 
send a copy of the letter to each of the 
governors. It was suggested that we also 
write the governors that if they wanted an 
agency they should support it and support 
it adequately and suggest a scale of ap 
propriations on the part of the states. 

- 253 - 

Bane: I remember we used Pennsylvania as the 
"Keystone State" in working out a formula 
solely on the basis of population. Then we 
told them that the budget which we then had 
was around $100,000, which wasn't enough to 
do what they wanted to do. So we asked the 
states to appropriate approximately $200,000, 
on the theory expressed by one of the gov 
ernors "That you might as well be hung for a 
hog as a shoat." (Laughter) To our great 
amazement and delight the first year after 
that, in 1940, the states appropriated 
$170,000 to the Council. And it's been 
going up and up and up ever since. The 
Council now has an appropriation from the 
states of about $650,000 or $700,000). 

Leiby: There's a suggested assessment, I gather, on 
the basis of population. 

Bane: Pure suggestion solely on the basis of popu 
lation. The Council has no authority to assess 
anyone. But, of course, in applying this 


suggestion you start with the states where you 
have the best opportunity the big states, where 

- 254 - 

Bane: the money is. And you work from there. 
"Tom did this, maybe you might consider doing 
that." I remember the years when Dewey was 
Governor of New York, we were expanding very 
rapidly. Occasionally I would go to New York 
to see him about the budget. New York's the 
biggest state, largest appropriation, bell 
wether, so to speak, from the money point of 
view. I'd go in to see the Governor and I 
would say, "Governor, you know these various 
additional assignments that the Governors' 
Conference has given to the Council the study 
of mental health, the study of state and local 
cooperation, the study of post-war reconstruc 
tion and redevelopment" I would get just 
about that far. He would say, "Frank, how 
much money do you want?" I would say, "Governor, 
to finance these various and sundry activities..." 
"I asked you how much money you wanted," said 
he. I would say, "$50,000." "Go down the 
hall and John Burton will put it 
in the budget. Good evening, come back and 


see me again sometime." 

- 255 - 

Leiby: Governor Dewey backed this. 

Bane: Oh, enthusiastically. And then, of course, 
Governor Martin of Pennsylvania would be in 
terested in what Governor Dewey had done. 
Governor Driscoll would wonder what would 
be New Jersey's proper share proportionally. 
And the snowball would roll along nicely, 

Leiby: Could you say something about your staff and 
its development? 

Bane: We had and they still have, incidentally, an 
excellent staff. The people that we had on 
our staff in the Council of State Governments 
were people like Hugh Gallagher, Leo Seybold, 
Brevard Crinfield, Elton McQuery, Herbert 
Wiltze, Sidney Specter, Prank Smothers, Roy 
Blakey, Morton Grodzins, William Fredrick, 
John Seely, etc, 

Leiby: How were they organized? 

Bane: We had three regional or area offices. The 
main office was in Chicago. When I started 
out, we had a branch office in New York and 
one in San Francisco. It's still here on 
Sutter Street. It handles the Western part 
of the country. 



H, wllk M ?r*i<sa* of 



- 256 - 

Mobilizing State Governments Per War 

Bane: The Council and the Governors' 

Conference, like everybody else, got mixed 
up in the most acute, urgent, demanding 
emergency that we'd ever had, namely, the 
coming of the Second World War. Whereupon 
we opened up an additional branch office in 
Washington, which is there now. 

The Council participated in the organization 
and administration of practically all of 
the war agencies that relied upon state 
participation and state cooperation to 
be effective. 

The first one was a commission which 
the President appointed in the late summer 
of 1940 called the Emergency Commission for 
Defense, the so-called Knudsen-Stettinius- 
Hillman-Budd-Henderson Commission. It was de 
signed to stimulate preparadness, to locate 
and start to build powder factories, to locate 
and start to build cantonments, to or- 

- 257 - 

Bane: ganize scrap drives and things of that kind, 
to help arrange for the administration of 
the Selective Service System which was 
administered by the states* The states 
were indispensable units of our country 
when it came to getting something done on 
the local level and getting it done quickly. 
The set-up was the President, then the gov 
ernor, then an administrative officer in 
every county and city under the governor. 
You even had district administrations, ward 
and district leaders under your city mayors 
and your county supervisors. So, you had 
a government from the President all the way 
down to the smallest district in the country, 
And you could move the whole governmental 
machinery by, figuratively speaking, just 
pressing a button which we did. Most 
of the work of the Council of State Gov 
ernments from 1940 to 1945 had to do with 
the war effort and how you could use that 

The Council and the governors in an 

- 258 - 

Bane: emergency situation is best illustrated, I 
think, by how we set up rationing in this 
country immediately after Pearl Harbor. 
The week after December 7th, was, of course, 
another Sunday, December 14th. A meeting 
was called secret, restricted. We 
hadn't gotten as far, in those days, as 
to have low secret and top secret. But a 
secret meeting was called down at the then 
Office of Price Control. About seven or 
eight of us from various agencies were there. 
We shut the door. We had the Capitol Police 
at the door to see that no one came in ex 
cept the experts with their charts and 

They came in and set them up and in 
formed us that what we had thought was a 
have nation, the United States, was decidedly 
a have not nation. That in one area, rubber, 
we didn't have enough rubber to take care of 
even the army's needs for a year and a half. 
We were completely cut off from all of our 

- 259 - 

Bane: rubber supply Malaya, Burma, the Par 
East. And we had no such thing in this 
country as synthetic rubber. They went 
on to say that there would be other com 
modities in short supply very quickly, 
especially sugar. 

Leiby: Who were these experts? 

Bane: One of the experts, who has been prominent 
in recent years, who was head of the Price 
Division in the Office of Price Administra 
tion, was John Kenneth Galbraith. He's now 
at Harvard and he wrote the book The Affluent 
Society and was, later, Ambassador to India. 

Another one of them was Ginsburg, who 
is now a lawyer in Washington. 

A third was Leon Henderson who was in 
charge of price administration and control. 

Leiby: They must have accumulated these facts ... 

Bane: They had been accumulating these facts 

through the Emergency Commission and through 

- 260 - 

Bane: the Office of Production Management. They 
knew what the general situation was, with 
respect to resources. It was an outgrowth 
of the National Resources Planning 
Board* They knew how much rubber 
we had. But they weren't particularly 
bothered about the situation before Pearl 
Harbor because there had been no trouble 
about supplies or transportation until our 
supply-line was cut off completely im 
mediately after Pearl Harbor. Then we 
were in trouble. We had no such thing as 
stockpiles, in those days. We had no stock 
pile in rubber, except a little one. 
It oould do for a year or so maybe! 

So we had to set up a rationing admin 
istration. The question was how to set it 
up. It was agreed finally, after much argument 
between the nationalists and the federalists, 
shall I say. One group wanted to set up a 
straight national system. And the other 
said, "We have a system of government, let's 


use it." I* was decided to use the federal 

- 261 - 

Bane: system* 

Leiby: Do you remember who took these various 

Bane: The usual state group, of which I was kind 
of the spokesman, took the federalists' 
part* And we had a gentleman on the 
legal staff of the Office of Price Admin 
istration , Tom Emerson , now at Tale , who 
was the primary advocate of the other side* 
The next day we simply got on the telephone 
and called all the governors and told them 
that this was what we were going to do* 
And they said, "How are you going to handle 
it?" Then we came to the point. The 
procedure was interesting. 

We set up two long tables down the 
middle of the floor with a flock of tele 
phones on them. We gave each girl a 
number of governors, starting alphabetically 
A-B-C-and D-- so and so* And we told 
the girls to make these calls* "Whenever 
you get a governor on the line, raise your 

- 262 - 

Bane: hand." So you walked right around the table 
and talked to them. (Laughter) The point 
of the matter was we wanted to ask them a 
favor, The favor when sugar became short 
was that we wanted to borrow their en 
tire public school system to register every 
body in the United States, man, woman, and 
child for ration books. So they could get 
their proportional part of things like sugar, 
which was a matter of distribution. Of 
course, tires, rubber, was a matter of se 
lection. So they agreed to lend us their 
systems the entire school systems lock, 
stock and barrel; from their Commissioners 
of Education to their county or city super 
intendents, to the principals of their 
schools, to the rooms in their schools. The 
schools were all manned by experts, as far 
as we were concerned, namely teachers. 
They could read and write and that was all 
we wanted them to do in registering these 
people. We registered, due to that organiza 
tion, every man, woman and child in the United 

- 263 - 

Bane: States in three afternoons, Wednesday, Thursday 
and Friday. We simply said on the radio 
every day for three days, "Next Wednesday, 
Thursday and Friday we're going to register 
people for their rationing books to get cer 
tain commodities, sugar for example If 
your name begins with an A and ends in an H 
you register on Wednesday afternoon at your 
nearest schoolhouse." In those days we 
had 269,000 sohoolhouses in the country- 
one in reasonable distance of every individual. 
"If your name begins with an H and runs through 
to P or Q, you register on Thursday afternoon." 
We repeated it and repeated it. I borrowed 
from Mr. Roosevelt, "Now remember mj dear 
friends, no registration, no ration book, no 
sugar. It f s your problem. We're just try 
ing to take care of you. But we can't if 
you don't register." (Laughter) We did 
the whole thing in three afternoons* An 
acute situation which you could handle through 
the existing machinery of government that 
reached every individual in the United States. 

- 264 - 

Leity: There was some problem about manpower, too, I sup 

Bane: Yes. There had been a great controversy when we 
set up the Social Security System, as I mentioned 
before, between the people who thought the employ 
ment offices and unemployment compensation should 
Tie national and other people who thought it should 
be a national policy and a national program but 
state administered. The state plan was adopted 
there also. So the employment offices were state 
offices, supervised by the federal government, 
but administered by the states. 

When the President wished to set up the 
War Manpower Commission he called the Executive 
Committee of the Governors' Conference and asked 
them to loan to him, the national government, all 
the employment offices for the duration of the 
emergency. He was going to set up the War Man- 
Power Commission, in order to shift people 
rapidly all over the country when and where 
needed. The governors, of course, agree . 

But the governors had been around, 
of them were experienced. They knew that times 

- 265 - 

Bane: do change and that wars do end. So they were eare- 
ful to put this agreement with the President into 
writing. The President requested, in writing, the 
loan of the employment offices for the duration-- 
with the understanding that they would be returned 
at the expiration of the emergency to the states to 
be state administered. The governors acknowledged 
the letter and quoted from the President's letter so 
there could be no misunderstanding whatsoever. In 
the due course of human events President Roosevelt 
died, the war was over, a reasonable time had 
elapsed, the acute emergency had been declared no 
longer to exist, so the Executive Committee of the 
Governors' Conference went to see then -President 
Truman with the letter , and requested the return 
of the employment offices to the states. 

The President, of course, didn't know what 
the committee wanted to see him about. They had just 
wired, asking to come in and see him. He 
hadn't been President long enough to know the in 
tricacies of what was involved in this. So when 
the governors talked with him he said, "Why sure, 
I wish there were some more things the states would 

- 266 - 

Bane: take over and relieve the federal government 
of all of this pressure," The Governors' 
Committee went out with that understanding* 
But as we walked out , one of the governors 
said to another , "What does that mean?" 
The other governor said , "It doesn't mean 
anything* The President doesn't know any 
thing about this* He wasn't "briefed on 
it. Wait until Paul Moffutt and the rest 
of the people have a chance to get to the 
President and it will be different." 
(Laughter) It was. 

We introduced a bill in Congress, which 
was passed easily, to return the employ 
ment offices to the states. The President 
vetoed it* Congress adjourned. The next 
year when Congress reconvened we again in 
troduced what might be called a bill to 
return the employment offices to the states. 
It was not a bill. It was an amendment to 
the Appropriations Act a rider which 
passed. Of course , the President won't 

- 267 - 

Bane: veto an appropriation act. So the employ 
ment offices were returned to the states* 

Leiby: V?hat did MeNutt tell the President that 
made him change his mind? 

Bane: McNutt told the President: (l) The employ 
ment service should never have been a federal- 
state system in the first place ; (2) They 
had had now four or five years of administer 
ing it as a national system. It was a 
cracker jack system, handling the problem 
admirably. We were going to need a good 
system in the reconstruction and reconversion 
period just as much as we did during the war 
years. It would be the height of folly to 
upset the existing mechanism. And further 
more I'm reasonably certain you see I'm 
just imagining; I'm thinking what I would 
have told the President had I been in McNutt 's 
position Mr. McNutt probably told him that 
many of the states really weren't competent 
to do this job and we would get a hodge 

- 268 - 

Bane: podge and a patchwork 'business , and that 
he must not under any circumstances go 
through with this agreement. It would 
"be really just a plain calamity. I'm 
certain the President was convinced that 
he was right. And that's why he vetoed 
the bill. 

Leiby: What sort of response did you make to this? 

Bane: We didn't make any response to the veto 
because it was a pocket veto. Congress 
had adjourned. 

Leiby: He dodged the issue. 

Bane: I wouldn't put it that way. There was no 
point in discussing it because everybody's 
mind was made up on all sides. So what we 
did was to draft a proposed amendment a 
rider to the Appropriations Bill. We 
got some people in the House, on Ways and 
Means and the Appropriations Committees 
and on the Senate side, some former gov- 

- 269 - 

Bane: ernors now Senators to introduce this 
amendment. It passed with very little 
trouble. Some of the people over at the 
White House did ask me in a rather pointed 
fashion what I as a political scientist 
thought of an irrelevant rider being at 
tached to an Appropriations Bill. And I 
agreed that I thought it was bad practice, 
very bad. (Laughter) 

Leiby: I should imagine that as a former director 
of the Social Security Administration you 
would have had considerable sympathy with 
the notion that state employment offices 
might very well have stayed with the 
federal government. 

Bane: Perhaps. I think I said to one of your 
classes that whereas I urged and argued 
very strenuously for the federal-state 
system of unemployment compensation in 1935, 
if I were rewriting the act today, I would 
be in favor of a national system. Times 
have changed. Industry is more and more 
dispersed. Labor is much more mobile and be. 

- 270 - 

Bane: coming more and more so every year* I think 
I'd go in that direction in 1965. 

Leiby: During the war years, then, the Council of 

State Governments and the Governors' Conference 
were instrumental in mobilizing the resources 
of state and local governments to serve the 
national interest in fields critical to the 
war emergency. This was rather an ideal situa 
tion because the governors were not reluctant 
to help; they were eager to help. 

Bane: Yes, eager! Everybody, during the war, from 

governor on down was asking everyone else just 
one question, "What can I do?" 

Official Positions During the War 

Leiby: You held some official positions during the 

war, as I remember. 
Bane: Yes. I was Director, for a while, of the 

Rationing Administration. I set it up* I 

was also... 

Leiby: You were on leave from the Council. 
Bane: On all of these war assignments I was on leave. 

- 271 - 

Leiby: I see* You set up the Rationing Administration. 

Bane: Yes. And I organized the initial Civil 

Defense Administration; also the Home TTse 
Division of the National Housing Administra 
tion. All of those were three or six month 
jobs. Then I'd go back to Chicago. But 
by the time I got comfortably settled, maybe 
a month or so , I'd get another call , "How 
about coming down and taking on this short 
assignment?" The short assignments, in 
those days, were supposed to be two or 
three weeks. They had a way of growing 
into three to six months. The way to get 
yourself released from a situation of that 
kind was to put somebody in your office 
that you knew could take over the Job and 
gradually shift it to him. Then confront 
the administrator with a fait accompli. 

Leiby: During the war , then , your agency really 
got established. Its prestige had sky'* 
rocketed before the war , but during the 

- 272 - 

Leiby: war even more. 

Bane: Yes. We got established and we got fi 
nanced. It had the support of the 
states. And it had prestige and status 
in the country , especially in Con 

Post War Activities of the Council 
Mental Health Study 

Leiby: What sort of activities did you turn to 

after the war? Was there any discussion 
about this? 

Bane: Yes. We discussed various projects at 
every annual board meeting outlined a 
program for the upcoming year. 

Leiby: Did any governors in particular stand out 

in your mind? 
Bane: For example, soon after the war we embarked 

- 273 - 

Bane: n a major study of mental health and mental 

Leiby: I know that study well. 

Bane: And the moving spirit behind that was the 

Governor of Kansas. Kansas, as you remember, 
jumped way out in the lead in the mental 
health field, largely at the instigation of 
the Menninger Clinic. 

We spent a great deal of time and a 
great deal of effort , with marked suc 
cess in improving the situation in 
mental health. We were ideally situated 
the Council of State Governments -to do some 
thing in mental health. We were thought of 
as practical, able, knowledgeable politicians 
who knew how to get along and work with gov 
ernors and legislators not as social workers, 
not as physicians, not as psychiatrists, not 
as psychologists. This was a practical program, 
So we could sell it. We had an excellent 
mental health committee composed of the 
best psychiatrists and technicians in 

- 274 - 

Bane: the field to help us. They would help us , 
shall I say , manufacture a package. Our 
job was to take that package and sell it; 
We sold it to a great many states* 

Leiby: Who suggested the outline of the investiga 
tion and discussion , do you remember? 

Bane: I think it probably grew out of discus 
sions in our staff and the experience of 
some of our staff. Of course , I car 
ried over into the Council of State Gov 
ernments my experience of twenty odd 
years in welfare and welfare administra 
tion. So the Council of State Govern 
ments became for a while , not inten 
tionally , but because I couldn't for 
get my other jobs , an action group 
for the American Public Welfare Associ 

Leiby: Yes, that's just what I was going to say. 
Bane: We were in the same building. And occasionally, 

- 275 - 

Bane: after Loula Dunn "became Welfare Director, 
in fact when Pred Hoeler was Director of 
the American Public Welfare Association, I 
developed a kind of a habit. Their office was 

on the fourth floor and mine was on the 
second* I would get letters asking 

me what I thought of certain wel 
fare programs . I would write on 
top of the letter , "Fred" or , later , 
"Loula The attached please tell 
me what I think." And they would 
tell me what they thought we should do, 

Leiby: "?he closest kind of cooperation. 

Bane: Close, close relationship. 

Leiby: The American Public Welfare Association spoke 
for welfare administrators primarily. That 
was their main interest. And , of 
course , they're mostly interested 
in public assistance. 

Bane: Yes, they were thought of naturally, 
as a special interest group. 

Leiby: Primarily interested in public assistance rather 
than mental health. 

Bane: Yes We were thought of as an agency 

- 276 - 

Bane: primarily interested in government; knowledge 
able in the realms of administrative and leg 
islative procedures; and could give both the 
legislators and the governors, hopefully, an 
objective opinion and appraisal of a situation. 
We had worked with them on budgets , 
setting up personnel and purchasing agencies, 
things of that kind* We were administrative 

Leiby: The axe you ground was administration, which 
presumably serves everybody and balances a 
variety of interests. 

Bane : Yes . 

Other Activities: Study of State 

Leiby: What were some other investigations that you 

remember particularly? 
Bane: We did an extensive one on higher education. 

W had an excellent advisory committee, again, 

as we had had on mental health. 
Leiby: This was as a state service. 

- 277 - 

Bane: Yes. 

We did a major study on state purchas- 
ing.That was an interesting one. We urged 
every state to set up a state purchasing de 
partment, a centralized purchasing agency. 
And we said to the state legislatures , blatantly 
and boldly, "If you set up these agencies and 
work with us in operating them in a 
cooperative group , we will guarantee to 
save you five times, ten times, twenty 
times as much money every year as you 
have appropriated to us." It was the simplest 
thing in the world. 

First, we got all of the states except 

one or two to set up purchasing agencies -- 

many of them already had them. 

Then we established relationships among the 

purchasing agents themselves, by getting them 
all together. We set up a schedule 
dealing with the usual commodities 
that are purchased by states light bulbs, 
automobiles, furniturewe started with a 
hundred items in these various categories. 
We urged each state to send us a report on 

- 278 - 

Bane: how much they paid for each of these com. 
modities. And we circulated these reports 
to all of the other purchasing agents. A 
purchasing agent would look at this and 
find out that in some instances he was 
paying much more than the fellow next door 
to him. These commodities were being sold, 
many times, for all that the market would 
bear. So pretty soon we got a standardized 
low over most of the country. We saved the 
states far more than they contributed to 
the Council of State Governments on that 
one single, simple operation. 

Leiby: Very useful. 

This hadn't been done before, partly, 
I suppose because people didn't know about 
it. But partly it was because it was in 
volved in politics. Isn't that it? 

Bane: Yes. 

Leiby: And what you did was to set up something 
that was, in a way, both. 

Bane: Yes. It was a research organization, an ad 
ministrative organization, and a promotional 

- 279 - 

Bane: organization for such things as establishing 
an executive budget, establishing centralized 
purchasing, establishing a personnel office 
in the office of the governor and directly 
responsible to the governor , etc. , 

Summary: Public Welfare and Public 

Leiby: Looking over the pattern a generation ago 
in which you've been very much active in 
both administration and public welfare, what 
seem to you to be the most important trends 
and developments in the field? And I'm 
particularly interested in public welfare 
administration . 

Bane: In the welfare field, perhaps more than any 

other area of government, the situation has 
changed in fifty years. Prior to the First 
World War, welfare was a minor interest of 

- 280 - 

Bane: government. It was the step-child of state 
and local governments. True, local govern 
ment had its overseers of the poor and its 
almshouse to take care of people who were 
judged to be already beyond redemption. 
Bat no one paid much attention to it. 
la this period of fifty years, welfare aa a 
function of government, as a governmental 
service, has literally passed from 
the horse and buggy days that Roosevelt 
used to refer to, to the rocket days that we 
have now. Welfare is easily one of the four 
major interests of all levels of government, 

Leiby: Education* 

Bane: Education , highways , welfare , and 

health that's where the money goes in 
state governments , in the national govern 
ment aside from defense- -and in local governments* 

Welfare has hanged insofar as 
operation and administration is concerned to 
an assignment and a job that requires competent, 
technical, trained, and able personnel rather 

- 281 - 

Bane: than the old overseer of the poor or the 

old delightful lady bountiful. Now it's a 
technical administrative job that requires 
well trained people. 

The operation has not only changed. The 
extent of interest has not only changed. 
Over and above the importance of activi 
ties in particular fields, is the 
change in philosophy in this country in- 
sofar as welfare is concerned. Prior to the 
First World War, welfare was regarded, to re. 
peat, as a minor task for local government 
largely thought of as straight out charity 
to be used only in case of dire need. That 
philosophy is gone and I think gone forever. 

The American people have adopted a 
philosophy with respect to welfare which 
can be stated very succinctly and that is 
that here in the United States today all 
government federal, state, and local has 
a direct, immediate, and continuing respon 
sibility for the welfare of every individual 

- 282 - 


- 283 - 

Abbott, Edith, 99,100,163 

Abbott, Grace, 111, 116,119,120 

Agricultural Adjustment Act, 201-202 

Alabama Child Welfare Program, 91-92 

Altmeyer, Arthur, 183,193,204,207,216 

American Association of Public Welfare Officials, 172 

American Bar Association, 226 

American Legislators' Association, 135-136 

American Municipal League, 135 

American Political Science Association, 103,104,110,146 

American Prison Association, 104 

American Public Welfare Association, 111,115-122,123,125, 
170-171 , 172-173 , 176 , 181 , 186 , 212 , 227 , 274-275 

American Red Cross, 151,153,160-161 

American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 122 

Architects' Building, Washington, D.C., 121 

Aronson, Henry, 203 

Asay, Ivan, 149 

Ashburn, , 78 

Associated Charities: Richmond, Virginia, 13,18,35; 
Knorville, Tennessee, 69; Philadelphia, Pen 
nsylvania, 36 

Banning, , 196 

Barkley, Senator Alben W., 209-210 
Bates, Sanford, 77,93,199 
Beeler, Roy, 65-66 
Beers, Clifford, 54,87 

- 284 - 

Bennett, James, 198-199 
Betters, Paul, 135 

Bignall, Miss , 69 

Blaisdell, Thomas, 197-198 
Blakey, Hoy, 255 

Bosh, Mrs. , 93 

Bricker, Governor John, 217 

Brookings Institute, 73,107,109 

Brown, Edgar, 251 

Brownlow, Louis, 26,56-58,59,60,61,62,64,66,76,79,113-115, 

Brownlow, Mrs* Louis, 26 
Burns, Allan, 152 
Burton, John, 254 

Byrd, Governor Harry, 17,41,43-44,45-50,71,74,78 
Byrd, Richard Evelyn, 44 

Cannon, James Bishop, 43 

Capitol Police, 258 

Car s tens, C.C., 88 

Catholic Charities, 152, 192 

Chamber of Commerce: Knorville, 60-61; Virginia, 78 

Chandler, Governor A.B. , 209 

Children's Bureau, 36,96,103,111,121,229 

Child Welfare Association, 96 

Child Welfare League of America, 88,89 

City Housing Corporation, Hew York, 114 

City manager form of government, 78-79 

Civil Defense Administration, 271 

Civil Works Administration, 160,164-165,168 

- 285 - 

Clague, Ewan, 197-198 

Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Los Angeles, 147 

Commission on Study of Executive Management of the 

Federal Government, 239-240 

Committee on Economic Security, 149,176-177,179 
Community Chest, 18,134,152 
Conant, Richard, 111,116 

Consulting in Public Administration, 104-110 
Cotton, Dr. Henry, 39,42,55,87 
Council of State Governments, 136,226,227,244-257,258-263, 

Crinfield, Brevard, 255 
Croxton, Frederick, 122,125,126,153 

Davey, Governor Martin, 215,216 
Davis, Governor Westmoreland, 24 
Dawes, Charles Gates, 125 
De Jarnette, Dr. Joseph, 39 
Devine, Professor Edward T., 2,7 
Dewey, Governor Thomas A., 254-255 
Dinwiddie, Emily, 36 
Drewry, Dr. W.F. , 10 
Driscoll, Governor Alfred, 255 
Dunn, Loula, 91-92,206,275 
Du Pont, E.I. and Company, 85 

Edgerton, , 65 

Eliot, Charles, 195 

Eliot, Thomas, 195,196 

Ellis, John, 3, 76-77,93,104,111,116,120,145-146 

Emergency Commission for Defense, 256-259 

Emerson, Thomas, 261 

- 286 - 

Family Service Agency, 13,69,128,153 

Family Welfare Agency, 13,96,134,151-152 

Federal Emergency Relief Administration, 94-95,99,160, 


Federal Highway Act of 1916, 85 
Federal Social Security Board, 176,182-185,187-189,226, 

Fernald, Dr. . 55 
Folks, Homer, 88,89 
Foundations: Carnegie Corporation, 126-127,128; Laura 

Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund (changed to Spelman 

Fund), 116,118,128,135,176-177; Russell Sage, 55 
Fredrick, William, 255 
Freeman, Douglas Southall, 102 
Freeman, Dr, , 102 

Galbraith, John Kenneth, 259 

Gallagher, Hugh, 255 

Garner, John Nance, 123,132 

General Accounting Office, 213 

Ginsburg, , 259 

Glass, Senator Carter: Controversy with Social Security 
Board, 234-239 

Governors 1 Conference, 142,228,229,254,256,270: consolida 
tion with Council of State Governments, 244,246-249? 
state employment offices lent to federal government for 
duration of war, 264-266; controversy with President 
Truman over return of employment offices to states 
after war, 266-269 

Grants-in-aid , 180 , 209-210 

Griff enhagen and Associates, 109 

Grodzins, Morton, 255 

- 287 - 

Hagood, Dr. . 102 

Hall, Dr. Albert, 107,109 

Hamilton, Walton, 196-198,200 

Hankins, May, 36,134 

Harris, Professor Joseph, 233 

Hart, Hastings, 55,86,89 

Hart, Judge , 33,34-35 

Hatcher, Dr. Samuel C., 6,10 

Hazen, Professor Charles, 3 

Heiser, Miss , 202 

Henderson, Leon, 259 

Herring, Governor Clyde, 108 

Hibbs, Dr. , 13,14 

Hindenburg, Paul Ton, 177 

Hiring Social Workers, 97-103 

Hitler, Adolph, 177 

Hoeler, Fred, 113,275 

Hoey, James, 191 

Hoey, Jane, 191-193,204,205,207,221,222,224 

Home Service, 153 

Home Use Division of the National Housing Administration, 271 

Hoover Committee on Emergency Employment, 100,117-118,120, 

Hoover, President Herbert, 117 

Hopkins, Harry, 91,94-95,99,150,163-164,166,169-170,173 

Horner, Governor , 212-214 

House, Professor Floyd, 73 

House Appropriations Committee, 250,268 

House Ways and Means Committee, 268 

Hunter, Howard, 128,129.134.149,150,153 

Hut chins, Robert Maynard, 163 

Hospitals: Central State, Virginia, 10; Foxboro, Mas 
sachusetts, 88; Knoxville General, 61-62; Trenton 
State, 87; Western State, Virginia, 48 

- 288 - 

Ickes, Harold, 166,168,169 

Illinois: reorganization of welfare department, 89-91; 

difficulties with social security law, 211-214 
Indiana Dunes, 181-182 

International City Managers Association, 135 
Iowa: study of state government, 90 

James, Arthur, 12, 13 

Johnson, Alex, 89 

John s tone, Dr , 89 

Joslin, , 117 

Journals: Mental Hygiene, 87; Survey Magazine. 87; 
Public Welfare News. 173-174 

Kelly Field, Texas, 4,5 

Kirchway, Dean George, 2,7,55,86 

Kline, Dr, George, 55 

Knight, Howard, 112,113,115 

Knoxville, Tennessee: director of public welfare, 56-70, 

Knudsen, William S., 256 

la Du, Mrs. , 116 

Langley Field, Virginia, 4,5 

La timer, Murray, 194 

League of Women Voters, 41 

Lee, Porter, 100 

Leet, Glen, 149 

Leland, Simeon E. , 181-182 

Lewis, Burdette, 128,129,133,141,153 

Lilienthal, David, 188 

Livingston, Louis, 148 

Lonsdale, Robert, 128,149-150,153 

Lowden, Governor Prank, 90 

- 289 - 

Maine: study of state government, 106-107 

Mapp, , 43 

Martin, Governor Edward, 255 

Mast in, Dr. J.P., 6-7,8,14-15 

Mclntyre, Marvin, 182,184,227 

McMillen, Wayne, 157 

McNutt, Paul, 240-243,266-269 

McQuery, Elton, 255 

Mencken, H.L., 43 

Mental Health Study, 272-274 

Meriam, Lewis, 107-108 

Merit system, 207-210; amendment to Social Security Act 

of 1937, 209-210 

Merriam, Charles, 163,186,239-240 
Miles, Vi ncen t, 183,216 
Mitchel Administration, New York, 133 
Moffett, Guy, 186 
Morgan, Arthur, 188 
Morgan, Harcourt, 188 

Morrisett, , 251 

Mulliner, Maurine, 189 
Munro, Professor John A., 73 

National Committee for Mental Hygiene, 87 

National Conference of Charities and Corrections, 93,103,112 

National Conference of Social Work, 93-96,104,109-110,111, 

112-113,115,192; Public Welfare Officials Section (Division 

Nine), 94,111,112,113,115,118 
National Institute of Public Administration, 45-49,50-53,73, 


National Mental Health Committee, 54 
National Recovery Act, 201 

- 290 - 

National Resources Board, 260 

National Youth Administration, 131 

New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies, 136 

New Jersey State Board of Welfare, 14 

New York State Charities Aid Association, 88,89 

Office of Price Administration, 259,261 

Office of Price Control, 258 

Office of Production Management, 260 

O'Grady, Father, 152,154,159-160 

Ohio: Labor Department, 153; and difficulties with 

social security law, 214-218 
Oklahoma: and difficulties with social security law, 218 

Payne, Judge , 151 

Pearl Harbor, 258,260 

Perkins, Prances, 150,183,187,195 

Persons, Prank, 128,129,133,149,150 

Petit, Walter, 100 

Policy and Administration: interconnection, 228-231, 


Pollard, Governor John, 120 
Potter, Ellen, 137 

Powell, , 107 

President's Emergency Fund, 173 

Prisons, Bureau of, 198-199 

Public Administration Clearinghouse, 135 

Public Administration in the 1920s, 75-96 

Public Welfare: changes in over a 50 year period, 279-281 

Pulitzer Prize, 209 

- 291 - 

Radburn, New Jersey, 114 

Rationing: administration of, 258-263,270-271 

Reconstruction Finance Act, 123-124 

Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 123-126,129,131 

Reid, W.T., 45 

Relief: direct vs. work relief, 161-171; emergency 
relief, 122-148,170 (federal relief, 123-124; state 
programs, 125-148); Federal Emergency Relief Admin 
istration, 94-95,99,160,165,170; private vs. 
public relief controversy, 150-161 (private, 151-152, 
153,157-158; public, 152-153,154-159); Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, 123-126,129,131; Temporary 
Emergency Relief Administration, 151 

Resnick, , 200 

Richmond, Mary, 73 

Ricks, Judge J. Hoge, 25-26 

Ridley, , 130 

Robinson, Senator Joseph, 123,132 

Roosevelt, President Franklin Delano, 56,168,169-170,183, 

Roosevelt, President Theodore, 246-247 

Roseman, Alvin, 149,150 

Ruml, Beard sley, 116,119,135,177,186 

Saunders, Colonel John, 34 

Schools and Colleges: Chicago School of ^ocial Service 
Administration, 99; Chicago School of Social Work, 63, 
173; Columbia University, 2,7,73,86; Harvard Univer 
sity, 12,195,259; Johns Hopkins University, 102; 
Nansemond County, Virginia school system, 4,5,7; 
New York School of Social Work, 55,63,100,173; North 
western University, 181; Randolph-Macon College, 1,6; 

- 292 - 

Schools and Colleges continued: Richmond School of Social 
Work, 13? University of California, 147,197-198,233; 
University of Chicago, 114,121,163-164,186; University 
of Pittsburgh, 150; University of Tennessee, 188; 
University of Texas, 5; University of Virginia, 71-74; 
Washington University, 196; William and Mary College, 
12,13-14; Yale University, 261 

Seely, John, 255 

Seiderman, Henry, 108 

Senate Appropriations Committee, 234,238,250,268 

Seybold, Leo, 255 

Shepperson, Gay, 36 

Sherwood, Robert, 162 

Shotwell, Professor James, 3 

Smothers, Frank, 255 

Social Security Administration, 148,201,203,219-225,228, 


Social Security Bill, 1935: 182; amendment to Social 
Security Act, 1937, (merit system) 209-210 

Social Security Program: survey of European social security 
programs, 176,177-179; organization and personnel, 189- 
203; Audits and Accounts Agency, 196; Bureau of 
Business Management, 198-199; Bureau of Information, 
200; Bureau of Old Age Insurance, 189-190,219; 
Bureau of Public Assistance, 189-190,219,221; Bureau 
of Research and Statistics, 196-198,200; Bureau of 
Unemployment Compensation, 189-190,193,219; general 
counsel, 195,196,220 

Specter, Sidney, 255 

State Purchasing, Study of, 277-279 

- 293 - 

State Social Security: state plans, 203-211; problems 

in various states, 211-218 
State Welfare Organizations, 136-146 
Stevenson, George, 54 

Stevenson, Marietta, 36,121,134,148,173,174 
Stokes, Tom, 208-209 
Swift, Lynton, 128,152 

Tate, Jack, 196 

Teaching: Nansemond County, Virginia, 4,5; University 

of Chicago, 186; University of Virginia, 71-74 
Temporary Emergency Relief Administration, 151 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 188,201 
Thompson, Geraldine Livingston, 146 
Toll, Henry, 226,244,245-246,248,251 
Tramburg, John, 77 
Truman, President Harry S., 265-269 (controversy over 

return of employment offices to states) 
Tunstall, Mrs. , 91-93 

United Nations: Save the Children Foundation, 149; 

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 


United Press, 208 

United States Civil Service Commission, 200,223 
United States Department of Health, Education, and 

Welfare, 107,243 
United States Department of Labor: 195; Bureau of Labor 

Statistics, 197; Department of Labor Building, 187; 

Employment Office, 150 
United States Supreme Court, 201-202 

- 294 - 

Vineland Experiment, 89 

Virginia: State Board of Charities and Corrections, 6-24; 
politics in public welfare, 18-20) sheriffs and the 
fee system, 17,19*22,2?; reorganization of State Board, 
24-43; Children's Code Commission, 24-26,28-29,37; 
Child Welfare Act, 25-42; State Department of Welfare, 
13 f 17, 26, 28-29 j Byrd reorganization of Department of 
Welfare, 44-55; State Highway Department, 85 

Wagenet, Gordon, 193-194 

Walker, James Otey, 64 

War Manpower Commission, 264 

Weigel, John, 214 

Williams, Aubrey, 128,129,130-131,133-134,141,149-150,153,158 

Williams, Judge , 67 

Wiltze, Herbert, 255 

Winant, Governor John, 182,184,185,197,204,207,216,230 

Wisconsin: Department of Industrial Relations, 183 

Witte, Ed, 179 

Woods, Arthur, 117 

Works Progress Administration, 131,160,165,169,208-209,214